libvirt users - Jun 2018 - Re: [libvirt] virRandomBits - not very random

On Tue, May 29, 2018 at 10:06:25AM -0400, John Ferlan
wrote:
>
>
>On 05/29/2018 09:44 AM, Michal Privoznik wrote:
>> On 05/29/2018 03:38 PM, Martin Kletzander wrote:
>>> On Fri, May 25, 2018 at 09:37:44AM -0500, Eric Blake wrote:
>>>> On 05/25/2018 09:17 AM, Michal Privoznik wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>>> We should probably seed it with data from
/dev/urandom, and/or the new
>>>>>>> Linux getrandom() syscall (or BSD equivalent).
>>>>>
>>>>> I'm not quite sure that right after reboot there's
going to be enough
>>>>> entropy. Every service that's starting wants some
random bits. But it's
>>>>> probably better than what we have now.
>>>>
>>>> Here's where we left things last time it came up:
>>>>
>>>>
https://www.redhat.com/archives/libvir-list/2014-December/msg00573.html
>>>>
>>>> If gnutls has an interface that will give us random bits
>>>> (gnutls_key_generate() in 3.0, perhaps), we should use THAT for
all of
>>>> our random bits (and forget about a seed), except when we are
mocking
>>>> things in our testsuite, and need a deterministic PRNG from a
>>>> deterministic seed.
>>>>
>>>> If not (including if we are not linked with gnutls), then we
should
>>>> prefer the new Linux syscall but fall back to /dev/urandom for
JUST
>>>> enough bits for a seed; once we're seeded, stick with using
our existing
>>>> PRNG for all future bits (after all, we aren't trying to
generate
>>>> cryptographically secure keys using virRandomBits - and the
places where
>>>> we DO need crypto-strong randomness such as setting up TLS
migration is
>>>> where we are relying on gnutls to provide it rather than
virRandomBits).
>>>>
>>>> So at this point, it's just a matter of someone writing the
patches.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Actually, do we need to have a fallback at all?  Can't we just
drop all the
>>> gross parts of the code the conditionally compile based on GNUTLS
>>> support?  Why
>>> don't we have gnutls required?
>>
>> That's exactly what I'm suggesting in my patches [1]. gnutls is
widely
>> available (including Linux, Windows, *BSD, Mac Os X). However, before
>> doing that we need to fix virRandomBits() to actually call
gnutls_rnd().
>>
>> 1: https://www.redhat.com/archives/libvir-list/2018-May/msg02077.html
>>
>
>I have this faint recollection of one of the CI platform builds failing
>because something in the gnutls* family didn't exist there when I was
>making the changes to add the domain master secret code....  After a bit
>of digging, it seems it was a perhaps a CENTOS6 environment:
>
> https://www.redhat.com/archives/libvir-list/2016-April/msg00287.html
>
>and since IIUC that's not an issue any more....
>
Oh, cool to know.  Michal also found the patch [1] where Dan switched the gnutls
from being mandatory to making it optional and there is no explanation for that
change in the commit message:

[1] f587c27768ee13f5bed6a9262106307b7a124403
>John
>
>now if I could only figure out why my mail client seems to be dropping
>any patches with "crypto" in the subject line (I'm missing
patches 2-4
>and 10 from the series referenced above)...
Maybe you have some weird server-side filter for it?

