Linux Virtualization - Jul 2015 - [PATCH v4 0/4] virtio: Clean up scatterlists and use the DMA API

On Tue, Jul 28, 2015 at 10:17 AM, Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka at siemens.com>
wrote:
> On 2015-07-28 19:10, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> The trouble is that this is really a property of the bus and not of
>> the device.  If you build a virtio device that physically plugs into a
>> PCIe slot, the device has no concept of an IOMMU in the first place.
>
> If one would build a real virtio device today, it would be broken
> because every IOMMU would start to translate its requests. Already from
> that POV, we really need to introduce a feature flag "I will be
> IOMMU-translated" so that a potential physical implementation can
carry
> it unconditionally.
>
Except that, with my patches, it would work correctly.  ISTM the thing
that's broken right now is QEMU and the virtio_pci driver.  My patches
fix the driver.  Last year that would have been the end of the story
except for PPC.  Now we have to deal with QEMU.
>> Similarly, if you take an L0-provided IOMMU-supporting device and pass
>> it through to L2 using current QEMU on L1 (with Q35 emulation and
>> iommu enabled), then, from L2's perspective, the device is 1:1 no
>> matter what the device thinks.
>>
>> IOW, I think the original design was wrong and now we have to deal
>> with it.  I think the best solution would be to teach QEMU to fix its
>> ACPI tables so that 1:1 virtio devices are actually exposed as 1:1.
>
> Only the current drivers are broken. And we can easily tell them apart
> from newer ones via feature flags. Sorry, don't get the problem.
I still don't see how feature flags solve the problem.  Suppose we
added a feature flag meaning "respects IOMMU".

Bad case 1:  Build a malicious device that advertises
non-IOMMU-respecting virtio.  Plug it in behind an IOMMU.  Host starts
leaking physical addresses to the device (and the device doesn't work,
of course).  Maybe that's only barely a security problem, but still...

Bad case 2:  Use current QEMU w/ IOMMU enabled.  Assign a virtio
device provided by L0 QEMU to L2.  L1 crashes.  I consider *that* to
be a security problem, although in practice no one will configure
their system that way because it has zero chance of actually working.
Nonetheless, the device does work if L1 accesses it directly?  The
issue is vfio doesn't notice that the device doesn't respect the IOMMU
because "respects-IOMMU" is a property of the PCI bus and the platform
IOMMU, and vfio assumes it works correctly.

Bad case 2: Some hypothetical well-behaved new QEMU provides a virtio
device that *does* respect the IOMMU and sets the feature flag.  They
emulate Q35 with an IOMMU.  They boot Linux 4.1.  Data corruption in
the guest.

We could make the rule that *all* virtio-pci devices (except on PPC)
respect the bus rules.  We'd have to fix QEMU so that virtio devices
on Q35 iommu=on systems set up a PCI topology where the devices
*aren't* behind the IOMMU or are protected by RMRRs or whatever.  Then
old kernels would work correctly on new hosts, new kernels would work
correctly except on old iommu-providing hosts, and Xen would work.

In fact, on Xen, it's impossible without colossal hacks to support
non-IOMMU-respecting virtio devices because Xen acts as an
intermediate IOMMU between the Linux dom0 guest and the actual host.
The QEMU host doesn't even know that Xen is involved.  This is why Xen
and virtio don't currently work together (without my patches): the
device thinks it doesn't respect the IOMMU, the driver thinks the
device doesn't respect the IOMMU, and they're both wrong.

TL;DR: I think there are only two cases.  Either a device respects the
IOMMU or a device doesn't know whether it respects the IOMMU.  The
latter case is problematic.

