Displaying 3 results from an estimated 3 matches for "x86speculativeloadharden".
2020 Apr 23
3
[cfe-dev] More verbose -mspeculative-load-hardening
...u looked into using the LLVM_DEBUG macro? You can use it to print
> where you want from the SLH pass.
> Check it out here:
> https://llvm.org/docs/ProgrammersManual.html#the-llvm-debug-macro-and-debug-option You'll
> have to add it where you want to see what SLH is doing in the
> X86SpeculativeLoadHardening.cpp file and rebuild from source to get the new
> error messages.
>
> Another useful thing for you might be to pass either of these to clang
> when you enable -mspeculative-load-hardening
>
> - -mllvm -print-after-all
> - -mllvm -print-after="x86-slh"
>
&g...
2020 Apr 22
3
[cfe-dev] More verbose -mspeculative-load-hardening
Hi
I think llvm-dev list (CC'ed) have more visibility in this.
On Wed, 22 Apr 2020 at 22:18, milsegv via cfe-dev <cfe-dev at lists.llvm.org>
wrote:
> Hello everyone,
>
> It may not be the best place to ask this but I found nothing on the
> internet about it.
> I'm working on Spectre V1 detection and stumbled upon the mitigation
> provided by clang, the
2018 Mar 23
5
RFC: Speculative Load Hardening (a Spectre variant #1 mitigation)
Hello all,
I've been working for the last month or so on a comprehensive mitigation
approach to variant #1 of Spectre. There are a bunch of reasons why this is
desirable:
- Critical software that is unlikely to be easily hand-mitigated (or where
the performance tradeoff isn't worth it) will have a compelling option.
- It gives us a baseline on performance for hand-mitigation.
- Combined