search for: total_len

...host/net.c > index 15d191a..de544ee 100644 > --- a/drivers/vhost/net.c > +++ b/drivers/vhost/net.c > @@ -479,6 +479,12 @@ static size_t init_iov_iter(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq, struct iov_iter *iter, > return len; > } > > +static bool vhost_exceeds_weight(int pkts, int total_len) > +{ > + return unlikely(total_len >= VHOST_NET_WEIGHT) || > + unlikely(pkts >= VHOST_NET_PKT_WEIGHT); I was going to say just one unlikely, but then the caller of this function also says unlikely(vhost_exceeds...), so I think you should just drop the unlikely statements her...

...q->done_idx == VHOST_NET_BATCH) @@ -845,11 +846,10 @@ static void handle_tx_copy(struct vhost_net *net, struct socket *sock) vq->heads[nvq->done_idx].id = cpu_to_vhost32(vq, head); vq->heads[nvq->done_idx].len = 0; ++nvq->done_idx; - if (vhost_exceeds_weight(++sent_pkts, total_len)) { - vhost_poll_queue(&vq->poll); - break; - } - } + } while (!(next_round = vhost_exceeds_weight(++sent_pkts, total_len))); + + if (next_round) + vhost_poll_queue(&vq->poll); vhost_tx_batch(net, nvq, sock, &msg); } @@ -873,8 +873,9 @@ static void handle_tx_zerocopy(st...

...q->done_idx == VHOST_NET_BATCH) @@ -845,11 +846,10 @@ static void handle_tx_copy(struct vhost_net *net, struct socket *sock) vq->heads[nvq->done_idx].id = cpu_to_vhost32(vq, head); vq->heads[nvq->done_idx].len = 0; ++nvq->done_idx; - if (vhost_exceeds_weight(++sent_pkts, total_len)) { - vhost_poll_queue(&vq->poll); - break; - } - } + } while (!(next_round = vhost_exceeds_weight(++sent_pkts, total_len))); + + if (next_round) + vhost_poll_queue(&vq->poll); vhost_tx_batch(net, nvq, sock, &msg); } @@ -873,8 +873,9 @@ static void handle_tx_zerocopy(st...

Hi: This series try to prvernt a guest triggerable CPU hogging through vhost kthread. This is done by introducing and checking the weight after each requrest. The patch has been tested with reproducer of vsock and virtio-net. Only compile test is done for vhost-scsi. Please review. This addresses CVE-2019-3900. Jason Wang (4): vhost: introduce vhost_exceeds_weight() vhost_net: fix possible

...845,11 +846,10 @@ static void handle_tx_copy(struct vhost_net *net, struct socket *sock) >> vq->heads[nvq->done_idx].id = cpu_to_vhost32(vq, head); >> vq->heads[nvq->done_idx].len = 0; >> ++nvq->done_idx; >> - if (vhost_exceeds_weight(++sent_pkts, total_len)) { >> - vhost_poll_queue(&vq->poll); >> - break; >> - } >> - } >> + } while (!(next_round = vhost_exceeds_weight(++sent_pkts, total_len))); >> + >> + if (next_round) >> + vhost_poll_queue(&vq->poll); >> >> vhost_...

...845,11 +846,10 @@ static void handle_tx_copy(struct vhost_net *net, struct socket *sock) >> vq->heads[nvq->done_idx].id = cpu_to_vhost32(vq, head); >> vq->heads[nvq->done_idx].len = 0; >> ++nvq->done_idx; >> - if (vhost_exceeds_weight(++sent_pkts, total_len)) { >> - vhost_poll_queue(&vq->poll); >> - break; >> - } >> - } >> + } while (!(next_round = vhost_exceeds_weight(++sent_pkts, total_len))); >> + >> + if (next_round) >> + vhost_poll_queue(&vq->poll); >> >> vhost_...

...--git a/drivers/vhost/net.c b/drivers/vhost/net.c index 15d191a..de544ee 100644 --- a/drivers/vhost/net.c +++ b/drivers/vhost/net.c @@ -479,6 +479,12 @@ static size_t init_iov_iter(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq, struct iov_iter *iter, return len; } +static bool vhost_exceeds_weight(int pkts, int total_len) +{ + return unlikely(total_len >= VHOST_NET_WEIGHT) || + unlikely(pkts >= VHOST_NET_PKT_WEIGHT); +} + /* Expects to be always run from workqueue - which acts as * read-size critical section for our kind of RCU. */ static void handle_tx(struct vhost_net *net) @@ -570,7 +576,6 @@ st...

...struct socket *sock) > > > > ????????? vq->heads[nvq->done_idx].id = cpu_to_vhost32(vq, head); > > > > ????????? vq->heads[nvq->done_idx].len = 0; > > > > ????????? ++nvq->done_idx; > > > > -??????? if (vhost_exceeds_weight(++sent_pkts, total_len)) { > > > > -??????????? vhost_poll_queue(&vq->poll); > > > > -??????????? break; > > > > -??????? } > > > > -??? } > > > > +??? } while (!(next_round = vhost_exceeds_weight(++sent_pkts, > > > > total_len))); > > &...

...struct socket *sock) > > > > ????????? vq->heads[nvq->done_idx].id = cpu_to_vhost32(vq, head); > > > > ????????? vq->heads[nvq->done_idx].len = 0; > > > > ????????? ++nvq->done_idx; > > > > -??????? if (vhost_exceeds_weight(++sent_pkts, total_len)) { > > > > -??????????? vhost_poll_queue(&vq->poll); > > > > -??????????? break; > > > > -??????? } > > > > -??? } > > > > +??? } while (!(next_round = vhost_exceeds_weight(++sent_pkts, > > > > total_len))); > > &...

