search for: tlen

...X * FLDSIZE_Y * sizeof(char)); x = FLDSIZE_X / 2; @@ -1145,34 +1170,34 @@ fingerprint_randomart(const char *alg, u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len, /* output upper border */ p = retval; - *p++ = '+'; + p += sprintf(p, "%s", border[0]); for (i = 0; i < (FLDSIZE_X - tlen) / 2; i++) - *p++ = '-'; + p += sprintf(p, "%s", border[1]); memcpy(p, title, tlen); p += tlen; for (i += tlen; i < FLDSIZE_X; i++) - *p++ = '-'; - *p++ = '+'; + p += sprintf(p, "%s", border[1]); + p += sprintf(p, "%s", border[2]);...

Le 06/07/15 12:33, Alex Bligh a ?crit : > On 6 Jul 2015, at 11:05, Christian Hesse <list at eworm.de> wrote: > >> +#ifdef HAVE_LOCALE_H >> + char *locale; >> + char *border_utf8[] = { "?", "?", "?", "?", "?", "?" }; >> +#endif >> + char *border_ascii[] = { "+", "-",

...quot;|", "+", "+" }; + char **border; char *augmentation_string = " .o+=*BOX@%&#/^SE"; - char *retval, *p, title[FLDSIZE_X], hash[FLDSIZE_X]; + char *retval, *p, title[FLDSIZE_X - 2], hash[FLDSIZE_X - 2]; u_char field[FLDSIZE_X][FLDSIZE_Y]; size_t i, tlen, hlen; u_int b; int x, y, r; size_t len = strlen(augmentation_string) - 1; - if ((retval = calloc((FLDSIZE_X + 3), (FLDSIZE_Y + 2))) == NULL) + if ((retval = malloc((FLDSIZE_X + 7) * FLDSIZE_Y + FLDSIZE_X * 3 * 2)) == NULL) return NULL; +#ifdef HAVE_LOCALE_H + /* initialize locale *...

...51 @@ } } - static int get_tmpname(char *fnametmp, char *fname) { - char *f; + char *f, holder; + size_t len; + + if(strlen(fname) > MAXPATHLEN) { + rprintf(FERROR,"%s: filename too long\n", fname); + return 0; + } + + holder = 0; /* open tmp file */ if (tmpdir) { + int tlen; f = strrchr(fname,'/'); if (f == NULL) f = fname; else f++; - if (strlen(tmpdir)+strlen(f)+10 > MAXPATHLEN) { - rprintf(FERROR,"filename too long\n"); + tlen = strlen(tmpdir) + 10; + if(tlen > MAXPATHLEN) { + rprintf(FERROR,"%s: filename too l...

...ctory string * ipwdstr Initial Present Working Directory string * returns Whether to exit prompt */ -char rosh_command(const char *cmdstr, char *pwdstr, const char *ipwdstr) +char rosh_command(const char *cmdstr, const char *ipwdstr) { char do_exit; + char tstr[ROSH_CMD_SZ]; + int tlen; do_exit = false; ROSH_DEBUG("--cmd:'%s'\n", cmdstr); + tlen = rosh_parse_sp_1(tstr, cmdstr, 0); switch (cmdstr[0]) { case 'e': case 'E': case 'q': case 'Q': - do_exit = true; + if ((strncasecmp("exit"...

Trying to copy the (binary) header of a input file directly to an output file, I've had repeatable seg faults. The call: writeChar(hdr, outfh, nchars=6144) when hdr just contains one empty string seems to be the culprit. The stack traces weren't all that illuminating, with sig 11 in memory-related functions following this. But in src/main/connections.c it looks like do_writechar

...in any case I did the following dirty/fast patch which works for me(tm): - --- connection.c Fri Dec 12 23:18:20 2003 +++ connection.c.mod Mon Jan 12 17:50:12 2004 @@ -530,12 +530,16 @@ static int _check_pass_icy(http_parser_t *parser, char *correctpass) { char *password; + int tlen; password = httpp_getvar(parser, HTTPP_VAR_ICYPASSWORD); if(!password) return 0; - - if (strcmp(password, correctpass)) + if (strstr(password, "SOURCE ") == password) password += 7; + if (strstr(password, correctpass) != password + || (password[(tlen...

What''s wrong... I have Celeron 633MHz nd 768Mb RAM. When I''m running my script everything is OK, but when I''m connecting Internet and LAN link computer is hanging. But when i dissconnect this everything is OK. I have 500 users, 1500 classes and 3000 filters. Is it normal? What should I do?

Is any way to detect changed MAC adresses? Someone taught change MACs peoples in my network and I have problems. E.g. Two computers working on one MAC, and one IP (static ARP and DHCP). WinXP is screaming some message... that two computers or more have the same IP. How can I find out who''s changed MAC?

...if (__virtio16_to_cpu(vio_le(), vnet_hdr.hdr_len) > len) > goto out_unlock; > > if (vnet_hdr.gso_type != VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE) { > @@ -2731,7 +2733,7 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len) > hlen = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev); > tlen = dev->needed_tailroom; > skb = packet_alloc_skb(sk, hlen + tlen, hlen, len, > - __virtio16_to_cpu(false, vnet_hdr.hdr_len), > + __virtio16_to_cpu(vio_le(), vnet_hdr.hdr_len), > msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err); > if (skb == NULL) &g...

