search for: sva

Hello, Is the SVA codebase publically available, and if so, where can I find it? Thanks. -- gregory malecha -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: <http://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/attachments/20110627/4f816aa6/attachment.html>

How about state of SVA (Secure Virutal Archtecture)? It seems there is no any demo or prototype produced. Cheers, Liu Jian ---- email to: gjk.liu at gmail.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: <http://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/attachments/20100420/e8dc1b16/atta...

Hi all, If it's not the right place to ask, please forgive me. Currently I'm working on a new operating system concept, called "Om". The first feature would be Android-like apps, coming in *.opk files that would contain all needed resources and source-code expressed in LLVM-IR assembly language. http://sett.com/openminded-os/uid/88508 How does it sound ? Julien

...erate loads that access memory past the end of a memory object. LLVM IR is capable of representing all the unsafe computations that C can do. > I would like to know if you are aware of any work in this direction > for LLVM IR so that I can compare with my own implementation. The SAFECode/SVA work uses a points-to analysis called DSA which infers the types of memory objects. A key result of the work is that the points-to analysis/type inference results of DSA can be made sound at run-time. The original version of DSA, working on older versions of LLVM, was able to find a fairly de...

SVA looks very promising. It would be great to be able to run unmodified C safely! However, it does not seem to address my original question: how can I ensure that code cannot DoS either the memory subsystem, or the CPU? In my proposal, I could execute said code in a concurrent process with a memory...

I am interested in type-based verification of LLVM IR in the areas of certified compilation and software verification. It seems to me that the LLVM IR type system is rather informal in the sense that there is no paper with a proper formalization of the type rules, and for example, a proof of soundness for well-formedness of the code. I would like to know if you are aware of any work in this

Hi, I ran into a problem when running DSA on Linux kernel (the Kernel version I used is 2.4.31). The analysis was aborted when it tried to do DSNode::mergeTypeInfo on some data structure in the kernel. I have filed a bug report at http://llvm.org/bugs/show_bug.cgi?id=1656. My question is what version of Linux kernel LLVM has been tested on successfully? To run DSA analysis, should I use the

Sandro Magi wrote: > SVA looks very promising. It would be great to be able to run > unmodified C safely! > > However, it does not seem to address my original question: how can I > ensure that code cannot DoS either the memory subsystem, or the CPU? > To be honest, while I understand your questions, I do...

Dear All, We now have two new mailing lists for SAFECode: 1) svadev: This mailing list is for discussion on SAFECode. Questions and comments about using SAFECode as well as development conversation on SAFECode can go here. 2) sva-commits: This mailing list gets email for all SVN commits made to SAFECode. -- John T.

...we can hijack its > control flow; > > then I enforce cfi of llvm and we can't hijack its control flow. > > Do you have any advice for me? > > > The CFI implementation we updated to work with x86-64 for the KCoFI > project is available at https://github.com/jtcriswell/SVA. You'll need > to create the exploit code (and potentially the vulnerability) yourself. > If you read the literature on CFI and memory safety (some of which is > cataloged at http://sva.cs.illinois.edu/menagerie), you should be able to > find programs and vulnerabilities that have...

.... That is why its precision is better pre-optimization than post-optimization. Just out of curiosity, what are you trying to do? I need call graph analysis for C/C++ code with function pointers, and so I'm writing an NSF proposal to seek funding to do that (among other enhancements to my SVA infrastructure). If it's something that would be useful to you (or other LLVM community members), it would be useful for me to know that. Regards, John Criswell -- John Criswell Assistant Professor Department of Computer Science, University of Rochester http://www.cs.rochester.edu/u/cris...

...t;criswell at illinois.edu>wrote: > Dear Petsas, > > For analyzing indirect function calls, your best bet is probably to use > the CallGraph analysis pass that is part of DSA. DSA is included in the > poolalloc code; you can get directions on downloading poolalloc from the > SVA web page: http://sva.cs.illinois.edu/docs/Install.html. > > The release_32 branch works with LLVM 3.2. I think mainline poolalloc was > recently updated to work with LLVM 3.4. > Do you know where I can find mainline poolalloc so as I can compile it with LLVM 3.4 ? > > Regards...

Hi I want to pursue a project based to improve the existing KCoFI method which is the Control Flow integrity method for commodity os. Since KCoFI is a llvm based project I plan to undertake the project to improve the existing KCoFI method. Following are the improvements that I want to pursue: 1. To improve the call graph used in KCoFI. Implement a stronger call graph. 2. Port the KCoFI to

SVA/safecode looks interesting. Is it available to play with? I grepped for strings such as "sva" "secure" "safecode" in the LLVM source tree and didn't find anything, nor did I see obvious links to implementations from the project web pages. In the short term, q...

...du> wrote: > > To be honest, while I understand your questions, I do not understand the > context in which you are asking them. Are you asking if LLVM provides > any facilities to provide these protections, or are you asking if we've > added any special features to LLVM (or to SVA; our research work based > on LLVM) to provide these protections beyond what is commonly provided > by systems today? Can you provide more information on how you want to > use LLVM for your project? The context was fully detailed in my original message: http://lists.cs.uiuc.edu/pipermail/...

Dear All, To add to this, you can find examples of inserting NOPs for X86 in the CFI pass originally written at Lehigh University that we ported to 64-bit X86 for SVA: https://github.com/jtcriswell/SVA/blob/master/llvm/lib/Target/X86/X86CFIOptPass.cpp Alternatively, you could use an InlineAsm call at the LLVM IR level (which I think would be easier to implement). Regards, John Criswell On 7/9/15 8:56 AM, Daniel Sanders wrote: > > Hi, > > Given...

...gt; > To be honest, while I understand your questions, I do not understand the > > context in which you are asking them. Are you asking if LLVM provides > > any facilities to provide these protections, or are you asking if we've > > added any special features to LLVM (or to SVA; our research work based > > on LLVM) to provide these protections beyond what is commonly provided > > by systems today? Can you provide more information on how you want to > > use LLVM for your project? > > The context was fully detailed in my original message: > http:/...

...void pmap_remove_all __P((vm_page_t m)); static vm_page_t pmap_enter_quick __P((pmap_t pmap, vm_offset_t va, vm_page_t m, vm_page_t mpte)); -static int pmap_remove_pte __P((pmap_t pmap, pt_entry_t* ptq, +static int pmap_remove_pte __P((struct pmap *pmap, unsigned *ptq, vm_offset_t sva)); -static void pmap_remove_page __P((pmap_t pmap, vm_offset_t va)); -static int pmap_remove_entry __P((pmap_t pmap, vm_page_t m, +static void pmap_remove_page __P((struct pmap *pmap, vm_offset_t va)); +static int pmap_remove_entry __P((struct pmap *pmap, vm_page_t m, vm_offset_t va)); stati...

Hi In my previous mail I mentioned the project on KCoFI( the control FLow integrity methods for commodity hardware http://sva.cs.illinois.edu/pubs/KCoFI-Oakland-2014.pdf ). Will it be more helpful to the community if I do the improvements number #1 and #3 mentioned in my previous mail to the mailing list or if i try to port it to arm architecture? I have decided to go ahead with the improvements #1 and #3 that are improvi...

...arch project that is developing a Secure Virtual Architecture using LLVM as the instruction set, and implementing via a VM which we call a Secure Virtual Machine. The memory safety foundations of this work are based on Dinakar Dhurjati's thesis and publications: http://llvm.org/pubs/ SVA is at a very preliminary stage but some slides about it are attached. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 2007-SVAOverview.ppt Type: application/vnd.ms-powerpoint Size: 827904 bytes Desc: not available URL: <http://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm...