Virtualization - Jun 2020 - Should SEV-ES #VC use IST? (Re: [PATCH] Allow RDTSC and RDTSCP from userspace)

On Mon, Apr 27, 2020 at 10:37:41AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski
wrote:
> I have a somewhat serious question: should we use IST for #VC at all?
> As I understand it, Rome and Naples make it mandatory for hypervisors
> to intercept #DB, which means that, due to the MOV SS mess, it's sort
> of mandatory to use IST for #VC.  But Milan fixes the #DB issue, so,
> if we're running under a sufficiently sensible hypervisor, we don't
> need IST for #VC.
The reason for #VC being IST is not only #DB, but also SEV-SNP. SNP adds
page ownership tracking between guest and host, so that the hypervisor
can't remap guest pages without the guest noticing.

If there is a violation of ownership, which can happen at any memory
access, there will be a #VC exception to notify the guest. And as this
can happen anywhere, for example on a carefully crafted stack page set
by userspace before doing SYSCALL, the only robust choice for #VC is to
use IST.

Regards,

	Joerg

On 28/04/2020 08:55, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 27, 2020 at 10:37:41AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> I have a somewhat serious question: should we use IST for #VC at all?
>> As I understand it, Rome and Naples make it mandatory for hypervisors
>> to intercept #DB, which means that, due to the MOV SS mess, it's
sort
>> of mandatory to use IST for #VC.  But Milan fixes the #DB issue, so,
>> if we're running under a sufficiently sensible hypervisor, we
don't
>> need IST for #VC.
> The reason for #VC being IST is not only #DB, but also SEV-SNP. SNP adds
> page ownership tracking between guest and host, so that the hypervisor
> can't remap guest pages without the guest noticing.
>
> If there is a violation of ownership, which can happen at any memory
> access, there will be a #VC exception to notify the guest. And as this
> can happen anywhere, for example on a carefully crafted stack page set
> by userspace before doing SYSCALL, the only robust choice for #VC is to
> use IST.
The kernel won't ever touch the guest stack before restoring %rsp in the
syscall path, but the (minimum 2) memory accesses required to save the
user %rsp and load the kernel stack may be subject to #VC exceptions, as
are instruction fetches at the head of the SYSCALL path.

So yes - #VC needs IST.

Sorry for the noise.? (That said, it is unfortunate that the hypervisor
messing with the memory backing the guest #VC handler results in an
infinite loop, rather than an ability to cleanly terminate.)

~Andrew

On Tue, Apr 28, 2020 at 09:55:12AM +0200, Joerg Roedel
wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 27, 2020 at 10:37:41AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > I have a somewhat serious question: should we use IST for #VC at all?
> > As I understand it, Rome and Naples make it mandatory for hypervisors
> > to intercept #DB, which means that, due to the MOV SS mess, it's
sort
> > of mandatory to use IST for #VC.  But Milan fixes the #DB issue, so,
> > if we're running under a sufficiently sensible hypervisor, we
don't
> > need IST for #VC.
> 
> The reason for #VC being IST is not only #DB, but also SEV-SNP. SNP adds
> page ownership tracking between guest and host, so that the hypervisor
> can't remap guest pages without the guest noticing.
> 
> If there is a violation of ownership, which can happen at any memory
> access, there will be a #VC exception to notify the guest. And as this
> can happen anywhere, for example on a carefully crafted stack page set
> by userspace before doing SYSCALL, the only robust choice for #VC is to
> use IST.
So what happens if this #VC triggers on the first access to the #VC
stack, because the malicious host has craftily mucked with only the #VC
IST stack page?

Or on the NMI IST stack, then we get #VC in NMI before the NMI can fix
you up.

AFAICT all of that is non-recoverable.

On Tue, Jun 23, 2020 at 01:07:06PM +0200, Peter Zijlstra
wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 28, 2020 at 09:55:12AM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> So what happens if this #VC triggers on the first access to the #VC
> stack, because the malicious host has craftily mucked with only the #VC
> IST stack page?
> 
> Or on the NMI IST stack, then we get #VC in NMI before the NMI can fix
> you up.
> 
> AFAICT all of that is non-recoverable.
I am not 100% sure, but I think if the #VC stack page is not validated,
the #VC should be promoted to a #DF.

Note that this is an issue only with secure nested paging (SNP), which
is not enabled yet with this patch-set. When it gets enabled a stack
recursion check in the #VC handler is needed which panics the VM. That
also fixes the #VC-in-early-NMI problem.

Regards,

	Joerg