Stephen Smalley
2009-Aug-18 14:14 UTC
[Xen-devel] [PATCH] xen/xsm/flask: Update to policy.24
Update Xen Flask module to policy.24.
This is a back-port of the latest SELinux code to Xen, adjusted
for Xen coding style and interfaces. Unneeded functionality such
as most object context config data, handle_unknown, MLS field defaulting,
etc has been omitted.
Signed-off-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: George S. Coker, II <gscoker@alpha.ncsc.mil>
---
tools/flask/policy/Makefile | 2
xen/xsm/flask/avc.c | 234 ++++++++-------
xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c | 2
xen/xsm/flask/include/avc_ss.h | 23 +
xen/xsm/flask/include/security.h | 14
xen/xsm/flask/ss/avtab.c | 142 +++++++--
xen/xsm/flask/ss/avtab.h | 20 -
xen/xsm/flask/ss/conditional.c | 23 -
xen/xsm/flask/ss/conditional.h | 2
xen/xsm/flask/ss/context.h | 33 +-
xen/xsm/flask/ss/ebitmap.c | 209 +++++++-------
xen/xsm/flask/ss/ebitmap.h | 94 ++++--
xen/xsm/flask/ss/hashtab.c | 10
xen/xsm/flask/ss/hashtab.h | 12
xen/xsm/flask/ss/mls.c | 321 ++++++++-------------
xen/xsm/flask/ss/mls.h | 6
xen/xsm/flask/ss/policydb.c | 411 +++++++++++++++++++++++----
xen/xsm/flask/ss/policydb.h | 29 +
xen/xsm/flask/ss/services.c | 574 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
xen/xsm/flask/ss/sidtab.c | 2
xen/xsm/flask/ss/symtab.c | 8
21 files changed, 1438 insertions(+), 733 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/flask/policy/Makefile b/tools/flask/policy/Makefile
--- a/tools/flask/policy/Makefile
+++ b/tools/flask/policy/Makefile
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
# By default, checkpolicy will create the highest
# version policy it supports. Setting this will
# override the version.
-OUTPUT_POLICY = 20
+#OUTPUT_POLICY = 20
# Policy Type
# strict, targeted,
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/avc.c b/xen/xsm/flask/avc.c
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/avc.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/avc.c
@@ -32,12 +32,7 @@
#include "avc.h"
#include "avc_ss.h"
-static const struct av_perm_to_string
-{
- u16 tclass;
- u32 value;
- const char *name;
-} av_perm_to_string[] = {
+static const struct av_perm_to_string av_perm_to_string[] = {
#define S_(c, v, s) { c, v, s },
#include "av_perm_to_string.h"
#undef S_
@@ -57,17 +52,22 @@
#undef TE_
#undef S_
-static const struct av_inherit
-{
- u16 tclass;
- const char **common_pts;
- u32 common_base;
-} av_inherit[] = {
-#define S_(c, i, b) { c, common_##i##_perm_to_string, b },
+static const struct av_inherit av_inherit[] = {
+#define S_(c, i, b) { .tclass = c, .common_pts = common_##i##_perm_to_string, \
+ .common_base = b },
#include "av_inherit.h"
#undef S_
};
+const struct selinux_class_perm selinux_class_perm = {
+ .av_perm_to_string = av_perm_to_string,
+ .av_pts_len = ARRAY_SIZE(av_perm_to_string),
+ .class_to_string = class_to_string,
+ .cts_len = ARRAY_SIZE(class_to_string),
+ .av_inherit = av_inherit,
+ .av_inherit_len = ARRAY_SIZE(av_inherit)
+};
+
#define AVC_CACHE_SLOTS 512
#define AVC_DEF_CACHE_THRESHOLD 512
#define AVC_CACHE_RECLAIM 16
@@ -86,17 +86,16 @@
u32 tsid;
u16 tclass;
struct av_decision avd;
- atomic_t used; /* used recently */
};
struct avc_node {
struct avc_entry ae;
- struct list_head list;
+ struct hlist_node list; /* anchored in avc_cache->slots[i] */
struct rcu_head rhead;
};
struct avc_cache {
- struct list_head slots[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS];
+ struct hlist_head slots[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS]; /* head for avc_node->list
*/
spinlock_t slots_lock[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS]; /* lock for writes */
atomic_t lru_hint; /* LRU hint for reclaim scan */
atomic_t active_nodes;
@@ -241,7 +240,7 @@
for ( i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++ )
{
- INIT_LIST_HEAD(&avc_cache.slots[i]);
+ INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&avc_cache.slots[i]);
spin_lock_init(&avc_cache.slots_lock[i]);
}
atomic_set(&avc_cache.active_nodes, 0);
@@ -254,6 +253,7 @@
{
int i, chain_len, max_chain_len, slots_used;
struct avc_node *node;
+ struct hlist_head *head;
rcu_read_lock();
@@ -261,11 +261,14 @@
max_chain_len = 0;
for ( i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++ )
{
- if ( !list_empty(&avc_cache.slots[i]) )
+ head = &avc_cache.slots[i];
+ if ( !hlist_empty(head) )
{
+ struct hlist_node *next;
+
slots_used++;
chain_len = 0;
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(node, &avc_cache.slots[i], list)
+ hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, next, head, list)
chain_len++;
if ( chain_len > max_chain_len )
max_chain_len = chain_len;
@@ -289,7 +292,7 @@
static void avc_node_delete(struct avc_node *node)
{
- list_del_rcu(&node->list);
+ hlist_del_rcu(&node->list);
call_rcu(&node->rhead, avc_node_free);
atomic_dec(&avc_cache.active_nodes);
}
@@ -303,7 +306,7 @@
static void avc_node_replace(struct avc_node *new, struct avc_node *old)
{
- list_replace_rcu(&old->list, &new->list);
+ hlist_replace_rcu(&old->list, &new->list);
call_rcu(&old->rhead, avc_node_free);
atomic_dec(&avc_cache.active_nodes);
}
@@ -312,31 +315,34 @@
{
struct avc_node *node;
int hvalue, try, ecx;
- unsigned long flags;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ struct hlist_head *head;
+ struct hlist_node *next;
+ spinlock_t *lock;
for ( try = 0, ecx = 0; try < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; try++ )
{
atomic_inc(&avc_cache.lru_hint);
hvalue = atomic_read(&avc_cache.lru_hint) & (AVC_CACHE_SLOTS -
1);
+ head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
+ lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
- spin_lock_irqsave(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flags);
-
- list_for_each_entry(node, &avc_cache.slots[hvalue], list)
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flags);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ hlist_for_each_entry(node, next, head, list)
{
- if ( atomic_dec_and_test(&node->ae.used) )
- {
- /* Recently Unused */
avc_node_delete(node);
avc_cache_stats_incr(reclaims);
ecx++;
if ( ecx >= AVC_CACHE_RECLAIM )
{
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flags);
- goto out;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flags);
+ goto out;
}
- }
}
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flags);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flags);
}
out:
return ecx;
@@ -352,8 +358,7 @@
memset(node, 0, sizeof(*node));
INIT_RCU_HEAD(&node->rhead);
- INIT_LIST_HEAD(&node->list);
- atomic_set(&node->ae.used, 1);
+ INIT_HLIST_NODE(&node->list);
avc_cache_stats_incr(allocations);
atomic_inc(&avc_cache.active_nodes);
@@ -364,40 +369,35 @@
return node;
}
-static void avc_node_populate(struct avc_node *node, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16
tclass, struct avc_entry *ae)
+static void avc_node_populate(struct avc_node *node, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+ u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd)
{
node->ae.ssid = ssid;
node->ae.tsid = tsid;
node->ae.tclass = tclass;
- memcpy(&node->ae.avd, &ae->avd, sizeof(node->ae.avd));
+ memcpy(&node->ae.avd, avd, sizeof(node->ae.avd));
}
static inline struct avc_node *avc_search_node(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
{
struct avc_node *node, *ret = NULL;
int hvalue;
+ struct hlist_head *head;
+ struct hlist_node *next;
hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(node, &avc_cache.slots[hvalue], list)
+ head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
+ hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, next, head, list)
{
- if ( ssid == node->ae.ssid && tclass == node->ae.tclass
&&
- tsid ==
node->ae.tsid )
+ if ( ssid == node->ae.ssid &&
+ tclass == node->ae.tclass &&
+ tsid == node->ae.tsid )
{
ret = node;
break;
}
}
- if ( ret == NULL )
- {
- /* cache miss */
- goto out;
- }
-
- /* cache hit */
- if ( atomic_read(&ret->ae.used) != 1 )
- atomic_set(&ret->ae.used, 1);
-out:
return ret;
}
@@ -415,22 +415,18 @@
* then this function return the avc_node.
* Otherwise, this function returns NULL.
*/
-static struct avc_node *avc_lookup(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32
requested)
+static struct avc_node *avc_lookup(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
{
struct avc_node *node;
avc_cache_stats_incr(lookups);
node = avc_search_node(ssid, tsid, tclass);
- if ( node && ((node->ae.avd.decided & requested) ==
requested) )
- {
+ if ( node )
avc_cache_stats_incr(hits);
- goto out;
- }
+ else
+ avc_cache_stats_incr(misses);
- node = NULL;
- avc_cache_stats_incr(misses);
-out:
return node;
}
@@ -477,34 +473,43 @@
* the access vectors into a cache entry, returns
* avc_node inserted. Otherwise, this function returns NULL.
*/
-static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct
avc_entry *ae)
+static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+ struct av_decision *avd)
{
struct avc_node *pos, *node = NULL;
int hvalue;
- unsigned long flag;
+ unsigned long flag;
- if ( avc_latest_notif_update(ae->avd.seqno, 1) )
+ if ( avc_latest_notif_update(avd->seqno, 1) )
goto out;
node = avc_alloc_node();
if ( node )
{
+ struct hlist_head *head;
+ struct hlist_node *next;
+ spinlock_t *lock;
+
hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
- avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, ae);
+ avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
- spin_lock_irqsave(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flag);
- list_for_each_entry(pos, &avc_cache.slots[hvalue], list)
+ head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
+ lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(pos, next, head, list)
{
- if ( pos->ae.ssid == ssid && pos->ae.tsid == tsid
&&
- pos->ae.tclass == tclass
)
+ if ( pos->ae.ssid == ssid &&
+ pos->ae.tsid == tsid &&
+ pos->ae.tclass == tclass )
{
avc_node_replace(node, pos);
goto found;
}
}
- list_add_rcu(&node->list, &avc_cache.slots[hvalue]);
+ hlist_add_head_rcu(&node->list, head);
found:
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flag);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
}
out:
return node;
@@ -622,11 +627,15 @@
* otherwise, this function update the AVC entry. The original AVC-entry object
* will release later by RCU.
*/
-static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16
tclass)
+static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16
tclass,
+ u32 seqno)
{
int hvalue, rc = 0;
- unsigned long flag;
+ unsigned long flag;
struct avc_node *pos, *node, *orig = NULL;
+ struct hlist_head *head;
+ struct hlist_node *next;
+ spinlock_t *lock;
node = avc_alloc_node();
if ( !node )
@@ -636,12 +645,18 @@
}
hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
- spin_lock_irqsave(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flag);
- list_for_each_entry(pos, &avc_cache.slots[hvalue], list)
+ head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
+ lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(pos, next, head, list)
{
- if ( ssid==pos->ae.ssid && tsid==pos->ae.tsid &&
-
tclass==pos->ae.tclass )
+ if ( ssid == pos->ae.ssid &&
+ tsid == pos->ae.tsid &&
+ tclass == pos->ae.tclass &&
+ seqno == pos->ae.avd.seqno )
{
orig = pos;
break;
@@ -659,7 +674,7 @@
* Copy and replace original node.
*/
- avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, &orig->ae);
+ avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, &orig->ae.avd);
switch ( event )
{
@@ -685,7 +700,7 @@
}
avc_node_replace(node, orig);
out_unlock:
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flag);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
out:
return rc;
}
@@ -697,31 +712,40 @@
int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
{
struct avc_callback_node *c;
- int i, rc = 0;
- unsigned long flag;
+ int i, rc = 0, tmprc;
+ unsigned long flag;
struct avc_node *node;
+ struct hlist_head *head;
+ struct hlist_node *next;
+ spinlock_t *lock;
for ( i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++ )
{
- spin_lock_irqsave(&avc_cache.slots_lock[i], flag);
- list_for_each_entry(node, &avc_cache.slots[i], list)
+ head = &avc_cache.slots[i];
+ lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[i];
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ hlist_for_each_entry(node, next, head, list)
avc_node_delete(node);
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&avc_cache.slots_lock[i], flag);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
}
for ( c = avc_callbacks; c; c = c->next )
{
if ( c->events & AVC_CALLBACK_RESET )
{
- rc = c->callback(AVC_CALLBACK_RESET,
- 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
- if ( rc )
- goto out;
+ tmprc = c->callback(AVC_CALLBACK_RESET,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
+ /* save the first error encountered for the return
+ value and continue processing the callbacks */
+ if ( !rc )
+ rc = tmprc;
}
}
avc_latest_notif_update(seqno, 0);
-out:
return rc;
}
@@ -745,41 +769,47 @@
* should be released for the auditing.