...vhost/net.c b/drivers/vhost/net.c index df51a35..061a06d 100644 --- a/drivers/vhost/net.c +++ b/drivers/vhost/net.c @@ -604,12 +604,6 @@ static size_t init_iov_iter(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq, struct iov_iter *iter, return iov_iter_count(iter); } -static bool vhost_exceeds_weight(int pkts, int total_len) -{ - return total_len >= VHOST_NET_WEIGHT || - pkts >= VHOST_NET_PKT_WEIGHT; -} - static int get_tx_bufs(struct vhost_net *net, struct vhost_net_virtqueue *nvq, struct msghdr *msg, @@ -845,10 +839,8 @@ static void handle_tx_copy(struct vhost_net *net, struct socke...

Hi all: We do not support XDP batching for TUN since it can only receive one packet a time from vhost_net. This series tries to remove this limitation by: - introduce a TUN specific msg_control that can hold a pointer to an array of XDP buffs - try copy and build XDP buff in vhost_net - store XDP buffs in an array and submit them once for every N packets from vhost_net - since TUN can only

...++++++--- > 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/drivers/vhost/net.c b/drivers/vhost/net.c > index de544ee..4ebac76 100644 > --- a/drivers/vhost/net.c > +++ b/drivers/vhost/net.c > @@ -485,6 +485,13 @@ static bool vhost_exceeds_weight(int pkts, int total_len) > unlikely(pkts >= VHOST_NET_PKT_WEIGHT); > } > > +static bool vhost_has_more_pkts(struct vhost_net *net, > + struct vhost_virtqueue *vq) > +{ > + return !vhost_vq_avail_empty(&net->dev, vq) && > + likely(!vhost_exceeds_maxpend(net));...

Hi: This series try to prevent a guest triggerable CPU hogging through vhost kthread. This is done by introducing and checking the weight after each requrest. The patch has been tested with reproducer of vsock and virtio-net. Only compile test is done for vhost-scsi. Please review. This addresses CVE-2019-3900. Changs from V1: - fix user-ater-free in vosck patch Jason Wang (4): vhost:

Hi: This series try to prevent a guest triggerable CPU hogging through vhost kthread. This is done by introducing and checking the weight after each requrest. The patch has been tested with reproducer of vsock and virtio-net. Only compile test is done for vhost-scsi. Please review. This addresses CVE-2019-3900. Changs from V1: - fix user-ater-free in vosck patch Jason Wang (4): vhost:

Hi: This series implement batch updating of used ring for TX. This help to reduce the cache contention on used ring. The idea is first split datacopy path from zerocopy, and do only batching for datacopy. This is because zercopy had already supported its own batching. TX PPS was increased 25.8% and Netperf TCP does not show obvious differences. The split of datapath will also be helpful for

Hi: This series implement batch updating of used ring for TX. This help to reduce the cache contention on used ring. The idea is first split datacopy path from zerocopy, and do only batching for datacopy. This is because zercopy had already supported its own batching. TX PPS was increased 25.8% and Netperf TCP does not show obvious differences. The split of datapath will also be helpful for

...ET_BATCH) > @@ -845,11 +846,10 @@ static void handle_tx_copy(struct vhost_net *net, struct socket *sock) > vq->heads[nvq->done_idx].id = cpu_to_vhost32(vq, head); > vq->heads[nvq->done_idx].len = 0; > ++nvq->done_idx; > - if (vhost_exceeds_weight(++sent_pkts, total_len)) { > - vhost_poll_queue(&vq->poll); > - break; > - } > - } > + } while (!(next_round = vhost_exceeds_weight(++sent_pkts, total_len))); > + > + if (next_round) > + vhost_poll_queue(&vq->poll); > > vhost_tx_batch(net, nvq, sock, &msg); >...

...ost_net >>> *net, struct socket *sock) >>> ????????? vq->heads[nvq->done_idx].id = cpu_to_vhost32(vq, head); >>> ????????? vq->heads[nvq->done_idx].len = 0; >>> ????????? ++nvq->done_idx; >>> -??????? if (vhost_exceeds_weight(++sent_pkts, total_len)) { >>> -??????????? vhost_poll_queue(&vq->poll); >>> -??????????? break; >>> -??????? } >>> -??? } >>> +??? } while (!(next_round = vhost_exceeds_weight(++sent_pkts, >>> total_len))); >>> + >>> +??? if (next_round) &gt...

.../tun.c | 14 +++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/tun.c b/drivers/net/tun.c index 6a7bde9..5563430 100644 --- a/drivers/net/tun.c +++ b/drivers/net/tun.c @@ -2067,14 +2067,17 @@ static int tun_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *m, size_t total_len, { struct tun_file *tfile = container_of(sock, struct tun_file, socket); struct tun_struct *tun = tun_get(tfile); + struct sk_buff *skb = m->msg_control; int ret; - if (!tun) - return -EBADFD; + if (!tun) { + ret = -EBADFD; + goto out_free_skb; + } if (flags & ~(MSG_DONTWAIT|...

...rue; > > pkt->off += payload_len; > @@ -440,7 +443,8 @@ static void vhost_vsock_handle_tx_kick(struct vhost_work *work) > struct vhost_vsock *vsock = container_of(vq->dev, struct vhost_vsock, > dev); > struct virtio_vsock_pkt *pkt; > - int head, pkts = 0, total_len = 0; > + int ret, pkts = 0, total_len = 0; > + struct vhost_buf buf; > unsigned int out, in; > bool added = false; > > @@ -461,12 +465,13 @@ static void vhost_vsock_handle_tx_kick(struct vhost_work *work) > goto no_more_replies; > } > > - head = vhost_g...