similar to: [PATCH, RFC] i386: highmem access assistance hypercalls

While looking at the origin of very frequently executed hypercalls (as usual, kernel builds are what''s being measured), I realized that the high page accessor functions in Linux would be good candidates to handle in the hypervisor - clearing or copying to/from a high page is a pretty frequent operation (provided there''s enough memory). However, the measured results

Assumes hypervisor interface headers have been sync-ed after the hypervisor side patch was applied. As usual, written and tested on 2.6.27.3 and made apply to the 2.6.18 tree without further testing. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com> Index: head-2008-10-24/arch/i386/mm/highmem-xen.c =================================================================== ---

Please CC as I''m not subscribed to valgrind-developers. Under Xen the toolstack is responsible for managing the domains in the system, e.g. creating, destroying, and otherwise manipulating them. To do this it uses a number of ioctls on the /proc/xen/privcmd device. Most of these (the MMAPBATCH ones) simply set things up such that a subsequenct mmap call will map the desired guest

Add hypercall (shadow op: enable/disable and clean/peek dirtied page bitmap). It consists of two parts: dirty page detecting and saving. For detecting, we setup the guest p2m''s leaf PTE read-only and whenever the guest tries to write something, permission fault happens and traps into xen. The permission-faulted GPA should be saved for the toolstack (when it wants to see which pages

Make sure MFN read from pte is valid before accessing the page info structure associated with it. Drop guest-to-machine-physical translation from ptwr code. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com> Index: 2007-05-14/xen/arch/x86/mm.c =================================================================== --- 2007-05-14.orig/xen/arch/x86/mm.c 2007-05-14 13:43:50.000000000 +0200 +++

Today is my day! This is with Xen 4.4 (pulled today) when I build a kernel in dom0 and have two guests launching at the same time. This is what I get: (XEN) Assertion ''l1e_get_pfn(MAPCACHE_L1ENT(hashent->idx)) == hashent->mfn'' failed at domain_page.c:203 and it blows up. Here is the full log: \ \/ /___ _ __ | || | | || | _ _ _ __ ___| |_ __ _| |__ | | ___

__map_domain_page() *must* be matched with an unmap_domain_page(). These five static inline functions each map a page (or two), then throw away the context needed to unmap it. Each of the changes are limited to their respective functions. In two cases, this involved replacing a large amount of pointer arithmetic with memcpy() (all callers were relying on memcpy() semantics of positive/negative

I''ve encountered a rather unusual bug while I''m implementing live migration on arndale board. After resume, domU kernel starts invoking hypercalls and at some point the hypercall parameters delivered to xen are corrupted. After some debugging (with the help of HW debugger), I found that cache polution happens, and here is the detailed sequence. 1) DomU kernel allocates a local

Add two virtual device operations: 1.set the callback irq for event channel 2.setup the hypercall paramerter share page. Signed-off-by: Ke Yu <ke.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Xiaofeng Ling <xiaofeng.ling@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Arun Sharma <arun.sharma@intel.com> diff -r 287d36b46fa3 xen/arch/x86/vmx.c --- a/xen/arch/x86/vmx.c Tue Aug 30 20:36:49 2005 +++

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> CC: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org> CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> CC: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org> CC: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com> CC: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com> --- misc/coverity_model.c | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 70 insertions(+)

# HG changeset patch # User Patrick Colp <Patrick.Colp@citrix.com> # Date 1249555177 -3600 # Node ID 684c8fc69d658d058246eb9edfc8eba187ae6f2c # Parent 68e8b8379244e293c55875e7dc3692fc81d3d212 hvm emul: fix cmpxchg emulation to use an atomic operation. Currently HVM cmpxchg emulation is done by doing a normal emulated write, which is not atomic. This patch changes it to use a cmpxchg

Hi, Can anybody shed light on the Xen function map_domain_page (in xen/arch/x86/x86_32/domain_page.c)? What is it doing? Jinpeng Wei _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel

x86:x2apic: Disable x2apic on x86-32 permanently x2apic initialization on x86_32 uses vcpu pointer before it is initialized. As x2apic is unlikely to be used on x86_32, this patch disables x2apic permanently on x86_32. It also asserts the sanity of vcpu pointer before dereference to prevent further misuse. Signed-off-by: Fengzhe Zhang <fengzhe.zhang@intel.com> diff -r 02c0af2bf280

From: Pranavkumar Sawargaonkar <pranavkumar@linaro.org> This patch adds initial platform stubs for APM X-Gene. Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup.patel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Pranavkumar Sawargaonkar <pranavkumar@linaro.org> Drop earlyprintk (split into earlier patch). Only build on ARM64. Drop empty init and reset hooks and enable 1:1 workaround. Signed-off-by: Ian

Trap guest WFI, block the guest VCPU unless it has pending interrupts. Awake the guest vcpu when a new interrupt for it arrrives. Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com> --- xen/arch/arm/domain_build.c | 2 +- xen/arch/arm/traps.c | 6 ++++++ xen/arch/arm/vgic.c | 4 +++- 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git

# HG changeset patch # User h00166998@h00166998.china.huawei.com # Date 1329462865 -28800 # Node ID 9fd12f919ddbd15927117eff42149664dba698ca # Parent b75664e5390583c5d2075c82a14245bc941b3aaf x86/mm: Make sure the event channel is released accurately In xenpaging source code,there is an interdomain communication between dom0 and domU. In mem_event_enable(),the function

Use copy_from_user when accessing guest_pt[] Signed-off-by: Arun Sharma <arun.sharma@intel.com> diff -r 2d289d7ab961 -r d0eccea63a24 xen/arch/x86/shadow.c --- a/xen/arch/x86/shadow.c Thu Jun 30 05:26:09 2005 +++ b/xen/arch/x86/shadow.c Thu Jun 30 05:26:24 2005 @@ -1906,7 +1906,7 @@ unsigned long gpfn, unsigned index) { unsigned long smfn = __shadow_status(d, gpfn, PGT_snapshot);

-- Advanced Micro Devices GmbH Sitz: Dornach, Gemeinde Aschheim, Landkreis München Registergericht München, HRB Nr. 43632 WEEE-Reg-Nr: DE 12919551 Geschäftsführer: Alberto Bozzo, Andrew Bowd _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel

The VMID field is 8 bits. Rather than allowing only up to 256 VMs per host reboot before things start "acting strange" instead maintain a simple bitmap of used VMIDs and allocate them statically to guests upon creation. This limits us to 256 concurrent VMs which is a reasonable improvement. Eventually we will want a proper scheme to allocate VMIDs on context switch. The existing code

The memory relating guest domain should be allocated from NUMA node on which the guest runs. Because the latency of the same NUMA node is faster than that of a different one. This patch fixes memory allocation for Address Translation Structure of VT-d. VT-d uses two types of Structures for DMA address translation. The one is Device Assignment Structure. The other is Address Translation