*/
int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
- struct av_decision *avd)
+ struct av_decision *in_avd)
{
struct avc_node *node;
- struct avc_entry entry, *p_ae;
+ struct av_decision avd_entry, *avd;
int rc = 0;
u32 denied;
+ BUG_ON(!requested);
+
rcu_read_lock();
- node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested);
+ node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass);
if ( !node )
{
rcu_read_unlock();
- rc = security_compute_av(ssid,tsid,tclass,requested,&entry.avd);
+
+ if ( in_avd )
+ avd = in_avd;
+ else
+ avd = &avd_entry;
+
+ rc = security_compute_av(ssid,tsid,tclass,requested,avd);
if ( rc )
goto out;
rcu_read_lock();
- node = avc_insert(ssid,tsid,tclass,&entry);
+ node = avc_insert(ssid,tsid,tclass,avd);
+ } else {
+ if ( in_avd )
+ memcpy(in_avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(*in_avd));
+ avd = &node->ae.avd;
}
- p_ae = node ? &node->ae : &entry;
+ denied = requested & ~(avd->allowed);
- if ( avd )
- memcpy(avd, &p_ae->avd, sizeof(*avd));
-
- denied = requested & ~(p_ae->avd.allowed);
-
- if ( !requested || denied )
+ if ( denied )
{
- if ( flask_enforcing )
+ if ( !flask_enforcing || (avd->flags & AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE) )
+ avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT,requested,
+ ssid,tsid,tclass,avd->seqno);
+ else
rc = -EACCES;
- else
- if ( node )
- avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT,requested,
- ssid,tsid,tclass);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c b/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c
@@ -346,7 +346,7 @@
memset(buf, 0, size);
length = snprintf(buf, size, "%x %x %x %x %u",
- avd.allowed, avd.decided,
+ avd.allowed, 0xffffffff,
avd.auditallow, avd.auditdeny,
avd.seqno);
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/include/avc_ss.h b/xen/xsm/flask/include/avc_ss.h
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/include/avc_ss.h
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/include/avc_ss.h
@@ -10,5 +10,28 @@
int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno);
+struct av_perm_to_string {
+ u16 tclass;
+ u32 value;
+ const char *name;
+};
+
+struct av_inherit {
+ const char **common_pts;
+ u32 common_base;
+ u16 tclass;
+};
+
+struct selinux_class_perm {
+ const struct av_perm_to_string *av_perm_to_string;
+ u32 av_pts_len;
+ u32 cts_len;
+ const char **class_to_string;
+ const struct av_inherit *av_inherit;
+ u32 av_inherit_len;
+};
+
+extern const struct selinux_class_perm selinux_class_perm;
+
#endif /* _FLASK_AVC_SS_H_ */
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/include/security.h b/xen/xsm/flask/include/security.h
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/include/security.h
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/include/security.h
@@ -26,10 +26,14 @@
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_VALIDATETRANS 19
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS 19
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB 20
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS 21
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP 22
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE 23
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY 24
/* Range of policy versions we understand*/
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE
-#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY
#ifdef FLASK_BOOTPARAM
extern int flask_enabled;
@@ -43,12 +47,15 @@
struct av_decision {
u32 allowed;
- u32 decided;
u32 auditallow;
u32 auditdeny;
u32 seqno;
+ u32 flags;
};
+/* definitions of av_decision.flags */
+#define AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE 0x0001
+
int security_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
struct av_decision *avd);
@@ -62,9 +69,6 @@
int security_context_to_sid(char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *out_sid);
-int security_context_to_sid_default(char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
- u32 *out_sid, u32 def_sid);
-
int security_get_user_sids(u32 callsid, char *username, u32 **sids, u32 *nel);
int security_pirq_sid(int pirq, u32 *out_sid);
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/avtab.c b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/avtab.c
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/avtab.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/avtab.c
@@ -12,6 +12,9 @@
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ *
+ * Updated: Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
+ * Tuned number of hash slots for avtab to reduce memory usage
*/
/* Ported to Xen 3.0, George Coker, <gscoker@alpha.ncsc.mil> */
@@ -25,11 +28,11 @@
#include "avtab.h"
#include "policydb.h"
-#define AVTAB_HASH(keyp) \
-((keyp->target_class + \
- (keyp->target_type << 2) + \
- (keyp->source_type << 9)) & \
- AVTAB_HASH_MASK)
+static inline int avtab_hash(struct avtab_key *keyp, u16 mask)
+{
+ return ((keyp->target_class + (keyp->target_type << 2) +
+ (keyp->source_type << 9)) & mask);
+}
static struct avtab_node* avtab_insert_node(struct avtab *h, int hvalue,
struct avtab_node * prev, struct avtab_node * cur, struct avtab_key *key,
@@ -64,10 +67,10 @@
struct avtab_node *prev, *cur, *newnode;
u16 specified = key->specified & ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD);
- if ( !h )
+ if ( !h || !h->htable )
return -EINVAL;
- hvalue = AVTAB_HASH(key);
+ hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
for ( prev = NULL, cur = h->htable[hvalue]; cur;
prev = cur, cur =
cur->next)
{
@@ -105,9 +108,9 @@
struct avtab_node *prev, *cur, *newnode;
u16 specified = key->specified & ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD);
- if ( !h )
+ if ( !h || !h->htable )
return NULL;
- hvalue = AVTAB_HASH(key);
+ hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
for ( prev = NULL, cur = h->htable[hvalue]; cur;
prev = cur, cur = cur->next
)
{
@@ -137,10 +140,10 @@
struct avtab_node *cur;
u16 specified = key->specified & ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD);
- if ( !h )
+ if ( !h || !h->htable )
return NULL;
- hvalue = AVTAB_HASH(key);
+ hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
for ( cur = h->htable[hvalue]; cur; cur = cur->next )
{
if ( key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
@@ -172,10 +175,10 @@
struct avtab_node *cur;
u16 specified = key->specified & ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD);
- if ( !h )
+ if ( !h || !h->htable )
return NULL;
- hvalue = AVTAB_HASH(key);
+ hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
for ( cur = h->htable[hvalue]; cur; cur = cur->next )
{
if ( key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
@@ -235,7 +238,7 @@
if ( !h || !h->htable )
return;
- for ( i = 0; i < AVTAB_SIZE; i++ )
+ for ( i = 0; i < h->nslot; i++ )
{
cur = h->htable[i];
while ( cur != NULL )
@@ -248,19 +251,52 @@
}
xfree(h->htable);
h->htable = NULL;
+ h->nslot = 0;
+ h->mask = 0;
}
-
int avtab_init(struct avtab *h)
{
+ h->htable = NULL;
+ h->nel = 0;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *h, u32 nrules)
+{
+ u16 mask = 0;
+ u32 shift = 0;
+ u32 work = nrules;
+ u32 nslot = 0;
int i;
- h->htable = (void *)xmalloc_array(struct avtab_node, AVTAB_SIZE);
+ if ( nrules == 0 )
+ goto avtab_alloc_out;
+
+ while ( work )
+ {
+ work = work >> 1;
+ shift++;
+ }
+ if ( shift > 2 )
+ shift = shift - 2;
+ nslot = 1 << shift;
+ if ( nslot > MAX_AVTAB_SIZE )
+ nslot = MAX_AVTAB_SIZE;
+ mask = nslot - 1;
+
+ h->htable = xmalloc_array(struct avtab_node *, nslot);
if ( !h->htable )
return -ENOMEM;
- for ( i = 0; i < AVTAB_SIZE; i++ )
+ for ( i = 0; i < nslot; i++ )
h->htable[i] = NULL;
+
+avtab_alloc_out:
h->nel = 0;
+ h->nslot = nslot;
+ h->mask = mask;
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "Flask: %d avtab hash slots, %d rules.\n",
+ h->nslot, nrules);
return 0;
}
@@ -271,7 +307,7 @@
slots_used = 0;
max_chain_len = 0;
- for ( i = 0; i < AVTAB_SIZE; i++ )
+ for ( i = 0; i < h->nslot; i++ )
{
cur = h->htable[i];
if ( cur )
@@ -290,7 +326,7 @@
}
printk(KERN_INFO "%s: %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, longest
"
- "chain length %d\n", tag, h->nel, slots_used,
AVTAB_SIZE,
+ "chain length %d\n", tag, h->nel, slots_used,
h->nslot,
max_chain_len);
}
@@ -303,17 +339,18 @@
AVTAB_MEMBER
};
-int avtab_read_item(void *fp, u32 vers, struct avtab *a,
+int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
int (*insertf)(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key
*k,
struct avtab_datum *d, void *p), void *p)
{
__le16 buf16[4];
u16 enabled;
__le32 buf32[7];
- u32 items, items2, val;
+ u32 items, items2, val, vers = pol->policyvers;
struct avtab_key key;
struct avtab_datum datum;
int i, rc;
+ unsigned set;
memset(&key, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_key));
memset(&datum, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_datum));
@@ -323,20 +360,20 @@
rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32));
if ( rc < 0 )
{
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: avtab: truncated entry\n");
return -1;
}
items2 = le32_to_cpu(buf32[0]);
if ( items2 > ARRAY_SIZE(buf32) )
{
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: entry overflow\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: avtab: entry overflow\n");
return -1;
}
rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32)*items2);
if ( rc < 0 )
{
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: avtab: truncated entry\n");
return -1;
}
items = 0;
@@ -345,21 +382,21 @@
key.source_type = (u16)val;
if ( key.source_type != val )
{
- printk("security: avtab: truncated source type\n");
+ printk("Flask: avtab: truncated source type\n");
return -1;
}
val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
key.target_type = (u16)val;
if ( key.target_type != val )
{
- printk("security: avtab: truncated target type\n");
+ printk("Flask: avtab: truncated target type\n");
return -1;
}
val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
key.target_class = (u16)val;
if ( key.target_class != val )
{
- printk("security: avtab: truncated target class\n");
+ printk("Flask: avtab: truncated target class\n");
return -1;
}
@@ -368,12 +405,12 @@
if ( !(val & (AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_TYPE)) )
{
- printk("security: avtab: null entry\n");
+ printk("Flask: avtab: null entry\n");
return -1;
}
if ( (val & AVTAB_AV) && (val & AVTAB_TYPE) )
{
- printk("security: avtab: entry has both access vectors and
types\n");
+ printk("Flask: avtab: entry has both access vectors and
types\n");
return -1;
}
@@ -390,7 +427,7 @@
}
if ( items != items2 ) {
- printk("security: avtab: entry only had %d items, expected
%d\n",
+ printk("Flask: avtab: entry only had %d items, expected
%d\n",
items2, items);
return -1;
}
@@ -400,7 +437,7 @@
rc = next_entry(buf16, fp, sizeof(u16)*4);
if ( rc < 0 )
{
- printk("security: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+ printk("Flask: avtab: truncated entry\n");
return -1;
}
@@ -410,13 +447,39 @@
key.target_class = le16_to_cpu(buf16[items++]);
key.specified = le16_to_cpu(buf16[items++]);
+ if ( !policydb_type_isvalid(pol, key.source_type) ||
+ !policydb_type_isvalid(pol, key.target_type) ||
+ !policydb_class_isvalid(pol, key.target_class) )
+ {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: avtab: invalid type or class\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ set = 0;
+ for ( i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spec_order); i++ )
+ {
+ if ( key.specified & spec_order[i] )
+ set++;
+ }
+ if ( !set || set > 1 )
+ {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: avtab: more than one specifier\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32));
if ( rc < 0 )
{
- printk("security: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+ printk("Flask: avtab: truncated entry\n");
return -1;
}
datum.data = le32_to_cpu(*buf32);
+ if ( (key.specified & AVTAB_TYPE) &&
+ !policydb_type_isvalid(pol, datum.data) )
+ {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: avtab: invalid type\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
return insertf(a, &key, &datum, p);
}
@@ -426,7 +489,7 @@
return avtab_insert(a, k, d);
}
-int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, void *fp, u32 vers)
+int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol)
{
int rc;
__le32 buf[1];
@@ -435,25 +498,28 @@
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
if ( rc < 0 )
{
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: truncated table\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: avtab: truncated table\n");
goto bad;
}
nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
if ( !nel )
{
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: table is empty\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: avtab: table is empty\n");
rc = -EINVAL;
goto bad;
}
+ rc = avtab_alloc(a, nel);
+ if ( rc )
+ goto bad;
for ( i = 0; i < nel; i++ )
{
- rc = avtab_read_item(fp,vers, a, avtab_insertf, NULL);
+ rc = avtab_read_item(a, fp, pol, avtab_insertf, NULL);
if ( rc )
{
if ( rc == -ENOMEM )
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: out of memory\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: avtab: out of memory\n");
else if ( rc == -EEXIST )
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: avtab: duplicate
entry\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: avtab: duplicate entry\n");
else
rc = -EINVAL;
goto bad;
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/avtab.h b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/avtab.h
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/avtab.h
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/avtab.h
@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ *
+ * Updated: Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
+ * Tuned number of hash slots for avtab to reduce memory usage
*/
/* Ported to Xen 3.0, George Coker, <gscoker@alpha.ncsc.mil> */
@@ -53,19 +56,23 @@
struct avtab {
struct avtab_node **htable;
u32 nel; /* number of elements */
+ u32 nslot; /* number of hash slots */
+ u16 mask; /* mask to compute hash func */
};
int avtab_init(struct avtab *);
+int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *, u32);
struct avtab_datum *avtab_search(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *k);
void avtab_destroy(struct avtab *h);
void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, char *tag);
-int avtab_read_item(void *fp, uint32_t vers, struct avtab *a,
+struct policydb;
+int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
int (*insert)(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k,
struct avtab_datum *d, void *p),
void *p);
-int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, void *fp, u32 vers);
+int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol);
struct avtab_node *avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab *h,
struct avtab_key *key, struct avtab_datum *datum);
@@ -75,11 +82,10 @@
struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node_next(struct avtab_node *node,
int specified);
-#define AVTAB_HASH_BITS 15
-#define AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS (1 << AVTAB_HASH_BITS)
-#define AVTAB_HASH_MASK (AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS-1)
-
-#define AVTAB_SIZE AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS
+#define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS 13
+#define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS (1 << MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS)
+#define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_MASK (MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS-1)
+#define MAX_AVTAB_SIZE MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS
#endif /* _SS_AVTAB_H_ */
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/conditional.c b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/conditional.c
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/conditional.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/conditional.c
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@
{
node->cur_state = new_state;
if ( new_state == -1 )
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: expression result was undefined -
disabling all rules.\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: expression result was undefined -
disabling all rules.\n");
/* turn the rules on or off */
for ( cur = node->true_list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next )
{
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@
{
if ( avtab_search(&p->te_avtab, k) )
{
- printk("security: type rule already exists outside of a "
+ printk("Flask: type rule already exists outside of a "
"conditional.");
goto err;
}
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@
{
if ( avtab_search_node_next(node_ptr, k->specified) )
{
- printk("security: too many conflicting type
rules.");
+ printk("Flask: too many conflicting type
rules.");
goto err;
}
found = 0;
@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@
}
if ( !found )
{
- printk("security: conflicting type rules.\n");
+ printk("Flask: conflicting type rules.\n");
goto err;
}
}
@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@
{
if ( avtab_search(&p->te_cond_avtab, k) )
{
- printk("security: conflicting type rules when adding type
rule "
+ printk("Flask: conflicting type rules when adding type
rule "
"for
true.\n");
goto err;
}
@@ -339,7 +339,7 @@
node_ptr = avtab_insert_nonunique(&p->te_cond_avtab, k, d);
if ( !node_ptr )
{
- printk("security: could not insert rule.");
+ printk("Flask: could not insert rule.");
goto err;
}
@@ -389,8 +389,7 @@
data.tail = NULL;
for ( i = 0; i < len; i++ )
{
- rc = avtab_read_item(fp, p->policyvers, &p->te_cond_avtab,
cond_insertf,
-
&data);
+ rc = avtab_read_item(&p->te_cond_avtab, fp, p, cond_insertf,
&data);
if ( rc )
return rc;
}
@@ -403,13 +402,13 @@
{
if ( expr->expr_type <= 0 || expr->expr_type > COND_LAST )
{
- printk("security: conditional expressions uses unknown
operator.\n");
+ printk("Flask: conditional expressions uses unknown
operator.\n");
return 0;
}
if ( expr->bool > p->p_bools.nprim )
{
- printk("security: conditional expressions uses unknown
bool.\n");
+ printk("Flask: conditional expressions uses unknown
bool.\n");
return 0;
}
return 1;
@@ -489,6 +488,10 @@
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ rc = avtab_alloc(&(p->te_cond_avtab), p->te_avtab.nel);
+ if ( rc )
+ goto err;
+
for ( i = 0; i < len; i++ )
{
node = xmalloc(struct cond_node);
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/conditional.h b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/conditional.h
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/conditional.h
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/conditional.h
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
#define COND_XOR 5 /* bool ^ bool */
#define COND_EQ 6 /* bool == bool */
#define COND_NEQ 7 /* bool != bool */
-#define COND_LAST 8
+#define COND_LAST COND_NEQ
__u32 expr_type;
__u32 bool;
struct cond_expr *next;
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/context.h b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/context.h
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/context.h
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/context.h
@@ -42,17 +42,40 @@
{
int rc;
- if (!flask_mls_enabled)
+ if ( !flask_mls_enabled )
return 0;
dst->range.level[0].sens = src->range.level[0].sens;
rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[0].cat,
&src->range.level[0].cat);
- if (rc)
+ if ( rc )
goto out;
dst->range.level[1].sens = src->range.level[1].sens;
rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[1].cat,
&src->range.level[1].cat);
- if (rc)
+ if ( rc )
+ ebitmap_destroy(&dst->range.level[0].cat);
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sets both levels in the MLS range of ''dst'' to the low
level of ''src''.
+ */
+static inline int mls_context_cpy_low(struct context *dst, struct context *src)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ if ( !flask_mls_enabled )
+ return 0;
+
+ dst->range.level[0].sens = src->range.level[0].sens;
+ rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[0].cat,
&src->range.level[0].cat);
+ if ( rc )
+ goto out;
+
+ dst->range.level[1].sens = src->range.level[0].sens;
+ rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[1].cat,
&src->range.level[0].cat);
+ if ( rc )
ebitmap_destroy(&dst->range.level[0].cat);
out:
return rc;
@@ -60,7 +83,7 @@
static inline int mls_context_cmp(struct context *c1, struct context *c2)
{
- if (!flask_mls_enabled)
+ if ( !flask_mls_enabled )
return 1;
return ((c1->range.level[0].sens == c2->range.level[0].sens)
&&
@@ -71,7 +94,7 @@
static inline void mls_context_destroy(struct context *c)
{
- if (!flask_mls_enabled)
+ if ( !flask_mls_enabled )
return;
ebitmap_destroy(&c->range.level[0].cat);
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/ebitmap.c b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/ebitmap.c
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/ebitmap.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/ebitmap.c
@@ -3,6 +3,10 @@
*
* Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
*/
+/*
+ * Updated: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
+ * Applied standard bit operations to improve bitmap scanning.
+ */
/* Ported to Xen 3.0, George Coker, <gscoker@alpha.ncsc.mil> */
@@ -11,6 +15,7 @@
#include <xen/xmalloc.h>
#include <xen/errno.h>
#include <xen/spinlock.h>
+#include <xen/bitmap.h>
#include "ebitmap.h"
#include "policydb.h"
@@ -23,7 +28,8 @@
n1 = e1->node;
n2 = e2->node;
- while ( n1 && n2 && (n1->startbit == n2->startbit)
&& (n1->map == n2->map) )
+ while ( n1 && n2 && (n1->startbit == n2->startbit)
&&
+ !memcmp(n1->maps, n2->maps, EBITMAP_SIZE / 8))
{
n1 = n1->next;
n2 = n2->next;
@@ -52,7 +58,7 @@
}
memset(new, 0, sizeof(*new));
new->startbit = n->startbit;
- new->map = n->map;
+ memcpy(new->maps, n->maps, EBITMAP_SIZE / 8);
new->next = NULL;
if ( prev )
prev->next = new;
@@ -69,6 +75,7 @@
int ebitmap_contains(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2)
{
struct ebitmap_node *n1, *n2;
+ int i;
if ( e1->highbit < e2->highbit )
return 0;
@@ -82,8 +89,11 @@
n1 = n1->next;
continue;
}
- if ( (n1->map & n2->map) != n2->map )
- return 0;
+ for ( i = 0; i < EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS; i++ )
+ {
+ if ( (n1->maps[i] & n2->maps[i]) != n2->maps[i] )
+ return 0;
+ }
n1 = n1->next;
n2 = n2->next;
@@ -105,13 +115,8 @@
n = e->node;
while ( n && (n->startbit <= bit) )
{
- if ( (n->startbit + MAPSIZE) > bit )
- {
- if ( n->map & (MAPBIT << (bit - n->startbit)) )
- return 1;
- else
- return 0;
- }
+ if ( (n->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE) > bit )
+ return ebitmap_node_get_bit(n, bit);
n = n->next;
}
@@ -126,37 +131,41 @@
n = e->node;
while ( n && n->startbit <= bit )
{
- if ( (n->startbit + MAPSIZE) > bit )
+ if ( (n->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE) > bit )
{
if ( value )
{
- n->map |= (MAPBIT << (bit - n->startbit));
+ ebitmap_node_set_bit(n, bit);
}
else
{
- n->map &= ~(MAPBIT << (bit - n->startbit));
- if ( !n->map )
+ unsigned int s;
+
+ ebitmap_node_clr_bit(n, bit);
+
+ s = find_first_bit(n->maps, EBITMAP_SIZE);
+ if ( s < EBITMAP_SIZE )
+ return 0;
+
+ /* drop this node from the bitmap */
+
+ if ( !n->next )
{
- /* drop this node from the bitmap */
+ /*
+ * this was the highest map
+ * within the bitmap
+ */
+ if ( prev )
+ e->highbit = prev->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE;
+ else
+ e->highbit = 0;
+ }
+ if ( prev )
+ prev->next = n->next;
+ else
+ e->node = n->next;
- if ( !n->next )
- {
- /*
- * this was the highest map
- * within the bitmap
- */
- if ( prev )
- e->highbit = prev->startbit + MAPSIZE;
- else
- e->highbit = 0;
- }
- if ( prev )
- prev->next = n->next;
- else
- e->node = n->next;
-
- xfree(n);
- }
+ xfree(n);
}
return 0;
}
@@ -172,12 +181,12 @@
return -ENOMEM;
memset(new, 0, sizeof(*new));
- new->startbit = bit & ~(MAPSIZE - 1);
- new->map = (MAPBIT << (bit - new->startbit));
+ new->startbit = bit - (bit % EBITMAP_SIZE);
+ ebitmap_node_set_bit(new, bit);
if ( !n )
/* this node will be the highest map within the bitmap */
- e->highbit = new->startbit + MAPSIZE;
+ e->highbit = new->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE;
if ( prev )
{
@@ -215,11 +224,11 @@
int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
{
- int rc;
- struct ebitmap_node *n, *l;
+ struct ebitmap_node *n = NULL;
+ u32 mapunit, count, startbit, index;
+ u64 map;
__le32 buf[3];
- u32 mapsize, count, i;
- __le64 map;
+ int rc, i;
ebitmap_init(e);
@@ -227,99 +236,99 @@
if ( rc < 0 )
goto out;
- mapsize = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ mapunit = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
e->highbit = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
count = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
- if ( mapsize != MAPSIZE )
+ if ( mapunit != sizeof(u64) * 8 )
{
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: map size %u does not "
- "match my size %Zd (high bit was %d)\n", mapsize,
- MAPSIZE, e->highbit);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: ebitmap: map size %u does not "
+ "match my size %Zd (high bit was %d)\n", mapunit,
+ sizeof(u64) * 8, e->highbit);
goto bad;
}
+
+ /* round up e->highbit */
+ e->highbit += EBITMAP_SIZE - 1;
+ e->highbit -= (e->highbit % EBITMAP_SIZE);
+
if ( !e->highbit )
{
e->node = NULL;
goto ok;
}
- if ( e->highbit & (MAPSIZE - 1) )
- {
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: high bit (%d) is not a "
- "multiple of the map size (%Zd)\n", e->highbit,
MAPSIZE);
- goto bad;
- }
- l = NULL;
+
for ( i = 0; i < count; i++ )
{
- rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ rc = next_entry(&startbit, fp, sizeof(u32));
if ( rc < 0 )
{
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: truncated map\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: ebitmap: truncated map\n");
goto bad;
}
- n = xmalloc(struct ebitmap_node);
- if ( !n )
+ startbit = le32_to_cpu(startbit);
+ if ( startbit & (mapunit - 1) )
{
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: out of memory\n");
- rc = -ENOMEM;
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: ebitmap start bit (%d) is "
+ "not a multiple of the map unit size (%u)\n",
+ startbit, mapunit);
goto bad;
}
- memset(n, 0, sizeof(*n));
+ if ( startbit > e->highbit - mapunit )
+ {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: ebitmap start bit (%d) is "
+ "beyond the end of the bitmap (%u)\n",
+ startbit, (e->highbit - mapunit));
+ goto bad;
+ }
- n->startbit = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ if ( !n || startbit >= n->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE )
+ {
+ struct ebitmap_node *tmp;
+ tmp = xmalloc(struct ebitmap_node);
+ if ( !tmp )
+ {
+ printk(KERN_ERR
+ "Flask: ebitmap: out of memory\n");
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(*tmp));
+ /* round down */
+ tmp->startbit = startbit - (startbit % EBITMAP_SIZE);
+ if ( n )
+ n->next = tmp;
+ else
+ e->node = tmp;
+ n = tmp;
+ }
+ else if ( startbit <= n->startbit )
+ {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: ebitmap: start bit %d"
+ " comes after start bit %d\n",
+ startbit, n->startbit);
+ goto bad;
+ }
- if ( n->startbit & (MAPSIZE - 1) )
- {
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap start bit (%d) is "
