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Hi, These three patches fix the problems in the version two. And them base on the Tao's patches: ocfs2/xattr: xattr improvement The first patch fix some problem in xattr code. The second patch add security EA support. The third patch add ACL support. Best regards, tiger

Hey everyone, after we finished the introduction of the new posix acl api last cycle we still left the generic POSIX ACL xattr handler around for two reasons. First, because a few filesystems relied on the ->list() method of the generic POSIX ACL xattr handlers in their ->listxattr() inode operation. Second, during inode initalization in inode_init_always() the registered xattr handlers in

...gt; /* calculate meta data/clusters for setting security xattr */ > diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c > index 95d0611c5fc7..55699c573541 100644 > --- a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c > +++ b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c > @@ -7259,9 +7259,21 @@ static int ocfs2_xattr_security_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler, > static int ocfs2_initxattrs(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr_array, > void *fs_info) > { > + struct ocfs2_security_xattr_info *si = fs_info; > const struct xattr *xattr; > int err = 0; > > + if (si) { > + si->value = kmemdup(x...

Hi, I split the previous support security EA patch into four patches for review. Them besed on joel's xattr-28 branch and tao's patch "Merge xattr set transaction". 1: move new_inode out of the transaction. 2: add ocfs2_xattr_set_handle. 3: add security xattr APIs 4: add init_security in mknod. Best regards, tiger

...security xattr */ > > > diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c > > > index 95d0611c5fc7..55699c573541 100644 > > > --- a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c > > > +++ b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c > > > @@ -7259,9 +7259,21 @@ static int ocfs2_xattr_security_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler, > > > static int ocfs2_initxattrs(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr_array, > > > void *fs_info) > > > { > > > + struct ocfs2_security_xattr_info *si = fs_info; > > > const struct xattr *xattr; > > > int err =...

...tr_info si = { + .name = NULL, .enable = 1, }; int did_quota = 0, did_quota_inode = 0; diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c index 389308efe85..469ec45baee 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c @@ -7259,9 +7259,21 @@ static int ocfs2_xattr_security_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler, static int ocfs2_initxattrs(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr_array, void *fs_info) { + struct ocfs2_security_xattr_info *si = fs_info; const struct xattr *xattr; int err = 0; + if (si) { + si->value = kmemdup(xattr_array->value, xattr_array->value_l...

When the extended attribute namespace grows to a b-tree, the leaf clusters are organized by means of 'buckets'. Each bucket is 4K in size, regardless of blocksize. Thus, a bucket may be made of more than one block. fs/ocfs2/xattr.c has a nice little abstraction to wrap this, struct ocfs2_xattr_bucket. It contains a list of buffer_heads representing these blocks, and there is even an

From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu at huawei.com> One of the major goals of LSM stacking is to run multiple LSMs side by side without interfering with each other. The ultimate decision will depend on individual LSM decision. Several changes need to be made to the LSM infrastructure to be able to support that. This patch set tackles one of them: gives to each LSM the ability to specify one

From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu at huawei.com> One of the major goals of LSM stacking is to run multiple LSMs side by side without interfering with each other. The ultimate decision will depend on individual LSM decision. Several changes need to be made to the LSM infrastructure to be able to support that. This patch set tackles one of them: gives to each LSM the ability to specify one