Displaying 6 results from an estimated 6 matches for "sarenet".
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safenet
2013 Jul 09
2
OCZ Vertex4 quirks
Same as its brothers/sisters, it's optimized for 4 KB blocks.
/*
* OCZ Vertex 4 SSDs
* 4k optimized
*/
{ T_DIRECT, SIP_MEDIA_FIXED, "ATA", "OCZ_VERTEX4*", "*"},
/*quirks/DA_Q_4K
Borja.
2006 May 09
1
Errors in the FreeBSD handbook (MAC framework)
(crossposted to freebsd-security just in case someone has to slap me) :)
Hello,
I'm doing some work with the MAC subsystem in FreeBSD, and I have
spotted some errors in the MAC documentation in the handbook.
1- Section 15.14.4. Error in the example dropping users "nagios" and
"www" into the insecure class. The example uses the command "pw
usermod nagios -L
2006 May 03
1
MAC policies and shared hosting
Hello,
I've been looking at the different MAC modules available and how they
cold help to implement a less insecure than usual shared hosting web
server.
I've not been able to come up with a suitable configuration, looking
at mac_bsdextended, mac_biba and mac_mls, but I think that a MAC
module with the following policies could be very useful for such an
environment. Have I
2005 Dec 13
2
Useful addition to ipfw
Hello,
I've found myself in a situation where a simple data inspection
capability added to ipfw would be very useful.
I'm not thinking about anything especially sophisticated, but what
about adding an option to check byte values (or flags, similar to
tcpdump)?
An example rule could be: add deny udp from any to me 12345 udp[4]&234
being the rule true if byte 4 in the UDP
2006 Oct 10
1
Proposal: MAC_BIBA and real-world usage
Hello,
Are there many people actually using the MAC subsystem in the real
world? I have been working to set up a shared hosting webserver and
I've stumbled against some limitations with the BIBA policy.
In short, it's an excellent model, and can be used succesfully if
applications are aware of its existance, but I find it incompatible
with the real-world needs in Unix, and,
2005 Sep 22
7
Mounting filesystems with "noexec"
Hello,
I've been playing a bit with the "noexec" flag for filesystems. It
can represent a substantial obstacle against the exploitation of
security holes.
However, I think it's not perfect yet.
First thing, an attempt to execute a program from a noexec-mounted
filesystem should be logged. It is either a very significant security
event, or it can drive nuts an