- "not a multiple of the map size (%Zd)\n",
- n->startbit, MAPSIZE);
- goto bad_free;
- }
- if ( n->startbit > (e->highbit - MAPSIZE) )
- {
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap start bit (%d) is "
- "beyond the end of the bitmap (%Zd)\n",
- n->startbit, (e->highbit - MAPSIZE));
- goto bad_free;
- }
rc = next_entry(&map, fp, sizeof(u64));
if ( rc < 0 )
{
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: truncated map\n");
- goto bad_free;
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: ebitmap: truncated map\n");
+ goto bad;
}
- n->map = le64_to_cpu(map);
+ map = le64_to_cpu(map);
- if ( !n->map )
+ index = (startbit - n->startbit) / EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE;
+ while ( map )
{
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: null map in "
- "ebitmap (startbit %d)\n", n->startbit);
- goto bad_free;
+ n->maps[index++] = map & (-1UL);
+ map = EBITMAP_SHIFT_UNIT_SIZE(map);
}
- if ( l )
- {
- if ( n->startbit <= l->startbit )
- {
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: start "
- "bit %d comes after start bit %d\n",
- n->startbit, l->startbit);
- goto bad_free;
- }
- l->next = n;
- }
- else
- e->node = n;
-
- l = n;
}
-
ok:
rc = 0;
out:
return rc;
-bad_free:
- xfree(n);
bad:
if ( !rc )
rc = -EINVAL;
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/ebitmap.h b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/ebitmap.h
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/ebitmap.h
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/ebitmap.h
@@ -14,14 +14,20 @@
#ifndef _SS_EBITMAP_H_
#define _SS_EBITMAP_H_
-#define MAPTYPE u64 /* portion of bitmap in each node */
-#define MAPSIZE (sizeof(MAPTYPE) * 8) /* number of bits in node bitmap */
-#define MAPBIT 1ULL /* a bit in the node bitmap */
+#include <xen/bitmap.h>
+
+#define EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS ((32 - sizeof(void *) - sizeof(u32)) \
+ / sizeof(unsigned long))
+#define EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE BITS_PER_LONG
+#define EBITMAP_SIZE (EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS * EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE)
+#define EBITMAP_BIT 1ULL
+#define EBITMAP_SHIFT_UNIT_SIZE(x) \
+ (((x) >> EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE / 2) >> EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE / 2)
struct ebitmap_node {
- u32 startbit; /* starting position in the total bitmap */
- MAPTYPE map; /* this node''s portion of the bitmap */
struct ebitmap_node *next;
+ unsigned long maps[EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS];
+ u32 startbit;
};
struct ebitmap {
@@ -32,11 +38,18 @@
#define ebitmap_length(e) ((e)->highbit)
#define ebitmap_startbit(e) ((e)->node ? (e)->node->startbit : 0)
-static inline unsigned int ebitmap_start(struct ebitmap *e,
- struct ebitmap_node **n)
+static inline unsigned int ebitmap_start_positive(struct ebitmap *e,
+ struct ebitmap_node **n)
{
- *n = e->node;
- return ebitmap_startbit(e);
+ unsigned int ofs;
+
+ for ( *n = e->node; *n; *n = (*n)->next )
+ {
+ ofs = find_first_bit((*n)->maps, EBITMAP_SIZE);
+ if ( ofs < EBITMAP_SIZE )
+ return (*n)->startbit + ofs;
+ }
+ return ebitmap_length(e);
}
static inline void ebitmap_init(struct ebitmap *e)
@@ -44,29 +57,66 @@
memset(e, 0, sizeof(*e));
}
-static inline unsigned int ebitmap_next(struct ebitmap_node **n,
- unsigned int bit)
+static inline unsigned int ebitmap_next_positive(struct ebitmap *e,
+ struct ebitmap_node **n,
+ unsigned int bit)
{
- if ( (bit == ((*n)->startbit + MAPSIZE - 1)) && (*n)->next )
+ unsigned int ofs;
+
+ ofs = find_next_bit((*n)->maps, EBITMAP_SIZE, bit - (*n)->startbit +
1);
+ if ( ofs < EBITMAP_SIZE )
+ return ofs + (*n)->startbit;
+
+ for ( *n = (*n)->next; *n; *n = (*n)->next )
{
- *n = (*n)->next;
- return (*n)->startbit;
+ ofs = find_first_bit((*n)->maps, EBITMAP_SIZE);
+ if ( ofs < EBITMAP_SIZE )
+ return ofs + (*n)->startbit;
}
-
- return (bit+1);
+ return ebitmap_length(e);
}
-static inline int ebitmap_node_get_bit(struct ebitmap_node * n,
- unsigned int bit)
+#define EBITMAP_NODE_INDEX(node, bit) \
+ (((bit) - (node)->startbit) / EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE)
+#define EBITMAP_NODE_OFFSET(node, bit) \
+ (((bit) - (node)->startbit) % EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE)
+
+static inline int ebitmap_node_get_bit(struct ebitmap_node *n,
+ unsigned int bit)
{
- if ( n->map & (MAPBIT << (bit - n->startbit)) )
+ unsigned int index = EBITMAP_NODE_INDEX(n, bit);
+ unsigned int ofs = EBITMAP_NODE_OFFSET(n, bit);
+
+ BUG_ON( index >= EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS );
+ if ( (n->maps[index] & (EBITMAP_BIT << ofs)) )
return 1;
return 0;
}
-#define ebitmap_for_each_bit(e, n, bit) \
- for ( bit = ebitmap_start(e, &n); bit < ebitmap_length(e); \
- bit = ebitmap_next(&n, bit) ) \
+static inline void ebitmap_node_set_bit(struct ebitmap_node *n,
+ unsigned int bit)
+{
+ unsigned int index = EBITMAP_NODE_INDEX(n, bit);
+ unsigned int ofs = EBITMAP_NODE_OFFSET(n, bit);
+
+ BUG_ON(index >= EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS);
+ n->maps[index] |= (EBITMAP_BIT << ofs);
+}
+
+static inline void ebitmap_node_clr_bit(struct ebitmap_node *n,
+ unsigned int bit)
+{
+ unsigned int index = EBITMAP_NODE_INDEX(n, bit);
+ unsigned int ofs = EBITMAP_NODE_OFFSET(n, bit);
+
+ BUG_ON( index >= EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS );
+ n->maps[index] &= ~(EBITMAP_BIT << ofs);
+}
+
+#define ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, n, bit) \
+ for ( bit = ebitmap_start_positive(e, &n); \
+ bit < ebitmap_length(e); \
+ bit = ebitmap_next_positive(e, &n, bit) ) \
int ebitmap_cmp(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2);
int ebitmap_cpy(struct ebitmap *dst, struct ebitmap *src);
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/hashtab.c b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/hashtab.c
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/hashtab.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/hashtab.c
@@ -11,8 +11,10 @@
#include <xen/errno.h>
#include "hashtab.h"
-struct hashtab *hashtab_create(u32 (*hash_value)(struct hashtab *h, void *key),
- int (*keycmp)(struct hashtab *h, void *key1, void *key2), u32 size)
+struct hashtab *hashtab_create(u32 (*hash_value)(struct hashtab *h,
+ const void *key),
+ int (*keycmp)(struct hashtab *h, const void *key1,
+ const void *key2), u32 size)
{
struct hashtab *p;
u32 i;
@@ -26,7 +28,7 @@
p->nel = 0;
p->hash_value = hash_value;
p->keycmp = keycmp;
- p->htable = (void *)xmalloc_array(struct hashtab_node, size);
+ p->htable = xmalloc_array(struct hashtab_node *, size);
if ( p->htable == NULL )
{
xfree(p);
@@ -80,7 +82,7 @@
return 0;
}
-void *hashtab_search(struct hashtab *h, void *key)
+void *hashtab_search(struct hashtab *h, const void *key)
{
u32 hvalue;
struct hashtab_node *cur;
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/hashtab.h b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/hashtab.h
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/hashtab.h
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/hashtab.h
@@ -22,9 +22,9 @@
struct hashtab_node **htable; /* hash table */
u32 size; /* number of slots in hash table */
u32 nel; /* number of elements in hash table */
- u32 (*hash_value)(struct hashtab *h, void *key);
+ u32 (*hash_value)(struct hashtab *h, const void *key);
/* hash function */
- int (*keycmp)(struct hashtab *h, void *key1, void *key2);
+ int (*keycmp)(struct hashtab *h, const void *key1, const void *key2);
/* key comparison function */
};
@@ -39,8 +39,10 @@
* Returns NULL if insufficent space is available or
* the new hash table otherwise.
*/
-struct hashtab *hashtab_create(u32 (*hash_value)(struct hashtab *h, void *key),
- int (*keycmp)(struct hashtab *h, void *key1, void *key2), u32
size);
+struct hashtab *hashtab_create(u32 (*hash_value)(struct hashtab *h,
+ const void *key),
+ int (*keycmp)(struct hashtab *h, const void *key1,
+ const void *key2), u32 size);
/*
* Inserts the specified (key, datum) pair into the specified hash table.
@@ -58,7 +60,7 @@
* Returns NULL if no entry has the specified key or
* the datum of the entry otherwise.
*/
-void *hashtab_search(struct hashtab *h, void *k);
+void *hashtab_search(struct hashtab *h, const void *k);
/*
* Destroys the specified hash table.
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/mls.c b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/mls.c
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/mls.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/mls.c
@@ -29,46 +29,49 @@
*/
int mls_compute_context_len(struct context * context)
{
- int i, l, len, range;
+ int i, l, len, head, prev;
+ char *nm;
+ struct ebitmap *e;
struct ebitmap_node *node;
- if (!flask_mls_enabled)
+ if ( !flask_mls_enabled )
return 0;
len = 1; /* for the beginning ":" */
for ( l = 0; l < 2; l++ )
{
- range = 0;
- len +=
strlen(policydb.p_sens_val_to_name[context->range.level[l].sens - 1]);
+ int index_sens = context->range.level[l].sens;
+ len += strlen(policydb.p_sens_val_to_name[index_sens - 1]);
- ebitmap_for_each_bit(&context->range.level[l].cat, node, i)
+ /* categories */
+ head = -2;
+ prev = -2;
+ e = &context->range.level[l].cat;
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, node, i)
{
- if ( ebitmap_node_get_bit(node, i) )
+ if ( i - prev > 1 )
{
- if ( range )
+ /* one or more negative bits are skipped */
+ if ( head != prev )
{
- range++;
- continue;
+ nm = policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[prev];
+ len += strlen(nm) + 1;
}
-
- len += strlen(policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i]) + 1;
- range++;
+ nm = policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i];
+ len += strlen(nm) + 1;
+ head = i;
}
- else
- {
- if ( range > 1 )
- len += strlen(policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i - 1]) + 1;
- range = 0;
- }
+ prev = i;
}
- /* Handle case where last category is the end of range */
- if ( range > 1 )
- len += strlen(policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i - 1]) + 1;
-
+ if ( prev != head )
+ {
+ nm = policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[prev];
+ len += strlen(nm) + 1;
+ }
if ( l == 0 )
{
if ( mls_level_eq(&context->range.level[0],
-
&context->range.level[1]) )
+ &context->range.level[1]) )
break;
else
len++;
@@ -85,8 +88,9 @@
*/
void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context, char **scontext)
{
- char *scontextp;
- int i, l, range, wrote_sep;
+ char *scontextp, *nm;
+ int i, l, head, prev;
+ struct ebitmap *e;
struct ebitmap_node *node;
if ( !flask_mls_enabled )
@@ -99,64 +103,51 @@
for ( l = 0; l < 2; l++ )
{
- range = 0;
- wrote_sep = 0;
- strlcpy(scontextp,
+ memcpy(scontextp,
policydb.p_sens_val_to_name[context->range.level[l].sens -
1],
strlen(policydb.p_sens_val_to_name[context->range.level[l].sens - 1]));
- scontextp +=
strlen(policydb.p_sens_val_to_name[context->range.level[l].sens - 1]);
+ scontextp += strlen(scontextp);
/* categories */
- ebitmap_for_each_bit(&context->range.level[l].cat, node, i)
+ head = -2;
+ prev = -2;
+ e = &context->range.level[l].cat;
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, node, i)
{
- if ( ebitmap_node_get_bit(node, i) )
+ if ( i - prev > 1 )
{
- if ( range )
+ /* one or more negative bits are skipped */
+ if ( prev != head )
{
- range++;
- continue;
- }
-
- if ( !wrote_sep )
- {
- *scontextp++ = '':'';
- wrote_sep = 1;
- }
- else
- *scontextp++ = '','';
- strlcpy(scontextp, policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i],
- strlen(policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i]));
- scontextp += strlen(policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i]);
- range++;
- }
- else
- {
- if ( range > 1 )
- {
- if ( range > 2 )
+ if ( prev - head > 1 )
*scontextp++ = ''.'';
else
*scontextp++ = '','';
-
- strlcpy(scontextp, policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i - 1],
- strlen(policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i - 1]));
- scontextp += strlen(policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i - 1]);
+ nm = policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[prev];
+ memcpy(scontextp, nm, strlen(nm));
+ scontextp += strlen(nm);
}
- range = 0;
+ if ( prev < 0 )
+ *scontextp++ = '':'';
+ else
+ *scontextp++ = '','';
+ nm = policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i];
+ memcpy(scontextp, nm, strlen(nm));
+ scontextp += strlen(nm);
+ head = i;
}
+ prev = i;
}
- /* Handle case where last category is the end of range */
- if ( range > 1 )
+ if ( prev != head )
{
- if ( range > 2 )
+ if ( prev - head > 1 )
*scontextp++ = ''.'';
else
*scontextp++ = '','';
-
- strlcpy(scontextp, policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i - 1],
- strlen(policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i - 1]));
- scontextp += strlen(policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i - 1]);
+ nm = policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[prev];
+ memcpy(scontextp, nm, strlen(nm));
+ scontextp += strlen(nm);
}
if ( l == 0 )
@@ -176,55 +167,57 @@
return;
}
+int mls_level_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_level *l)
+{
+ struct level_datum *levdatum;
+ struct ebitmap_node *node;
+ int i;
+
+ if ( !l->sens || l->sens > p->p_levels.nprim )
+ return 0;
+ levdatum = hashtab_search(p->p_levels.table,
+ p->p_sens_val_to_name[l->sens - 1]);
+ if ( !levdatum )
+ return 0;
+
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&l->cat, node, i)
+ {
+ if ( i > p->p_cats.nprim )
+ return 0;
+ if ( !ebitmap_get_bit(&levdatum->level->cat, i) )
+ {
+ /*
+ * Category may not be associated with
+ * sensitivity.