...if (__virtio16_to_cpu(vio_le(), vnet_hdr.hdr_len) > len) > goto out_unlock; > > if (vnet_hdr.gso_type != VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE) { > @@ -2731,7 +2733,7 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len) > hlen = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev); > tlen = dev->needed_tailroom; > skb = packet_alloc_skb(sk, hlen + tlen, hlen, len, > - __virtio16_to_cpu(false, vnet_hdr.hdr_len), > + __virtio16_to_cpu(vio_le(), vnet_hdr.hdr_len), > msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err); > if (skb == NULL) &g...

...-tcpts + * from OpenBSD patch for OpenBSD 3.6 015_tcp.patch */ if ((to.to_flags & TOF_TS) != 0 && SEQ_LEQ(th->th_seq, tp->last_ack_sent)) { + if (SEQ_LEQ(tp->last_ack_sent, th->th_seq + tlen + + ((thflags & (TH_SYN|TH_FIN)) != 0))) + tp->ts_recent = to.to_tsval; + else + tp->ts_recent = 0; tp->ts_recent_age = ticks;...

...e + * the buffer was refilled before XDP is set. This + * only happen for several packets, for simplicity, + * offload them to generic XDP routine. + */ if (unlikely(xdp_headroom < virtnet_get_headroom(vi))) { - int offset = buf - page_address(page) + header_offset; - unsigned int tlen = len + vi->hdr_len; - u16 num_buf = 1; - - xdp_headroom = virtnet_get_headroom(vi); - header_offset = VIRTNET_RX_PAD + xdp_headroom; - headroom = vi->hdr_len + header_offset; - buflen = SKB_DATA_ALIGN(GOOD_PACKET_LEN + headroom) + - SKB_DATA_ALIGN(sizeof(struct skb_shared_info)...

Hello. I am trying to play through the following test scenario about certificate revocation on Ubuntu 18.04, which has OpenSSH of this version: OpenSSH_7.6p1 Ubuntu-4, OpenSSL 1.0.2n? 7 Dec 2017 1. A CA key is created ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -f ca 2. The CA public key is added to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys on some server: cert-authority ssh-ed25519 AAAA...e ca at yoga 3. A user key is created on a

...if (__virtio16_to_cpu(vio_le(), vnet_hdr.hdr_len) > len) > goto out_unlock; > > if (vnet_hdr.gso_type != VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE) { > @@ -2731,7 +2733,7 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len) > hlen = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev); > tlen = dev->needed_tailroom; > skb = packet_alloc_skb(sk, hlen + tlen, hlen, len, > - __virtio16_to_cpu(false, vnet_hdr.hdr_len), > + __virtio16_to_cpu(vio_le(), vnet_hdr.hdr_len), > msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err); > if (skb == NULL) &g...

...if (__virtio16_to_cpu(vio_le(), vnet_hdr.hdr_len) > len) > goto out_unlock; > > if (vnet_hdr.gso_type != VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE) { > @@ -2731,7 +2733,7 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len) > hlen = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev); > tlen = dev->needed_tailroom; > skb = packet_alloc_skb(sk, hlen + tlen, hlen, len, > - __virtio16_to_cpu(false, vnet_hdr.hdr_len), > + __virtio16_to_cpu(vio_le(), vnet_hdr.hdr_len), > msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err); > if (skb == NULL) &g...

..., vnet_hdr.hdr_len) > len) > > goto out_unlock; > > > > if (vnet_hdr.gso_type != VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE) { > > @@ -2731,7 +2733,7 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len) > > hlen = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev); > > tlen = dev->needed_tailroom; > > skb = packet_alloc_skb(sk, hlen + tlen, hlen, len, > > - __virtio16_to_cpu(false, vnet_hdr.hdr_len), > > + __virtio16_to_cpu(vio_le(), vnet_hdr.hdr_len), > > msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err); > &...

...P were attached. This worries me a bit, for troubleshooting purposes... as this can give a strange user experience given point #1. > + */ > if (unlikely(xdp_headroom < virtnet_get_headroom(vi))) { > - int offset = buf - page_address(page) + header_offset; > - unsigned int tlen = len + vi->hdr_len; > - u16 num_buf = 1; -- Best regards, Jesper Dangaard Brouer MSc.CS, Principal Kernel Engineer at Red Hat LinkedIn: http://www.linkedin.com/in/brouer

...P were attached. This worries me a bit, for troubleshooting purposes... as this can give a strange user experience given point #1. > + */ > if (unlikely(xdp_headroom < virtnet_get_headroom(vi))) { > - int offset = buf - page_address(page) + header_offset; > - unsigned int tlen = len + vi->hdr_len; > - u16 num_buf = 1; -- Best regards, Jesper Dangaard Brouer MSc.CS, Principal Kernel Engineer at Red Hat LinkedIn: http://www.linkedin.com/in/brouer

Hi list, I have no idea if Damien Miller had the time to work on that. I have an initial patch to authenticate using PKCS#11 and ECDSA keys. This requires OpenSSL 1.0.2, prior OpenSSL versions do not expose the required interfaces to override the signature function pointer for ECDSA. The only limitation is that the OpenSSL API misses some cleanup function (finish, for instance), hence I have yet