Virtualization - Mar 2019 - [RFC PATCH V2 5/5] vhost: access vq metadata through kernel virtual address

On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 10:16:00PM -0500, Michael S. Tsirkin
wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 09:55:39PM -0500, Jerome Glisse wrote:
> > On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 09:21:03PM -0500, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > > On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 02:17:20PM -0500, Jerome Glisse wrote:
> > > > > It's because of all these issues that I preferred
just accessing
> > > > > userspace memory and handling faults. Unfortunately
there does not
> > > > > appear to exist an API that whitelists a specific
driver along the lines
> > > > > of "I checked this code for speculative info
leaks, don't add barriers
> > > > > on data path please".
> > > > 
> > > > Maybe it would be better to explore adding such helper then
remapping
> > > > page into kernel address space ?
> > > 
> > > I explored it a bit (see e.g. thread around: "__get_user
slower than
> > > get_user") and I can tell you it's not trivial given the
issue is around
> > > security.  So in practice it does not seem fair to keep a
significant
> > > optimization out of kernel because *maybe* we can do it
differently even
> > > better :)
> > 
> > Maybe a slightly different approach between this patchset and other
> > copy user API would work here. What you want really is something like
> > a temporary mlock on a range of memory so that it is safe for the
> > kernel to access range of userspace virtual address ie page are
> > present and with proper permission hence there can be no page fault
> > while you are accessing thing from kernel context.
> > 
> > So you can have like a range structure and mmu notifier. When you
> > lock the range you block mmu notifier to allow your code to work on
> > the userspace VA safely. Once you are done you unlock and let the
> > mmu notifier go on. It is pretty much exactly this patchset except
> > that you remove all the kernel vmap code. A nice thing about that
> > is that you do not need to worry about calling set page dirty it
> > will already be handle by the userspace VA pte. It also use less
> > memory than when you have kernel vmap.
> > 
> > This idea might be defeated by security feature where the kernel is
> > running in its own address space without the userspace address
> > space present.
> 
> Like smap?
Yes like smap but also other newer changes, with similar effect, since
the spectre drama.

Cheers,
J?r?me

On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 10:40:53PM -0500, Jerome Glisse
wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 10:16:00PM -0500, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 09:55:39PM -0500, Jerome Glisse wrote:
> > > On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 09:21:03PM -0500, Michael S. Tsirkin
wrote:
> > > > On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 02:17:20PM -0500, Jerome Glisse
wrote:
> > > > > > It's because of all these issues that I
preferred just accessing
> > > > > > userspace memory and handling faults.
Unfortunately there does not
> > > > > > appear to exist an API that whitelists a specific
driver along the lines
> > > > > > of "I checked this code for speculative info
leaks, don't add barriers
> > > > > > on data path please".
> > > > > 
> > > > > Maybe it would be better to explore adding such helper
then remapping
> > > > > page into kernel address space ?
> > > > 
> > > > I explored it a bit (see e.g. thread around:
"__get_user slower than
> > > > get_user") and I can tell you it's not trivial
given the issue is around
> > > > security.  So in practice it does not seem fair to keep a
significant
> > > > optimization out of kernel because *maybe* we can do it
differently even
> > > > better :)
> > > 
> > > Maybe a slightly different approach between this patchset and
other
> > > copy user API would work here. What you want really is something
like
> > > a temporary mlock on a range of memory so that it is safe for the
> > > kernel to access range of userspace virtual address ie page are
> > > present and with proper permission hence there can be no page
fault
> > > while you are accessing thing from kernel context.
> > > 
> > > So you can have like a range structure and mmu notifier. When you
> > > lock the range you block mmu notifier to allow your code to work
on
> > > the userspace VA safely. Once you are done you unlock and let the
> > > mmu notifier go on. It is pretty much exactly this patchset
except
> > > that you remove all the kernel vmap code. A nice thing about that
> > > is that you do not need to worry about calling set page dirty it
> > > will already be handle by the userspace VA pte. It also use less
> > > memory than when you have kernel vmap.
> > > 
> > > This idea might be defeated by security feature where the kernel
is
> > > running in its own address space without the userspace address
> > > space present.
> > 
> > Like smap?
> 
> Yes like smap but also other newer changes, with similar effect, since
> the spectre drama.
> 
> Cheers,
> J?r?me
Sorry do you mean meltdown and kpti?

-- 
MST

On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 10:43:12PM -0500, Michael S. Tsirkin
wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 10:40:53PM -0500, Jerome Glisse wrote:
> > On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 10:16:00PM -0500, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > > On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 09:55:39PM -0500, Jerome Glisse wrote:
> > > > On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 09:21:03PM -0500, Michael S. Tsirkin
wrote:
> > > > > On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 02:17:20PM -0500, Jerome Glisse
wrote:
> > > > > > > It's because of all these issues that I
preferred just accessing
> > > > > > > userspace memory and handling faults.
Unfortunately there does not
> > > > > > > appear to exist an API that whitelists a
specific driver along the lines
> > > > > > > of "I checked this code for speculative
info leaks, don't add barriers
> > > > > > > on data path please".
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > Maybe it would be better to explore adding such
helper then remapping
> > > > > > page into kernel address space ?
> > > > > 
> > > > > I explored it a bit (see e.g. thread around:
"__get_user slower than
> > > > > get_user") and I can tell you it's not trivial
given the issue is around
> > > > > security.  So in practice it does not seem fair to keep
a significant
> > > > > optimization out of kernel because *maybe* we can do it
differently even
> > > > > better :)
> > > > 
> > > > Maybe a slightly different approach between this patchset
and other
> > > > copy user API would work here. What you want really is
something like
> > > > a temporary mlock on a range of memory so that it is safe
for the
> > > > kernel to access range of userspace virtual address ie page
are
> > > > present and with proper permission hence there can be no
page fault
> > > > while you are accessing thing from kernel context.
> > > > 
> > > > So you can have like a range structure and mmu notifier.
When you
> > > > lock the range you block mmu notifier to allow your code to
work on
> > > > the userspace VA safely. Once you are done you unlock and
let the
> > > > mmu notifier go on. It is pretty much exactly this patchset
except
> > > > that you remove all the kernel vmap code. A nice thing about
that
> > > > is that you do not need to worry about calling set page
dirty it
> > > > will already be handle by the userspace VA pte. It also use
less
> > > > memory than when you have kernel vmap.
> > > > 
> > > > This idea might be defeated by security feature where the
kernel is
> > > > running in its own address space without the userspace
address
> > > > space present.
> > > 
> > > Like smap?
> > 
> > Yes like smap but also other newer changes, with similar effect, since
> > the spectre drama.
> > 
> > Cheers,
> > J?r?me
> 
> Sorry do you mean meltdown and kpti?
Yes all that and similar thing. I do not have the full list in my head.

Cheers,
J?r?me