+ */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int mls_range_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_range *r)
+{
+ return ( mls_level_isvalid(p, &r->level[0]) &&
+ mls_level_isvalid(p, &r->level[1]) &&
+ mls_level_dom(&r->level[1], &r->level[0]));
+}
+
/*
* Return 1 if the MLS fields in the security context
* structure `c'' are valid. Return 0 otherwise.
*/
int mls_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c)
{
- struct level_datum *levdatum;
struct user_datum *usrdatum;
- struct ebitmap_node *node;
- int i, l;
if ( !flask_mls_enabled )
return 1;
- /*
- * MLS range validity checks: high must dominate low, low level must
- * be valid (category set <-> sensitivity check), and high level must
- * be valid (category set <-> sensitivity check)
- */
- if ( !mls_level_dom(&c->range.level[1], &c->range.level[0]) )
- /* High does not dominate low. */
+ if ( !mls_range_isvalid(p, &c->range) )
return 0;
- for ( l = 0; l < 2; l++ )
- {
- if ( !c->range.level[l].sens || c->range.level[l].sens >
-
p->p_levels.nprim )
- return 0;
- levdatum = hashtab_search(p->p_levels.table,
- p->p_sens_val_to_name[c->range.level[l].sens - 1]);
- if ( !levdatum )
- return 0;
-
- ebitmap_for_each_bit(&c->range.level[l].cat, node, i)
- {
- if ( ebitmap_node_get_bit(node, i) )
- {
- if ( i > p->p_cats.nprim )
- return 0;
- if ( !ebitmap_get_bit(&levdatum->level->cat, i) )
- /*
- * Category may not be associated with
- * sensitivity in low level.
- */
- return 0;
- }
- }
- }
-
if ( c->role == OBJECT_R_VAL )
return 1;
@@ -241,26 +234,6 @@
}
/*
- * Copies the MLS range from `src'' into `dst''.
- */
-static inline int mls_copy_context(struct context *dst, struct context *src)
-{
- int l, rc = 0;
-
- /* Copy the MLS range from the source context */
- for ( l = 0; l < 2; l++ )
- {
- dst->range.level[l].sens = src->range.level[l].sens;
- rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[l].cat,
- &src->range.level[l].cat);
- if ( rc )
- break;
- }
-
- return rc;
-}
-
-/*
* Set the MLS fields in the security context structure
* `context'' based on the string representation in
* the string `*scontext''. Update `*scontext'' to
@@ -270,16 +243,11 @@
* This function modifies the string in place, inserting
* NULL characters to terminate the MLS fields.
*
- * If a def_sid is provided and no MLS field is present,
- * copy the MLS field of the associated default context.
- * Used for upgraded to MLS systems where objects may lack
- * MLS fields.
- *
* Policy read-lock must be held for sidtab lookup.
*
*/
-int mls_context_to_sid(char oldc, char **scontext, struct context *context,
- struct sidtab *s, u32 def_sid)
+int mls_context_to_sid(char oldc, char **scontext,
+ struct context *context, struct sidtab *s)
{
char delim;
@@ -292,23 +260,10 @@
return 0;
/*
- * No MLS component to the security context, try and map to
- * default if provided.
+ * No MLS component to the security context -> error.
*/
if ( !oldc )
- {
- struct context *defcon;
-
- if ( def_sid == SECSID_NULL )
- goto out;
-
- defcon = sidtab_search(s, def_sid);
- if ( !defcon )
- goto out;
-
- rc = mls_copy_context(context, defcon);
goto out;
- }
/* Extract low sensitivity. */
scontextp = p = *scontext;
@@ -421,26 +376,6 @@
}
/*
- * Copies the effective MLS range from `src'' into `dst''.
- */
-static inline int mls_scopy_context(struct context *dst, struct context *src)
-{
- int l, rc = 0;
-
- /* Copy the MLS range from the source context */
- for ( l = 0; l < 2; l++ )
- {
- dst->range.level[l].sens = src->range.level[0].sens;
- rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[l].cat,
- &src->range.level[0].cat);
- if ( rc )
- break;
- }
-
- return rc;
-}
-
-/*
* Copies the MLS range `range'' into `context''.
*/
static inline int mls_range_set(struct context *context,
@@ -537,20 +472,17 @@
c->range.level[l].sens = levdatum->level->sens;
ebitmap_init(&bitmap);
- ebitmap_for_each_bit(&c->range.level[l].cat, node, i)
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&c->range.level[l].cat, node, i)
{
- if ( ebitmap_node_get_bit(node, i) )
- {
- int rc;
+ int rc;
- catdatum = hashtab_search(newp->p_cats.table,
- oldp->p_cat_val_to_name[i]);
- if ( !catdatum )
- return -EINVAL;
- rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&bitmap, catdatum->value - 1, 1);
- if ( rc )
- return rc;
- }
+ catdatum = hashtab_search(newp->p_cats.table,
+ oldp->p_cat_val_to_name[i]);
+ if ( !catdatum )
+ return -EINVAL;
+ rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&bitmap, catdatum->value - 1, 1);
+ if ( rc )
+ return rc;
}
ebitmap_destroy(&c->range.level[l].cat);
c->range.level[l].cat = bitmap;
@@ -562,48 +494,37 @@
int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext, struct context *tcontext,
u16 tclass, u32 specified, struct context *newcontext)
{
+ struct range_trans *rtr;
+
if ( !flask_mls_enabled )
return 0;
switch ( specified )
{
case AVTAB_TRANSITION:
- if ( tclass == SECCLASS_DOMAIN )
+ /* Look for a range transition rule. */
+ for (rtr = policydb.range_tr; rtr; rtr = rtr->next)
{
- struct range_trans *rangetr;
- /* Look for a range transition rule. */
- for ( rangetr = policydb.range_tr; rangetr;
- rangetr = rangetr->next)
+ if (rtr->source_type == scontext->type &&
+ rtr->target_type == tcontext->type &&
+ rtr->target_class == tclass)
{
- if ( rangetr->dom == scontext->type &&
- rangetr->type == tcontext->type)
- {
- /* Set the range from the rule */
- return mls_range_set(newcontext,
&rangetr->range);
- }
+ /* Set the range from the rule */
+ return mls_range_set(newcontext,
+ &rtr->target_range);
}
}
/* Fallthrough */
case AVTAB_CHANGE:
if ( tclass == SECCLASS_DOMAIN )
/* Use the process MLS attributes. */
- return mls_copy_context(newcontext, scontext);
+ return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, scontext);
else
+ /* Use the process effective MLS attributes. */
+ return mls_context_cpy_low(newcontext, scontext);
+ case AVTAB_MEMBER:
/* Use the process effective MLS attributes. */
- return mls_scopy_context(newcontext, scontext);
- case AVTAB_MEMBER:
- /* Only polyinstantiate the MLS attributes if
- the type is being polyinstantiated */
- if ( newcontext->type != tcontext->type )
- {
- /* Use the process effective MLS attributes. */
- return mls_scopy_context(newcontext, scontext);
- }
- else
- {
- /* Use the related object MLS attributes. */
- return mls_copy_context(newcontext, tcontext);
- }
+ return mls_context_cpy_low(newcontext, scontext);
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/mls.h b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/mls.h
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/mls.h
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/mls.h
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
*
* Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
*
- * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
*/
#ifndef _SS_MLS_H_
@@ -20,9 +20,11 @@
int mls_compute_context_len(struct context *context);
void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context, char **scontext);
int mls_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c);
+int mls_range_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_range *r);
+int mls_level_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_level *l);
int mls_context_to_sid(char oldc, char **scontext, struct context *context,
- struct sidtab *s, u32 def_sid);
+ struct sidtab *s);
int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp, struct policydb *newp,
struct context *context);
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/policydb.c b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/policydb.c
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/policydb.c
@@ -100,6 +100,26 @@
.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
.ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
},
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
+ },
};
static struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(int version)
@@ -188,6 +208,9 @@
if ( rc )
goto out_free_avtab;
+ ebitmap_init(&p->policycaps);
+ ebitmap_init(&p->permissive_map);
+
out:
return rc;
@@ -244,7 +267,9 @@
role = datum;
p = datap;
- if ( !role->value || role->value > p->p_roles.nprim )
+ if ( !role->value
+ || role->value > p->p_roles.nprim
+ || role->bounds > p->p_roles.nprim )
return -EINVAL;
p->p_role_val_to_name[role->value - 1] = key;
p->role_val_to_struct[role->value - 1] = role;
@@ -261,9 +286,12 @@
if ( typdatum->primary )
{
- if ( !typdatum->value || typdatum->value > p->p_types.nprim
)
+ if ( !typdatum->value
+ || typdatum->value > p->p_types.nprim
+ || typdatum->bounds > p->p_types.nprim )
return -EINVAL;
p->p_type_val_to_name[typdatum->value - 1] = key;
+ p->type_val_to_struct[typdatum->value - 1] = typdatum;
}
return 0;
@@ -276,7 +304,9 @@
usrdatum = datum;
p = datap;
- if ( !usrdatum->value || usrdatum->value > p->p_users.nprim )
+ if ( !usrdatum->value
+ || usrdatum->value > p->p_users.nprim
+ || usrdatum->bounds > p->p_users.nprim )
return -EINVAL;
p->p_user_val_to_name[usrdatum->value - 1] = key;
p->user_val_to_struct[usrdatum->value - 1] = usrdatum;
@@ -356,7 +386,7 @@
goto out;
p->class_val_to_struct - (void *)xmalloc_array(struct
class_datum, p->p_classes.nprim);
+ xmalloc_array(struct class_datum *, p->p_classes.nprim);
if ( !p->class_val_to_struct )
{
rc = -ENOMEM;
@@ -404,14 +434,14 @@
{
int i, rc = 0;
- printk(KERN_INFO "security: %d users, %d roles, %d types, %d
bools",
+ printk(KERN_INFO "Flask: %d users, %d roles, %d types, %d
bools",
p->p_users.nprim, p->p_roles.nprim, p->p_types.nprim,
p->p_bools.nprim);
if ( flask_mls_enabled )
printk(", %d sens, %d cats", p->p_levels.nprim,
p->p_cats.nprim);
printk("\n");
- printk(KERN_INFO "security: %d classes, %d rules\n",
+ printk(KERN_INFO "Flask: %d classes, %d rules\n",
p->p_classes.nprim, p->te_avtab.nel);
#ifdef DEBUG_HASHES
@@ -420,7 +450,7 @@
#endif
p->role_val_to_struct - (void *)xmalloc_array(struct role_datum,
p->p_roles.nprim);
+ xmalloc_array(struct role_datum *, p->p_roles.nprim);
if ( !p->role_val_to_struct )
{
rc = -ENOMEM;
@@ -428,13 +458,21 @@
}
p->user_val_to_struct - (void *)xmalloc_array(struct user_datum,
p->p_users.nprim);
+ xmalloc_array(struct user_datum *, p->p_users.nprim);
if ( !p->user_val_to_struct )
{
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
+ p->type_val_to_struct + xmalloc_array(struct type_datum *,
p->p_types.nprim);
+ if ( !p->type_val_to_struct )
+ {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
if ( cond_init_bool_indexes(p) )
{
rc = -ENOMEM;
@@ -627,6 +665,7 @@
xfree(p->class_val_to_struct);
xfree(p->role_val_to_struct);
xfree(p->user_val_to_struct);
+ xfree(p->type_val_to_struct);
avtab_destroy(&p->te_avtab);
@@ -639,6 +678,7 @@
c = c->next;
ocontext_destroy(ctmp,i);
}
+ p->ocontexts[i] = NULL;
}
cond_policydb_destroy(p);
@@ -659,15 +699,29 @@
for ( rt = p->range_tr; rt; rt = rt -> next )
{
- if ( lrt ) xfree(lrt);
+ if ( lrt )
+ {
+ ebitmap_destroy(&lrt->target_range.level[0].cat);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&lrt->target_range.level[1].cat);
+ xfree(lrt);
+ }
lrt = rt;
}
- if ( lrt ) xfree(lrt);
+ if ( lrt )
+ {
+ ebitmap_destroy(&lrt->target_range.level[0].cat);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&lrt->target_range.level[1].cat);
+ xfree(lrt);
+ }
- for ( i = 0; i < p->p_types.nprim; i++ )
- ebitmap_destroy(&p->type_attr_map[i]);
+ if ( p->type_attr_map )
+ for ( i = 0; i < p->p_types.nprim; i++ )
+ ebitmap_destroy(&p->type_attr_map[i]);
xfree(p->type_attr_map);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&p->policycaps);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&p->permissive_map);
+
return;
}
@@ -683,7 +737,7 @@
rc = sidtab_init(s);
if ( rc )
{
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: out of memory on SID table
init\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: out of memory on SID table init\n");
goto out;
}
@@ -692,14 +746,14 @@
{
if ( !c->context[0].user )
{
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: SID %s was never "
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: SID %s was never "
"defined.\n", c->u.name);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if ( sidtab_insert(s, c->sid[0], &c->context[0]) )
{
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: unable to load initial "
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: unable to load initial "
"SID %s.\n", c->u.name);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
@@ -709,6 +763,27 @@
return rc;
}
+int policydb_class_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int class)
+{
+ if ( !class || class > p->p_classes.nprim )
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int policydb_role_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int role)
+{
+ if ( !role || role > p->p_roles.nprim )
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int policydb_type_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int type)
+{
+ if ( !type || type > p->p_types.nprim )
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
/*
* Return 1 if the fields in the security context
* structure `c'' are valid. Return 0 otherwise.