--Andy

On 2015-07-28 20:22, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 28, 2015 at 10:17 AM, Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka at
siemens.com> wrote:
>> On 2015-07-28 19:10, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>> The trouble is that this is really a property of the bus and not of
>>> the device.  If you build a virtio device that physically plugs
into a
>>> PCIe slot, the device has no concept of an IOMMU in the first
place.
>>
>> If one would build a real virtio device today, it would be broken
>> because every IOMMU would start to translate its requests. Already from
>> that POV, we really need to introduce a feature flag "I will be
>> IOMMU-translated" so that a potential physical implementation can
carry
>> it unconditionally.
>>
> 
> Except that, with my patches, it would work correctly.  ISTM the thing
I haven't looked at your patches yet - they make the virtio PCI driver
in Linux IOMMU-compatible? Perfect - except for a compatibility check,
right?
> that's broken right now is QEMU and the virtio_pci driver.  My patches
> fix the driver.  Last year that would have been the end of the story
> except for PPC.  Now we have to deal with QEMU.
> 
>>> Similarly, if you take an L0-provided IOMMU-supporting device and
pass
>>> it through to L2 using current QEMU on L1 (with Q35 emulation and
>>> iommu enabled), then, from L2's perspective, the device is 1:1
no
>>> matter what the device thinks.
>>>
>>> IOW, I think the original design was wrong and now we have to deal
>>> with it.  I think the best solution would be to teach QEMU to fix
its
>>> ACPI tables so that 1:1 virtio devices are actually exposed as 1:1.
>>
>> Only the current drivers are broken. And we can easily tell them apart
>> from newer ones via feature flags. Sorry, don't get the problem.
> 
> I still don't see how feature flags solve the problem.  Suppose we
> added a feature flag meaning "respects IOMMU".
> 
> Bad case 1:  Build a malicious device that advertises
> non-IOMMU-respecting virtio.  Plug it in behind an IOMMU.  Host starts
> leaking physical addresses to the device (and the device doesn't work,
> of course).  Maybe that's only barely a security problem, but still...
I don't see right now how critical such a hypothetical case could be.
But the OS / its drivers could still decide to refuse talking to such a
device.
> 
> Bad case 2:  Use current QEMU w/ IOMMU enabled.  Assign a virtio
> device provided by L0 QEMU to L2.  L1 crashes.  I consider *that* to
> be a security problem, although in practice no one will configure
> their system that way because it has zero chance of actually working.
> Nonetheless, the device does work if L1 accesses it directly?  The
> issue is vfio doesn't notice that the device doesn't respect the
IOMMU
> because "respects-IOMMU" is a property of the PCI bus and the
platform
> IOMMU, and vfio assumes it works correctly.
I would have no problem with rejecting configurations in future QEMU
that try to expose unconfined virtio devices in the presence of IOMMU
emulation. Once we can do better, it's just about letting the guest know
about the difference.

The current situation is indeed just broken, we don't need to discuss
this as we can't change history to prevent this.
> 
> Bad case 2: Some hypothetical well-behaved new QEMU provides a virtio
> device that *does* respect the IOMMU and sets the feature flag.  They
> emulate Q35 with an IOMMU.  They boot Linux 4.1.  Data corruption in
> the guest.
No. In that case, the feature negotiation of
"virtio-with-iommu-support"
would have failed for older drivers, and the device would have never
been used by the guest.
> 
> We could make the rule that *all* virtio-pci devices (except on PPC)
> respect the bus rules.  We'd have to fix QEMU so that virtio devices
> on Q35 iommu=on systems set up a PCI topology where the devices
> *aren't* behind the IOMMU or are protected by RMRRs or whatever.  Then
> old kernels would work correctly on new hosts, new kernels would work
> correctly except on old iommu-providing hosts, and Xen would work.
I don't see a point in doing anything about old QEMU with IOMMU enabled
and virtio devices plugged except declaring such setups broken. No one
should have configured this for production purposes, only for test
setups (like we, with the knowledge about the limitations).
> 
> In fact, on Xen, it's impossible without colossal hacks to support
> non-IOMMU-respecting virtio devices because Xen acts as an
> intermediate IOMMU between the Linux dom0 guest and the actual host.
> The QEMU host doesn't even know that Xen is involved.  This is why Xen
> and virtio don't currently work together (without my patches): the
> device thinks it doesn't respect the IOMMU, the driver thinks the
> device doesn't respect the IOMMU, and they're both wrong.
> 
> TL;DR: I think there are only two cases.  Either a device respects the
> IOMMU or a device doesn't know whether it respects the IOMMU.  The
> latter case is problematic.
See above, the latter is only problematic on setups that actually use an
IOMMU. If that includes Xen, then no one should use it until virtio can
declare itself IOMMU compatible, and drivers exist that process this.

Jan

-- 
Siemens AG, Corporate Technology, CT RTC ITP SES-DE
Corporate Competence Center Embedded Linux