On Wed, May 30, 2018 at 10:21:54PM +0200, Martin Kletzander
wrote:
> On Tue, May 29, 2018 at 10:06:25AM -0400, John Ferlan wrote:
> > 
> > 
> > On 05/29/2018 09:44 AM, Michal Privoznik wrote:
> > > On 05/29/2018 03:38 PM, Martin Kletzander wrote:
> > > > On Fri, May 25, 2018 at 09:37:44AM -0500, Eric Blake wrote:
> > > > > On 05/25/2018 09:17 AM, Michal Privoznik wrote:
> > > > > 
> > > > > > > > We should probably seed it with data
from /dev/urandom, and/or the new
> > > > > > > > Linux getrandom() syscall (or BSD
equivalent).
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > I'm not quite sure that right after reboot
there's going to be enough
> > > > > > entropy. Every service that's starting wants
some random bits. But it's
> > > > > > probably better than what we have now.
> > > > > 
> > > > > Here's where we left things last time it came up:
> > > > > 
> > > > >
https://www.redhat.com/archives/libvir-list/2014-December/msg00573.html
> > > > > 
> > > > > If gnutls has an interface that will give us random
bits
> > > > > (gnutls_key_generate() in 3.0, perhaps), we should use
THAT for all of
> > > > > our random bits (and forget about a seed), except when
we are mocking
> > > > > things in our testsuite, and need a deterministic PRNG
from a
> > > > > deterministic seed.
> > > > > 
> > > > > If not (including if we are not linked with gnutls),
then we should
> > > > > prefer the new Linux syscall but fall back to
/dev/urandom for JUST
> > > > > enough bits for a seed; once we're seeded, stick
with using our existing
> > > > > PRNG for all future bits (after all, we aren't
trying to generate
> > > > > cryptographically secure keys using virRandomBits - and
the places where
> > > > > we DO need crypto-strong randomness such as setting up
TLS migration is
> > > > > where we are relying on gnutls to provide it rather
than virRandomBits).
> > > > > 
> > > > > So at this point, it's just a matter of someone
writing the patches.
> > > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > Actually, do we need to have a fallback at all?? Can't
we just drop all the
> > > > gross parts of the code the conditionally compile based on
GNUTLS
> > > > support?? Why
> > > > don't we have gnutls required?
> > > 
> > > That's exactly what I'm suggesting in my patches [1].
gnutls is widely
> > > available (including Linux, Windows, *BSD, Mac Os X). However,
before
> > > doing that we need to fix virRandomBits() to actually call
gnutls_rnd().
> > > 
> > > 1:
https://www.redhat.com/archives/libvir-list/2018-May/msg02077.html
> > > 
> > 
> > I have this faint recollection of one of the CI platform builds
failing
> > because something in the gnutls* family didn't exist there when I
was
> > making the changes to add the domain master secret code....  After a
bit
> > of digging, it seems it was a perhaps a CENTOS6 environment:
> > 
> > https://www.redhat.com/archives/libvir-list/2016-April/msg00287.html
> > 
> > and since IIUC that's not an issue any more....
> > 
> 
> Oh, cool to know.  Michal also found the patch [1] where Dan switched the
gnutls
> from being mandatory to making it optional and there is no explanation for
that
> change in the commit message:
> 
> [1] f587c27768ee13f5bed6a9262106307b7a124403
Not all usage scenarios in libvirt have required GNUTLS - only the remote
driver, when using stateful virt drivers. If you're just biulding libvirt
for usage with ESX/HyperV/etc, there's no reason you'd want GNUTLS
historically.

Also note when building the setuid libvirt pieces we must never use GNUTLS
because its library constructors do very bad things leading to CVEs.


Regards,
Daniel
-- 
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On Fri, Jun 01, 2018 at 11:17:44AM +0100, Daniel P. Berrangé
wrote:
>On Wed, May 30, 2018 at 10:21:54PM +0200, Martin Kletzander wrote:
>> On Tue, May 29, 2018 at 10:06:25AM -0400, John Ferlan wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> > On 05/29/2018 09:44 AM, Michal Privoznik wrote:
>> > > On 05/29/2018 03:38 PM, Martin Kletzander wrote:
>> > > > On Fri, May 25, 2018 at 09:37:44AM -0500, Eric Blake
wrote:
>> > > > > On 05/25/2018 09:17 AM, Michal Privoznik wrote:
>> > > > >
>> > > > > > > > We should probably seed it with data
from /dev/urandom, and/or the new
>> > > > > > > > Linux getrandom() syscall (or BSD
equivalent).
>> > > > > >
>> > > > > > I'm not quite sure that right after reboot
there's going to be enough
>> > > > > > entropy. Every service that's starting
wants some random bits. But it's
>> > > > > > probably better than what we have now.
>> > > > >
>> > > > > Here's where we left things last time it came
up:
>> > > > >
>> > > > >
https://www.redhat.com/archives/libvir-list/2014-December/msg00573.html
>> > > > >
>> > > > > If gnutls has an interface that will give us random
bits
>> > > > > (gnutls_key_generate() in 3.0, perhaps), we should
use THAT for all of
>> > > > > our random bits (and forget about a seed), except
when we are mocking
>> > > > > things in our testsuite, and need a deterministic
PRNG from a
>> > > > > deterministic seed.
>> > > > >
>> > > > > If not (including if we are not linked with
gnutls), then we should
>> > > > > prefer the new Linux syscall but fall back to
/dev/urandom for JUST
>> > > > > enough bits for a seed; once we're seeded,
stick with using our existing
>> > > > > PRNG for all future bits (after all, we aren't
trying to generate
>> > > > > cryptographically secure keys using virRandomBits -
and the places where
>> > > > > we DO need crypto-strong randomness such as setting
up TLS migration is
>> > > > > where we are relying on gnutls to provide it rather
than virRandomBits).
>> > > > >
>> > > > > So at this point, it's just a matter of someone
writing the patches.
>> > > > >
>> > > >
>> > > > Actually, do we need to have a fallback at all? 
Can't we just drop all the
>> > > > gross parts of the code the conditionally compile based
on GNUTLS
>> > > > support?  Why
>> > > > don't we have gnutls required?
>> > >
>> > > That's exactly what I'm suggesting in my patches [1].
gnutls is widely
>> > > available (including Linux, Windows, *BSD, Mac Os X).
However, before
>> > > doing that we need to fix virRandomBits() to actually call
gnutls_rnd().
>> > >
>> > > 1:
https://www.redhat.com/archives/libvir-list/2018-May/msg02077.html
>> > >
>> >
>> > I have this faint recollection of one of the CI platform builds
failing
>> > because something in the gnutls* family didn't exist there
when I was
>> > making the changes to add the domain master secret code....  After
a bit
>> > of digging, it seems it was a perhaps a CENTOS6 environment:
>> >
>> >
https://www.redhat.com/archives/libvir-list/2016-April/msg00287.html
>> >
>> > and since IIUC that's not an issue any more....
>> >
>>
>> Oh, cool to know.  Michal also found the patch [1] where Dan switched
the gnutls
>> from being mandatory to making it optional and there is no explanation
for that
>> change in the commit message:
>>
>> [1] f587c27768ee13f5bed6a9262106307b7a124403
>
>Not all usage scenarios in libvirt have required GNUTLS - only the remote
>driver, when using stateful virt drivers. If you're just biulding
libvirt
>for usage with ESX/HyperV/etc, there's no reason you'd want GNUTLS
historically.
>
>Also note when building the setuid libvirt pieces we must never use GNUTLS
>because its library constructors do very bad things leading to CVEs.
>
Good to know, thanks for the info.  I'll need to read up on the gnutls
constructors (is it just gnutls or some other libs as well?) even though I
remember researching something related to it some time ago.  However that
doesn't mean it has to be optional.

Do you think there are people who would be bothered by the requirement of
gnutls?  I'm sure most of them have gnutls anyway.  Some of them even need
to
have, for example if you have a look at virCryptoHashBuf() its stub returns -1
and it is used in ESX.  If you compile without GNUTLS, all the functions that
require it will just fail and it's not something that is used rarely.

We can we make it required only if you are building with qemu or remote or esx
or basically something that requires it.  Encryption of RAW volumes for example.
Or lock driver.  But I don't think there are some who run the builds
themselves
and doesn't want gnutls on their system.  I can't think of a reason for
having
it and not linking libvirt with it.
>
>Regards,
>Daniel
>-- 
>|: https://berrange.com      -o-    https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange
:|
>|: https://libvirt.org         -o-            https://fstop138.berrange.com
:|
>|: https://entangle-photo.org    -o-    https://www.instagram.com/dberrange
:|
>
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