@@ -772,14 +847,14 @@
items = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
if ( items > ARRAY_SIZE(buf) )
{
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: mls: range overflow\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: mls: range overflow\n");
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * items);
if ( rc < 0 )
{
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: mls: truncated range\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: mls: truncated range\n");
goto out;
}
r->level[0].sens = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
@@ -791,7 +866,7 @@
rc = ebitmap_read(&r->level[0].cat, fp);
if ( rc )
{
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: mls: error reading low "
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: mls: error reading low "
"categories\n");
goto out;
}
@@ -800,7 +875,7 @@
rc = ebitmap_read(&r->level[1].cat, fp);
if ( rc )
{
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: mls: error reading high "
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: mls: error reading high "
"categories\n");
goto bad_high;
}
@@ -810,7 +885,7 @@
rc = ebitmap_cpy(&r->level[1].cat, &r->level[0].cat);
if ( rc )
{
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: mls: out of memory\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: mls: out of memory\n");
goto bad_high;
}
}
@@ -836,7 +911,7 @@
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
if ( rc < 0 )
{
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: context truncated\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: context truncated\n");
goto out;
}
c->user = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
@@ -846,7 +921,7 @@
{
if ( mls_read_range_helper(&c->range, fp) )
{
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: error reading MLS range of "
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: error reading MLS range of "
"context\n");
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
@@ -855,7 +930,7 @@
if ( !policydb_context_isvalid(p, c) )
{
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: invalid security context\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: invalid security context\n");
context_destroy(c);
rc = -EINVAL;
}
@@ -1121,7 +1196,7 @@
cladatum->comkey);
if ( !cladatum->comdatum )
{
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: unknown common %s\n",
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: unknown common %s\n",
cladatum->comkey);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto bad;
@@ -1166,8 +1241,8 @@
{
char *key = NULL;
struct role_datum *role;
- int rc;
- __le32 buf[2];
+ int rc, to_read = 2;
+ __le32 buf[3];
u32 len;
role = xmalloc(struct role_datum);
@@ -1178,12 +1253,17 @@
}
memset(role, 0, sizeof(*role));
- rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+ if ( p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY )
+ to_read = 3;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(buf[0]) * to_read);
if ( rc < 0 )
goto bad;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
role->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ if ( p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY )
+ role->bounds = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
key = xmalloc_array(char, len + 1);
if ( !key )
@@ -1231,8 +1311,8 @@
{
char *key = NULL;
struct type_datum *typdatum;
- int rc;
- __le32 buf[3];
+ int rc, to_read = 3;
+ __le32 buf[4];
u32 len;
typdatum = xmalloc(struct type_datum);
@@ -1243,13 +1323,30 @@
}
memset(typdatum, 0, sizeof(*typdatum));
- rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+ if ( p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY )
+ to_read = 4;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(buf[0]) * to_read);
if ( rc < 0 )
goto bad;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
typdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
- typdatum->primary = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ if ( p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY )
+ {
+ u32 prop = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+ if ( prop & TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_PRIMARY )
+ typdatum->primary = 1;
+ if ( prop & TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_ATTRIBUTE )
+ typdatum->attribute = 1;
+
+ typdatum->bounds = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ typdatum->primary = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ }
key = xmalloc_array(char, len + 1);
if ( !key )
@@ -1287,14 +1384,14 @@
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
if ( rc < 0 )
{
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: mls: truncated level\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: mls: truncated level\n");
goto bad;
}
lp->sens = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
if ( ebitmap_read(&lp->cat, fp) )
{
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: mls: error reading level
categories\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: mls: error reading level
categories\n");
goto bad;
}
return 0;
@@ -1307,8 +1404,8 @@
{
char *key = NULL;
struct user_datum *usrdatum;
- int rc;
- __le32 buf[2];
+ int rc, to_read = 2;
+ __le32 buf[3];
u32 len;
usrdatum = xmalloc(struct user_datum);
@@ -1319,12 +1416,17 @@
}
memset(usrdatum, 0, sizeof(*usrdatum));
- rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+ if ( p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY )
+ to_read = 3;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(buf[0]) * to_read);
if ( rc < 0 )
goto bad;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
usrdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ if ( p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY )
+ usrdatum->bounds = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
key = xmalloc_array(char, len + 1);
if ( !key )
@@ -1475,6 +1577,142 @@
cat_read,
};
+static int user_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+ struct user_datum *upper, *user;
+ struct policydb *p = datap;
+ int depth = 0;
+
+ upper = user = datum;
+ while (upper->bounds)
+ {
+ struct ebitmap_node *node;
+ unsigned long bit;
+
+ if ( ++depth == POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH )
+ {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: user %s: "
+ "too deep or looped boundary",
+ (char *) key);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ upper = p->user_val_to_struct[upper->bounds - 1];
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user->roles, node, bit)
+ {
+ if ( ebitmap_get_bit(&upper->roles, bit) )
+ continue;
+
+ printk(KERN_ERR
+ "Flask: boundary violated policy: "
+ "user=%s role=%s bounds=%s\n",
+ p->p_user_val_to_name[user->value - 1],
+ p->p_role_val_to_name[bit],
+ p->p_user_val_to_name[upper->value - 1]);
+
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int role_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+ struct role_datum *upper, *role;
+ struct policydb *p = datap;
+ int depth = 0;
+
+ upper = role = datum;
+ while (upper->bounds)
+ {
+ struct ebitmap_node *node;
+ unsigned long bit;
+
+ if ( ++depth == POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH )
+ {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: role %s: "
+ "too deep or looped bounds\n",
+ (char *) key);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ upper = p->role_val_to_struct[upper->bounds - 1];
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&role->types, node, bit)
+ {
+ if ( ebitmap_get_bit(&upper->types, bit) )
+ continue;
+
+ printk(KERN_ERR
+ "Flask: boundary violated policy: "
+ "role=%s type=%s bounds=%s\n",
+ p->p_role_val_to_name[role->value - 1],
+ p->p_type_val_to_name[bit],
+ p->p_role_val_to_name[upper->value - 1]);
+
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int type_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+ struct type_datum *upper, *type;
+ struct policydb *p = datap;
+ int depth = 0;
+
+ upper = type = datum;
+ while (upper->bounds)
+ {
+ if ( ++depth == POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH )
+ {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: type %s: "
+ "too deep or looped boundary\n",
+ (char *) key);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ upper = p->type_val_to_struct[upper->bounds - 1];
+ if ( upper->attribute )
+ {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: type %s: "
+ "bounded by attribute %s",
+ (char *) key,
+ p->p_type_val_to_name[upper->value - 1]);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int policydb_bounds_sanity_check(struct policydb *p)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ if ( p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY )
+ return 0;
+
+ rc = hashtab_map(p->p_users.table,
+ user_bounds_sanity_check, p);
+ if ( rc )
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = hashtab_map(p->p_roles.table,
+ role_bounds_sanity_check, p);
+ if ( rc )
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = hashtab_map(p->p_types.table,
+ type_bounds_sanity_check, p);
+ if ( rc )
+ return rc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
extern int ss_initialized;
/*
@@ -1505,7 +1743,7 @@
if ( le32_to_cpu(buf[0]) != POLICYDB_MAGIC )
{
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: policydb magic number 0x%x does "
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: policydb magic number 0x%x does "
"not match expected magic number 0x%x\n",
le32_to_cpu(buf[0]), POLICYDB_MAGIC);
goto bad;
@@ -1514,7 +1752,7 @@
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
if ( len != strlen(POLICYDB_STRING) )
{
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: policydb string length %d does not
"
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: policydb string length %d does not "
"match expected length %lu\n",
len, strlen(POLICYDB_STRING));
goto bad;
@@ -1522,7 +1760,7 @@
policydb_str = xmalloc_array(char, len + 1);
if ( !policydb_str )
{
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: unable to allocate memory for policydb
"
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: unable to allocate memory for policydb
"
"string of length %d\n", len);
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto bad;
@@ -1530,14 +1768,14 @@
rc = next_entry(policydb_str, fp, len);
if ( rc < 0 )
{
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: truncated policydb string
identifier\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: truncated policydb string
identifier\n");
xfree(policydb_str);
goto bad;
}
policydb_str[len] = 0;
if ( strcmp(policydb_str, POLICYDB_STRING) )
{
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: policydb string %s does not match
"
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: policydb string %s does not match "
"my string %s\n", policydb_str, POLICYDB_STRING);
xfree(policydb_str);
goto bad;
@@ -1555,7 +1793,7 @@
if ( p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN ||
p->policyvers >
POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX )
{
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: policydb version %d does not match
"
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: policydb version %d does not match
"
"my version range %d-%d\n",
le32_to_cpu(buf[0]), POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN,
POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX);
goto bad;
@@ -1589,20 +1827,28 @@
}
}
+ if ( p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP &&
+ ebitmap_read(&p->policycaps, fp) != 0 )
+ goto bad;
+
+ if ( p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE &&
+ ebitmap_read(&p->permissive_map, fp) != 0 )
+ goto bad;
+
info = policydb_lookup_compat(p->policyvers);
if ( !info )
{
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: unable to find policy compat info
"
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: unable to find policy compat info "
"for version %d\n", p->policyvers);
goto bad;
}
if ( le32_to_cpu(buf[2]) != info->sym_num ||
- le32_to_cpu(buf[3]) !=
info->ocon_num )
+ le32_to_cpu(buf[3]) != info->ocon_num )
{
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: policydb table sizes (%d,%d) do "
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: policydb table sizes (%d,%d) do "
"not match mine (%d,%d)\n", le32_to_cpu(buf[2]),
- le32_to_cpu(buf[3]),
+ le32_to_cpu(buf[3]),
info->sym_num, info->ocon_num);
goto bad;
}
@@ -1624,7 +1870,7 @@
p->symtab[i].nprim = nprim;
}
- rc = avtab_read(&p->te_avtab, fp, p->policyvers);
+ rc = avtab_read(&p->te_avtab, fp, p);
if ( rc )
goto bad;
@@ -1659,6 +1905,13 @@
tr->role = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
tr->type = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
tr->new_role = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ if ( !policydb_role_isvalid(p, tr->role) ||
+ !policydb_type_isvalid(p, tr->type) ||
+ !policydb_role_isvalid(p, tr->new_role) )
+ {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto bad;
+ }
ltr = tr;
}
@@ -1685,6 +1938,12 @@
goto bad;
ra->role = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
ra->new_role = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ if ( !policydb_role_isvalid(p, ra->role) ||
+ !policydb_role_isvalid(p, ra->new_role) )
+ {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto bad;
+ }
lra = ra;
}
@@ -1720,15 +1979,20 @@
rc = -EINVAL;
switch ( i )
{
- case OCON_ISID:
- rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
- if ( rc < 0 )
- goto bad;
- c->sid[0] = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
- rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p,
fp);
- if ( rc )
- goto bad;
+ case OCON_ISID:
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if ( rc < 0 )
+ goto bad;
+ c->sid[0] = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+ if ( rc )
+ goto bad;
break;
+ default:
+ printk(KERN_ERR
+ "Flask: unsupported object context config
data\n");
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto bad;
}
}
}
@@ -1737,9 +2001,16 @@
if ( rc < 0 )
goto bad;
nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ if ( nel )
+ {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: unsupported genfs config data\n");
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto bad;
+ }
if ( p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS )
{
