similar to: virRandomBits - not very random

Displaying 20 results from an estimated 7000 matches similar to: "virRandomBits - not very random"

2018 May 25
3
Re: virRandomBits - not very random
Reviving an ancient thread: On 11/04/2014 02:18 AM, Daniel P. Berrange wrote: > On Mon, Nov 03, 2014 at 11:09:12AM -0500, Brian Rak wrote: >> I just ran into an issue where I had about 30 guests get duplicate mac >> addresses assigned. These were scattered across 30 different machines. >> >> Some debugging revealed that: >> >> 1) All the host machines were
2014 Nov 04
0
Re: virRandomBits - not very random
On Mon, Nov 03, 2014 at 11:09:12AM -0500, Brian Rak wrote: > I just ran into an issue where I had about 30 guests get duplicate mac > addresses assigned. These were scattered across 30 different machines. > > Some debugging revealed that: > > 1) All the host machines were restarted within a couple seconds of each > other > 2) All the host machines had fairly similar
2018 May 25
0
Re: virRandomBits - not very random
On 05/25/2018 02:58 PM, Eric Blake wrote: > Reviving an ancient thread: > > On 11/04/2014 02:18 AM, Daniel P. Berrange wrote: >> On Mon, Nov 03, 2014 at 11:09:12AM -0500, Brian Rak wrote: >>> I just ran into an issue where I had about 30 guests get duplicate mac >>> addresses assigned.  These were scattered across 30 different machines. >>> >>>
2018 May 25
2
Re: virRandomBits - not very random
On 05/25/2018 09:17 AM, Michal Privoznik wrote: >>> We should probably seed it with data from /dev/urandom, and/or the new >>> Linux getrandom() syscall (or BSD equivalent). > > I'm not quite sure that right after reboot there's going to be enough > entropy. Every service that's starting wants some random bits. But it's > probably better than what we
2018 May 29
2
Re: [libvirt] virRandomBits - not very random
On 05/29/2018 03:38 PM, Martin Kletzander wrote: > On Fri, May 25, 2018 at 09:37:44AM -0500, Eric Blake wrote: >> On 05/25/2018 09:17 AM, Michal Privoznik wrote: >> >>>>> We should probably seed it with data from /dev/urandom, and/or the new >>>>> Linux getrandom() syscall (or BSD equivalent). >>> >>> I'm not quite sure that right
2018 May 30
2
Re: [libvirt] virRandomBits - not very random
On Tue, May 29, 2018 at 10:06:25AM -0400, John Ferlan wrote: > > >On 05/29/2018 09:44 AM, Michal Privoznik wrote: >> On 05/29/2018 03:38 PM, Martin Kletzander wrote: >>> On Fri, May 25, 2018 at 09:37:44AM -0500, Eric Blake wrote: >>>> On 05/25/2018 09:17 AM, Michal Privoznik wrote: >>>> >>>>>>> We should probably seed it with
2018 Jun 01
2
Re: [libvirt] virRandomBits - not very random
On Fri, Jun 01, 2018 at 11:17:44AM +0100, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote: >On Wed, May 30, 2018 at 10:21:54PM +0200, Martin Kletzander wrote: >> On Tue, May 29, 2018 at 10:06:25AM -0400, John Ferlan wrote: >> > >> > >> > On 05/29/2018 09:44 AM, Michal Privoznik wrote: >> > > On 05/29/2018 03:38 PM, Martin Kletzander wrote: >> > > > On Fri,
2018 May 29
0
Re: [libvirt] virRandomBits - not very random
On 05/29/2018 09:44 AM, Michal Privoznik wrote: > On 05/29/2018 03:38 PM, Martin Kletzander wrote: >> On Fri, May 25, 2018 at 09:37:44AM -0500, Eric Blake wrote: >>> On 05/25/2018 09:17 AM, Michal Privoznik wrote: >>> >>>>>> We should probably seed it with data from /dev/urandom, and/or the new >>>>>> Linux getrandom() syscall (or BSD
2018 May 29
0
Re: [libvirt] virRandomBits - not very random
On Fri, May 25, 2018 at 09:37:44AM -0500, Eric Blake wrote: >On 05/25/2018 09:17 AM, Michal Privoznik wrote: > >>>> We should probably seed it with data from /dev/urandom, and/or the new >>>> Linux getrandom() syscall (or BSD equivalent). >> >> I'm not quite sure that right after reboot there's going to be enough >> entropy. Every service
2018 Jun 01
0
Re: [libvirt] virRandomBits - not very random
On Wed, May 30, 2018 at 10:21:54PM +0200, Martin Kletzander wrote: > On Tue, May 29, 2018 at 10:06:25AM -0400, John Ferlan wrote: > > > > > > On 05/29/2018 09:44 AM, Michal Privoznik wrote: > > > On 05/29/2018 03:38 PM, Martin Kletzander wrote: > > > > On Fri, May 25, 2018 at 09:37:44AM -0500, Eric Blake wrote: > > > > > On 05/25/2018
2018 Jun 01
0
Re: [libvirt] virRandomBits - not very random