On Tue, Jul 28, 2015 at 12:06 PM, Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka at siemens.com>
wrote:
> On 2015-07-28 20:22, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> On Tue, Jul 28, 2015 at 10:17 AM, Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka at
siemens.com> wrote:
>>> On 2015-07-28 19:10, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>>> The trouble is that this is really a property of the bus and
not of
>>>> the device.  If you build a virtio device that physically plugs
into a
>>>> PCIe slot, the device has no concept of an IOMMU in the first
place.
>>>
>>> If one would build a real virtio device today, it would be broken
>>> because every IOMMU would start to translate its requests. Already
from
>>> that POV, we really need to introduce a feature flag "I will
be
>>> IOMMU-translated" so that a potential physical implementation
can carry
>>> it unconditionally.
>>>
>>
>> Except that, with my patches, it would work correctly.  ISTM the thing
>
> I haven't looked at your patches yet - they make the virtio PCI driver
> in Linux IOMMU-compatible? Perfect - except for a compatibility check,
> right?
Yes.  (virtio_pci_legacy, anyway.  Presumably virtio_pci_modern is
easy to adapt, too.)
>
>> that's broken right now is QEMU and the virtio_pci driver.  My
patches
>> fix the driver.  Last year that would have been the end of the story
>> except for PPC.  Now we have to deal with QEMU.
>>
>>>> Similarly, if you take an L0-provided IOMMU-supporting device
and pass
>>>> it through to L2 using current QEMU on L1 (with Q35 emulation
and
>>>> iommu enabled), then, from L2's perspective, the device is
1:1 no
>>>> matter what the device thinks.
>>>>
>>>> IOW, I think the original design was wrong and now we have to
deal
>>>> with it.  I think the best solution would be to teach QEMU to
fix its
>>>> ACPI tables so that 1:1 virtio devices are actually exposed as
1:1.
>>>
>>> Only the current drivers are broken. And we can easily tell them
apart
>>> from newer ones via feature flags. Sorry, don't get the
problem.
>>
>> I still don't see how feature flags solve the problem.  Suppose we
>> added a feature flag meaning "respects IOMMU".
>>
>> Bad case 1:  Build a malicious device that advertises
>> non-IOMMU-respecting virtio.  Plug it in behind an IOMMU.  Host starts
>> leaking physical addresses to the device (and the device doesn't
work,
>> of course).  Maybe that's only barely a security problem, but
still...
>
> I don't see right now how critical such a hypothetical case could be.
> But the OS / its drivers could still decide to refuse talking to such a
> device.
>
How does OS know it's such a device as opposed to a QEMU-supplied thing?
>>
>> Bad case 2: Some hypothetical well-behaved new QEMU provides a virtio
>> device that *does* respect the IOMMU and sets the feature flag.  They
>> emulate Q35 with an IOMMU.  They boot Linux 4.1.  Data corruption in
>> the guest.
>
> No. In that case, the feature negotiation of
"virtio-with-iommu-support"
> would have failed for older drivers, and the device would have never
> been used by the guest.
So are you suggesting that newer virtio devices always provide this
feature flag and, if supplied by QEMU with iommu=on, simply refuse to
operate of the driver doesn't support that flag?

That could work as long as QEMU with the current (broken?) iommu=on
never exposes such a device.
>
>>
>> We could make the rule that *all* virtio-pci devices (except on PPC)
>> respect the bus rules.  We'd have to fix QEMU so that virtio
devices
>> on Q35 iommu=on systems set up a PCI topology where the devices
>> *aren't* behind the IOMMU or are protected by RMRRs or whatever. 
Then
>> old kernels would work correctly on new hosts, new kernels would work
>> correctly except on old iommu-providing hosts, and Xen would work.
>
> I don't see a point in doing anything about old QEMU with IOMMU enabled
> and virtio devices plugged except declaring such setups broken. No one
> should have configured this for production purposes, only for test
> setups (like we, with the knowledge about the limitations).
>
I'm fine with that.  In fact, I proposed these patches before QEMU had
this feature in the first place.
>>
>> In fact, on Xen, it's impossible without colossal hacks to support
>> non-IOMMU-respecting virtio devices because Xen acts as an
>> intermediate IOMMU between the Linux dom0 guest and the actual host.
>> The QEMU host doesn't even know that Xen is involved.  This is why
Xen
>> and virtio don't currently work together (without my patches): the
>> device thinks it doesn't respect the IOMMU, the driver thinks the
>> device doesn't respect the IOMMU, and they're both wrong.
>>
>> TL;DR: I think there are only two cases.  Either a device respects the
>> IOMMU or a device doesn't know whether it respects the IOMMU.  The
>> latter case is problematic.
>
> See above, the latter is only problematic on setups that actually use an
> IOMMU. If that includes Xen, then no one should use it until virtio can
> declare itself IOMMU compatible, and drivers exist that process this.
Xen works right now with my patches on standard QEMU (as long as
iommu=off).  Certainly no one except me uses it now with virtio
because it doesn't work with mainline kernels.

If we apply something similar enough to my patches, then even old
hypervisors (e.g. Amazon's hardware virt systems) will support Xen
with virtio devices passed in just fine.

--Andy