+ int new_rangetr = p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
if ( rc < 0 )
goto bad;
@@ -1761,11 +2032,31 @@
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, (sizeof(u32) * 2));
if ( rc < 0 )
goto bad;
- rt->dom = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
- rt->type = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
- rc = mls_read_range_helper(&rt->range, fp);
+ rt->source_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ rt->target_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ if ( new_rangetr )
+ {
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if ( rc < 0 )
+ goto bad;
+ rt->target_class = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ } else
+ rt->target_class = SECCLASS_DOMAIN;
+ if ( !policydb_type_isvalid(p, rt->source_type) ||
+ !policydb_type_isvalid(p, rt->target_type) ||
+ !policydb_class_isvalid(p, rt->target_class) )
+ {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ rc = mls_read_range_helper(&rt->target_range, fp);
if ( rc )
goto bad;
+ if ( !mls_range_isvalid(p, &rt->target_range) )
+ {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "Flask: rangetrans: invalid
range\n");
+ goto bad;
+ }
lrt = rt;
}
}
@@ -1787,6 +2078,10 @@
goto bad;
}
+ rc = policydb_bounds_sanity_check(p);
+ if ( rc )
+ goto bad;
+
rc = 0;
out:
return rc;
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/policydb.h b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/policydb.h
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/policydb.h
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/policydb.h
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
/* Role attributes */
struct role_datum {
u32 value; /* internal role value */
+ u32 bounds; /* boundary of role */
struct ebitmap dominates; /* set of roles dominated by this role */
struct ebitmap types; /* set of authorized types for role */
};
@@ -83,12 +84,25 @@
/* Type attributes */
struct type_datum {
u32 value; /* internal type value */
+ u32 bounds; /* boundary of type */
unsigned char primary; /* primary name? */
+ unsigned char attribute;/* attribute ?*/
};
+/*
+ * type_datum properties
+ * available at the kernel policy version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY
+ */
+#define TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_PRIMARY 0x0001
+#define TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_ATTRIBUTE 0x0002
+
+/* limitation of boundary depth */
+#define POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH 4
+
/* User attributes */
struct user_datum {
u32 value; /* internal user value */
+ u32 bounds; /* bounds of user */
struct ebitmap roles; /* set of authorized roles for user */
struct mls_range range; /* MLS range (min - max) for user */
struct mls_level dfltlevel; /* default login MLS level for user */
@@ -108,9 +122,10 @@
};
struct range_trans {
- u32 dom; /* current process domain */
- u32 type; /* program executable type */
- struct mls_range range; /* new range */
+ u32 source_type;
+ u32 target_type;
+ u32 target_class;
+ struct mls_range target_range;
struct range_trans *next;
};
@@ -191,6 +206,7 @@
struct class_datum **class_val_to_struct;
struct role_datum **role_val_to_struct;
struct user_datum **user_val_to_struct;
+ struct type_datum **type_val_to_struct;
/* type enforcement access vectors and transitions */
struct avtab te_avtab;
@@ -218,12 +234,19 @@
/* type -> attribute reverse mapping */
struct ebitmap *type_attr_map;
+ struct ebitmap policycaps;
+
+ struct ebitmap permissive_map;
+
unsigned int policyvers;
};
extern void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p);
extern int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s);
extern int policydb_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c);
+extern int policydb_class_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int class);
+extern int policydb_type_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int type);
+extern int policydb_role_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int role);
extern int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
#define PERM_SYMTAB_SIZE 32
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/services.c b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/services.c
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/services.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/services.c
@@ -12,8 +12,22 @@
*
* Added conditional policy language extensions
*
- * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
- * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul.moore@hp.com>
+ *
+ * Added support for the policy capability bitmap
+ *
+ * Updated: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * Added validation of kernel classes and permissions
+ *
+ * Updated: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
+ *
+ * Added support for bounds domain and audit messaged on masked permissions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2008, 2009 NEC Corporation
+ * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004, 2006 Tresys Technology, LLC
* Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -42,9 +56,9 @@
static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock);
#define POLICY_RDLOCK read_lock(&policy_rwlock)
-#define POLICY_WRLOCK write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock)
+#define POLICY_WRLOCK write_lock(&policy_rwlock)
#define POLICY_RDUNLOCK read_unlock(&policy_rwlock)
-#define POLICY_WRUNLOCK write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock)
+#define POLICY_WRUNLOCK write_unlock(&policy_rwlock)
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(load_sem);
#define LOAD_LOCK spin_lock(&load_sem)
@@ -66,6 +80,12 @@
static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext,
u32 *scontext_len);
+static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u32 requested,
+ struct av_decision *avd);
+
/*
* Return the boolean value of a constraint expression
* when it is applied to the specified source and target
@@ -259,12 +279,180 @@
}
/*
+ * security_dump_masked_av - dumps masked permissions during
+ * security_compute_av due to RBAC, MLS/Constraint and Type bounds.
+ */
+static int dump_masked_av_helper(void *k, void *d, void *args)
+{
+ struct perm_datum *pdatum = d;
+ char **permission_names = args;
+
+ BUG_ON(pdatum->value < 1 || pdatum->value > 32);
+
+ permission_names[pdatum->value - 1] = (char *)k;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void security_dump_masked_av(struct context *scontext,
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u32 permissions,
+ const char *reason)
+{
+ struct common_datum *common_dat;
+ struct class_datum *tclass_dat;
+ char *tclass_name;
+ char *scontext_name = NULL;
+ char *tcontext_name = NULL;
+ char *permission_names[32];
+ int index;
+ u32 length;
+ unsigned char need_comma = 0;
+
+ if ( !permissions )
+ return;
+
+ tclass_name = policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass - 1];
+ tclass_dat = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+ common_dat = tclass_dat->comdatum;
+
+ /* init permission_names */
+ if ( common_dat &&
+ hashtab_map(common_dat->permissions.table,
+ dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0 )
+ goto out;
+
+ if ( hashtab_map(tclass_dat->permissions.table,
+ dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0 )
+ goto out;
+
+ /* get scontext/tcontext in text form */
+ if ( context_struct_to_string(scontext,
+ &scontext_name, &length) < 0 )
+ goto out;
+
+ if ( context_struct_to_string(tcontext,
+ &tcontext_name, &length) < 0 )
+ goto out;
+
+ printk("Flask: op=security_compute_av reason=%s "
+ "scontext=%s tcontext=%s tclass=%s perms=",
+ reason, scontext_name, tcontext_name, tclass_name);
+
+ for ( index = 0; index < 32; index++ )
+ {
+ u32 mask = (1 << index);
+
+ if ( (mask & permissions) == 0 )
+ continue;
+
+ printk("%s%s",
+ need_comma ? "," : "",
+ permission_names[index]
+ ? permission_names[index] : "????");
+ need_comma = 1;
+ }
+ printk("\n");
+out:
+ /* release scontext/tcontext */
+ xfree(tcontext_name);
+ xfree(scontext_name);
+
+ return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * security_boundary_permission - drops violated permissions
+ * on boundary constraint.
+ */
+static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u32 requested,
+ struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+ struct context lo_scontext;
+ struct context lo_tcontext;
+ struct av_decision lo_avd;
+ struct type_datum *source
+ = policydb.type_val_to_struct[scontext->type - 1];
+ struct type_datum *target
+ = policydb.type_val_to_struct[tcontext->type - 1];
+ u32 masked = 0;
+
+ if ( source->bounds )
+ {
+ memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
+
+ memcpy(&lo_scontext, scontext, sizeof(lo_scontext));
+ lo_scontext.type = source->bounds;
+
+ context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
+ tcontext,
+ tclass,
+ requested,
+ &lo_avd);
+ if ( (lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed )
+ return; /* no masked permission */
+ masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
+ }
+
+ if ( target->bounds )
+ {
+ memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
+
+ memcpy(&lo_tcontext, tcontext, sizeof(lo_tcontext));
+ lo_tcontext.type = target->bounds;
+
+ context_struct_compute_av(scontext,
+ &lo_tcontext,
+ tclass,
+ requested,
+ &lo_avd);
+ if ( (lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed )
+ return; /* no masked permission */
+ masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
+ }
+
+ if ( source->bounds && target->bounds )
+ {
+ memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
+ /*
+ * lo_scontext and lo_tcontext are already
+ * set up.
+ */
+
+ context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
+ &lo_tcontext,
+ tclass,
+ requested,
+ &lo_avd);
+ if ( (lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed )
+ return; /* no masked permission */
+ masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
+ }
+
+ if ( masked )
+ {
+ /* mask violated permissions */
+ avd->allowed &= ~masked;
+
+ /* audit masked permissions */
+ security_dump_masked_av(scontext, tcontext,
+ tclass, masked, "bounds");
+ }
+}
+
+/*
* Compute access vectors based on a context structure pair for
* the permissions in a particular class.
*/
static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
- struct context *tcontext, u16 tclass, u32
requested,
- struct av_decision
*avd)
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u32 requested,
+ struct av_decision *avd)
{
struct constraint_node *constraint;
struct role_allow *ra;
@@ -275,22 +463,22 @@
struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode;
unsigned int i, j;
- if ( !tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim )
- {
- printk(KERN_ERR "security_compute_av: unrecognized class
%d\n",
- tclass);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
- tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
-
/*
* Initialize the access vectors to the default values.
*/
avd->allowed = 0;
- avd->decided = 0xffffffff;
avd->auditallow = 0;
avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
avd->seqno = latest_granting;
+ avd->flags = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * We do not presently support policydb.handle_unknown == allow in Xen.
+ */
+ if ( !tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim )
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
/*
* If a specific type enforcement rule was defined for
@@ -300,14 +488,10 @@
avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV;
sattr = &policydb.type_attr_map[scontext->type - 1];
tattr = &policydb.type_attr_map[tcontext->type - 1];
- ebitmap_for_each_bit(sattr, snode, i)
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i)
{
- if ( !ebitmap_node_get_bit(snode, i) )
- continue;
- ebitmap_for_each_bit(tattr, tnode, j)
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j)
{
- if ( !ebitmap_node_get_bit(tnode, j) )
- continue;
avkey.source_type = i + 1;
avkey.target_type = j + 1;
for ( node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
@@ -338,7 +522,7 @@
if ( (constraint->permissions & (avd->allowed) ) &&
!constraint_expr_eval(scontext, tcontext, NULL,
constraint->expr))
{
- avd->allowed = (avd->allowed) &
~(constraint->permissions);
+ avd->allowed &= ~(constraint->permissions);
}
constraint = constraint->next;
}
@@ -349,23 +533,25 @@
* pair.
*/
if ( tclass == SECCLASS_DOMAIN &&
-/* removed until future dynamic domain capability
- (avd->allowed & (DOMAIN__TRANSITION | DOMAIN__DYNTRANSITION))
&&
-*/
- scontext->role !=
tcontext->role )
- {
+ (avd->allowed & DOMAIN__TRANSITION) &&
+ scontext->role != tcontext->role )
+ {
for ( ra = policydb.role_allow; ra; ra = ra->next )
{
if ( scontext->role == ra->role && tcontext->role
== ra->new_role )
break;
}
-/* removed until future dynamic domain capability
if (!ra)
- avd->allowed = (avd->allowed) & ~(DOMAIN__TRANSITION |
- DOMAIN__DYNTRANSITION);
-*/
+ avd->allowed &= ~DOMAIN__TRANSITION;
}
+ /*
+ * If the given source and target types have boundary
+ * constraint, lazy checks have to mask any violated
+ * permission and notice it to userspace via audit.
+ */
+ type_attribute_bounds_av(scontext, tcontext,
+ tclass, requested, avd);
return 0;
}
@@ -477,7 +663,7 @@
* if the access vector decisions were computed successfully.
*/
int security_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
- struct av_decision *avd)
+ struct av_decision *avd)
{
struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
int rc = 0;
@@ -485,7 +671,6 @@
if ( !ss_initialized )
{
avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
- avd->decided = 0xffffffff;
avd->auditallow = 0;
avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
avd->seqno = latest_granting;
@@ -510,6 +695,10 @@
}
rc = context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, requested, avd);
+
+ /* permissive domain? */
+ if ( ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, scontext->type) )
+ avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
out:
POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
return rc;
@@ -611,7 +800,18 @@
}
-static int security_context_to_sid_core(char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32
*sid, u32 def_sid)
+/**
+ * security_context_to_sid - Obtain a SID for a given security context.