On Fri, Jun 01, 2018 at 02:01:03PM +0200, Martin Kletzander wrote: > On Fri, Jun 01, 2018 at 11:17:44AM +0100, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote: > > On Wed, May 30, 2018 at 10:21:54PM +0200, Martin Kletzander wrote: > > > On Tue, May 29, 2018 at 10:06:25AM -0400, John Ferlan wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > On 05/29/2018 09:44 AM, Michal Privoznik wrote:
2019 Mar 05
1
getrandom() before forking daemon is blocking init system
> On 05 March 2019 at 18:51 William Taylor via dovecot <dovecot at dovecot.org> wrote: > > > On Tue, Mar 05, 2019 at 05:39:28PM +0100, Axel Burri via dovecot wrote: > > Hello > > > > When booting from a slow machine, I can observe dovecot blocking the > > whole boot process. I traced it down to the getrandom() system call in > > lib/randgen.c,
2015 Mar 03
1
Re: QEMU interface type=ethernet
2015-03-02 23:41 GMT+03:00 Brian Rak <brak@gameservers.com>: > In IRC, I was directed to this patch: > https://www.redhat.com/archives/libvir-list/2015-February/msg01212.html ... > which does exactly what I was looking for. It doesn't build cleanly in that > state, but it's pretty trivial fix (needs actualType added to the function > definition for
2016 Jul 29
2
getrandom waits for a long time when /dev/random is insufficiently read from
Am Freitag, 29. Juli 2016, 09:03:45 CEST schrieb Alex Xu: Hi Alex, > On Fri, 29 Jul 2016 12:24:27 +0200 > > Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav at gnutls.org> wrote: > > On Fri, Jul 29, 2016 at 7:40 AM, Stephan Mueller > > > > <smueller at chronox.de> wrote: > > > And finally, you have a coding error that is very very common but > > > fatal
2016 Jul 29
2
getrandom waits for a long time when /dev/random is insufficiently read from
Am Freitag, 29. Juli 2016, 09:03:45 CEST schrieb Alex Xu: Hi Alex, > On Fri, 29 Jul 2016 12:24:27 +0200 > > Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav at gnutls.org> wrote: > > On Fri, Jul 29, 2016 at 7:40 AM, Stephan Mueller > > > > <smueller at chronox.de> wrote: > > > And finally, you have a coding error that is very very common but > > > fatal
2015 Mar 02
2
QEMU interface type=ethernet
With Libvirt under modern kernels, you can't use <interface type='ethernet'> unless QEMU is running as root. Running qemu as root is not ideal, but I was able to track down the issue to this linux change: http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=ca6bb5d7ab22ac79f608fe6cbc6b12de6a5a19f0 Which means that if you're seeing errors like this:
2019 Mar 05
2
getrandom() before forking daemon is blocking init system
Hello When booting from a slow machine, I can observe dovecot blocking the whole boot process. I traced it down to the getrandom() system call in lib/randgen.c, which blocks until the random number generator is initialized (dmesg "random: crng init done"). This can take up to three minutes (!) on my machine, as there is not much entropy available (no hardware RNG, network VPN is also
2016 Jul 29
2
getrandom waits for a long time when /dev/random is insufficiently read from
Am Freitag, 29. Juli 2016, 10:14:07 CEST schrieb Alex Xu: Hi Alex, > On Fri, 29 Jul 2016 15:12:30 +0200 > > Stephan Mueller <smueller at chronox.de> wrote as excerpted: > > Am Freitag, 29. Juli 2016, 09:03:45 CEST schrieb Alex Xu: > > > In my opinion, assuming I am not doing something terribly wrong, > > > this constitutes a bug in the kernel's
2016 Jul 29
2
getrandom waits for a long time when /dev/random is insufficiently read from
Am Freitag, 29. Juli 2016, 10:14:07 CEST schrieb Alex Xu: Hi Alex, > On Fri, 29 Jul 2016 15:12:30 +0200 > > Stephan Mueller <smueller at chronox.de> wrote as excerpted: > > Am Freitag, 29. Juli 2016, 09:03:45 CEST schrieb Alex Xu: > > > In my opinion, assuming I am not doing something terribly wrong, > > > this constitutes a bug in the kernel's
2014 Sep 19
3
Standardizing an MSR or other hypercall to get an RNG seed?
On Fri, Sep 19, 2014 at 09:40:42AM -0700, H. Peter Anvin wrote: > > There is a huge disadvantage to the fact that CPUID is a user space > instruction, though. But if the goal is to provide something like getrandom(2) direct from the Host OS, it's not necessarily harmful to allow the Guest ring 3 code to be able to fetch randomness in that way. The hypervisor can implement rate