+ * @scontext: security context
+ * @scontext_len: length in bytes
+ * @sid: security identifier, SID
+ *
+ * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
+ * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
+ * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
+ * memory is available, or 0 on success.
+ */
+int security_context_to_sid(char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid)
{
char *scontext2;
struct context context;
@@ -701,12 +901,12 @@
*p++ = 0;
typdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, scontextp);
- if ( !typdatum )
+ if ( !typdatum || typdatum->attribute )
goto out_unlock;
context.type = typdatum->value;
- rc = mls_context_to_sid(oldc, &p, &context, &sidtab, def_sid);
+ rc = mls_context_to_sid(oldc, &p, &context, &sidtab);
if ( rc )
goto out_unlock;
@@ -732,45 +932,6 @@
return rc;
}
-/**
- * security_context_to_sid - Obtain a SID for a given security context.
- * @scontext: security context
- * @scontext_len: length in bytes
- * @sid: security identifier, SID
- *
- * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
- * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
- * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
- * memory is available, or 0 on success.
- */
-int security_context_to_sid(char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid)
-{
- return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
- sid, SECSID_NULL);
-}
-
-/**
- * security_context_to_sid_default - Obtain a SID for a given security context,
- * falling back to specified default if needed.
- *
- * @scontext: security context
- * @scontext_len: length in bytes
- * @sid: security identifier, SID
- * @def_sid: default SID to assign on errror
- *
- * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
- * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
- * The default SID is passed to the MLS layer to be used to allow
- * kernel labeling of the MLS field if the MLS field is not present
- * (for upgrading to MLS without full relabel).
- * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
- * memory is available, or 0 on success.
- */
-int security_context_to_sid_default(char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid,
u32 def_sid)
-{
- return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len, sid, def_sid);
-}
-
static int compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(
struct context *scontext, struct context *tcontext, u16 tclass,
struct context *newcontext)
@@ -1001,88 +1162,128 @@
}
/*
- * Verify that each permission that is defined under the
- * existing policy is still defined with the same value
- * in the new policy.
+ * Verify that each kernel class that is defined in the
+ * policy is correct
*/
-static int validate_perm(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+static int validate_classes(struct policydb *p)
{
- struct hashtab *h;
- struct perm_datum *perdatum, *perdatum2;
- int rc = 0;
+ int i, j;
+ struct class_datum *cladatum;
+ struct perm_datum *perdatum;
+ u32 nprim, tmp, common_pts_len, perm_val, pol_val;
+ u16 class_val;
+ const struct selinux_class_perm *kdefs = &selinux_class_perm;
+ const char *def_class, *def_perm, *pol_class;
+ struct symtab *perms;
- h = p;
- perdatum = datum;
-
- perdatum2 = hashtab_search(h, key);
- if ( !perdatum2 )
+ for ( i = 1; i < kdefs->cts_len; i++ )
{
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: permission %s disappeared", (char
*)key);
- rc = -ENOENT;
- goto out;
- }
- if ( perdatum->value != perdatum2->value )
- {
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: the value of permission %s
changed",
- (char *)key);
- rc = -EINVAL;
- }
-out:
- return rc;
-}
-
-/*
- * Verify that each class that is defined under the
- * existing policy is still defined with the same
- * attributes in the new policy.
- */
-static int validate_class(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
-{
- struct policydb *newp;
- struct class_datum *cladatum, *cladatum2;
- int rc;
-
- newp = p;
- cladatum = datum;
-
- cladatum2 = hashtab_search(newp->p_classes.table, key);
- if ( !cladatum2 )
- {
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: class %s disappeared\n", (char
*)key);
- rc = -ENOENT;
- goto out;
- }
- if (cladatum->value != cladatum2->value) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: the value of class %s changed\n",
- (char *)key);
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
- if ( (cladatum->comdatum && !cladatum2->comdatum) ||
- (!cladatum->comdatum &&
cladatum2->comdatum) )
- {
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: the inherits clause for the access
"
- "vector definition for class %s changed\n", (char
*)key);
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
- if ( cladatum->comdatum )
- {
- rc = hashtab_map(cladatum->comdatum->permissions.table,
validate_perm,
-
cladatum2->comdatum->permissions.table);
- if ( rc )
+ def_class = kdefs->class_to_string[i];
+ if ( !def_class )
+ continue;
+ if ( i > p->p_classes.nprim )
{
- printk(" in the access vector definition for class %s\n",
- (char *)key);
- goto out;
+ printk(KERN_INFO
+ "Flask: class %s not defined in policy\n",
+ def_class);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ pol_class = p->p_class_val_to_name[i-1];
+ if ( strcmp(pol_class, def_class) )
+ {
+ printk(KERN_ERR
+ "Flask: class %d is incorrect, found %s but should be
%s\n",
+ i, pol_class, def_class);
+ return -EINVAL;
}
}
- rc = hashtab_map(cladatum->permissions.table, validate_perm,
-
cladatum2->permissions.table);
- if ( rc )
- printk(" in access vector definition for class %s\n", (char
*)key);
-out:
- return rc;
+ for ( i = 0; i < kdefs->av_pts_len; i++ )
+ {
+ class_val = kdefs->av_perm_to_string[i].tclass;
+ perm_val = kdefs->av_perm_to_string[i].value;
+ def_perm = kdefs->av_perm_to_string[i].name;
+ if ( class_val > p->p_classes.nprim )
+ continue;
+ pol_class = p->p_class_val_to_name[class_val-1];
+ cladatum = hashtab_search(p->p_classes.table, pol_class);
+ BUG_ON( !cladatum );
+ perms = &cladatum->permissions;
+ nprim = 1 << (perms->nprim - 1);
+ if ( perm_val > nprim )
+ {
+ printk(KERN_INFO
+ "Flask: permission %s in class %s not defined in
policy\n",
+ def_perm, pol_class);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ perdatum = hashtab_search(perms->table, def_perm);
+ if ( perdatum == NULL )
+ {
+ printk(KERN_ERR
+ "Flask: permission %s in class %s not found in
policy\n",
+ def_perm, pol_class);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ pol_val = 1 << (perdatum->value - 1);
+ if ( pol_val != perm_val )
+ {
+ printk(KERN_ERR
+ "Flask: permission %s in class %s has incorrect
value\n",
+ def_perm, pol_class);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+ for ( i = 0; i < kdefs->av_inherit_len; i++ )
+ {
+ class_val = kdefs->av_inherit[i].tclass;
+ if ( class_val > p->p_classes.nprim )
+ continue;
+ pol_class = p->p_class_val_to_name[class_val-1];
+ cladatum = hashtab_search(p->p_classes.table, pol_class);
+ BUG_ON( !cladatum );
+ if ( !cladatum->comdatum )
+ {
+ printk(KERN_ERR
+ "Flask: class %s should have an inherits clause but does
not\n",
+ pol_class);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ tmp = kdefs->av_inherit[i].common_base;
+ common_pts_len = 0;
+ while ( !(tmp & 0x01) )
+ {
+ common_pts_len++;
+ tmp >>= 1;
+ }
+ perms = &cladatum->comdatum->permissions;
+ for ( j = 0; j < common_pts_len; j++ )
+ {
+ def_perm = kdefs->av_inherit[i].common_pts[j];
+ if ( j >= perms->nprim )
+ {
+ printk(KERN_INFO
+ "Flask: permission %s in class %s not defined in
policy\n",
+ def_perm, pol_class);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ perdatum = hashtab_search(perms->table, def_perm);
+ if ( perdatum == NULL )
+ {
+ printk(KERN_ERR
+ "Flask: permission %s in class %s not found in
policy\n",
+ def_perm, pol_class);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if ( perdatum->value != j + 1 )
+ {
+ printk(KERN_ERR
+ "Flask: permission %s in class %s has incorrect
value\n",
+ def_perm, pol_class);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
}
/* Clone the SID into the new SID table. */
@@ -1105,7 +1306,7 @@
u32 len;
context_struct_to_string(context, &s, &len);
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: context %s is invalid\n", s);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: context %s is invalid\n", s);
xfree(s);
}
return rc;
@@ -1184,12 +1385,12 @@
bad:
context_struct_to_string(&oldc, &s, &len);
context_destroy(&oldc);
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: invalidating context %s\n", s);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: invalidating context %s\n", s);
xfree(s);
goto out;
}
-extern void flask_complete_init(void);
+static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p);
/**
* security_load_policy - Load a security policy configuration.
@@ -1225,6 +1426,14 @@
policydb_destroy(&policydb);
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if ( validate_classes(&policydb) )
+ {
+ printk(KERN_ERR
+ "Flask: the definition of a class is
incorrect\n");
+ sidtab_destroy(&sidtab);
+ policydb_destroy(&policydb);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
policydb_loaded_version = policydb.policyvers;
ss_initialized = 1;
seqno = ++latest_granting;
@@ -1245,15 +1454,22 @@
sidtab_init(&newsidtab);
- /* Verify that the existing classes did not change. */
- if ( hashtab_map(policydb.p_classes.table, validate_class,
&newpolicydb) )
+ /* Verify that the kernel defined classes are correct. */
+ if ( validate_classes(&newpolicydb) )
{
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: the definition of an existing "
- "class
changed\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR
+ "Flask: the definition of a class is incorrect\n");
rc = -EINVAL;
goto err;
}
+ rc = security_preserve_bools(&newpolicydb);
+ if ( rc )
+ {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Flask: unable to preserve booleans\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
/* Clone the SID table. */
sidtab_shutdown(&sidtab);
if ( sidtab_map(&sidtab, clone_sid, &newsidtab) )
@@ -1517,15 +1733,11 @@
}
memset(mysids, 0, maxnel*sizeof(*mysids));
- ebitmap_for_each_bit(&user->roles, rnode, i)
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user->roles, rnode, i)
{
- if ( !ebitmap_node_get_bit(rnode, i) )
- continue;
role = policydb.role_val_to_struct[i];
usercon.role = i+1;
- ebitmap_for_each_bit(&role->types, tnode, j) {
- if ( !ebitmap_node_get_bit(tnode, j) )
- continue;
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&role->types, tnode, j) {
usercon.type = j+1;
if ( mls_setup_user_range(fromcon, user, &usercon) )
@@ -1640,7 +1852,7 @@
goto out;
}
- printk(KERN_INFO "security: committed booleans { ");
+ printk(KERN_INFO "Flask: committed booleans { ");
for ( i = 0; i < len; i++ )
{
if ( values[i] )
@@ -1695,3 +1907,37 @@
POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
return rc;
}
+
+static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p)
+{
+ int rc, nbools = 0, *bvalues = NULL, i;
+ char **bnames = NULL;
+ struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
+ struct cond_node *cur;
+
+ rc = security_get_bools(&nbools, &bnames, &bvalues);
+ if ( rc )
+ goto out;
+ for ( i = 0; i < nbools; i++ )
+ {
+ booldatum = hashtab_search(p->p_bools.table, bnames[i]);
+ if ( booldatum )
+ booldatum->state = bvalues[i];
+ }
+ for ( cur = p->cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next )
+ {
+ rc = evaluate_cond_node(p, cur);
+ if ( rc )
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+out:
+ if ( bnames )
+ {
+ for ( i = 0; i < nbools; i++ )
+ xfree(bnames[i]);
+ }
+ xfree(bnames);
+ xfree(bvalues);
+ return rc;
+}
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/sidtab.c b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/sidtab.c
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/sidtab.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/sidtab.c
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
{
int i;
- s->htable = (void *)xmalloc_array(struct sidtab_node, SIDTAB_SIZE);
+ s->htable = xmalloc_array(struct sidtab_node *, SIDTAB_SIZE);
if ( !s->htable )
return -ENOMEM;
for ( i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++ )
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/symtab.c b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/symtab.c
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/symtab.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/symtab.c
@@ -12,9 +12,9 @@
#include <xen/errno.h>
#include "symtab.h"
-static unsigned int symhash(struct hashtab *h, void *key)
+static unsigned int symhash(struct hashtab *h, const void *key)
{
- char *p, *keyp;
+ const char *p, *keyp;
unsigned int size;
unsigned int val;
@@ -26,9 +26,9 @@
return val & (h->size - 1);
}
-static int symcmp(struct hashtab *h, void *key1, void *key2)
+static int symcmp(struct hashtab *h, const void *key1, const void *key2)
{
- char *keyp1, *keyp2;
+ const char *keyp1, *keyp2;
keyp1 = key1;
keyp2 = key2;
--
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency
_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com
http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel
Keir Fraser
2009-Aug-19 12:10 UTC
Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] xen/xsm/flask: Update to policy.24
On 18/08/2009 15:14, "Stephen Smalley" <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote:> Update Xen Flask module to policy.24. > This is a back-port of the latest SELinux code to Xen, adjusted > for Xen coding style and interfaces. Unneeded functionality such > as most object context config data, handle_unknown, MLS field defaulting, > etc has been omitted. > > Signed-off-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> > Signed-off-by: George S. Coker, II <gscoker@alpha.ncsc.mil>The patch didn''t apply. Given that the affected source files have a thick layer of dust on them, it is probably because the patch got mangled somehow. Try re-sending as an attachment. -- Keir _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel