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On 2020-06-10 15:24, Cornelia Huck wrote: > On Wed, 10 Jun 2020 15:11:51 +0200 > Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> wrote: > >> Protected Virtualisation protects the memory of the guest and >> do not allow a the host to access all of its memory. >> >> Let's refuse a VIRTIO device which does not use IOMMU >> protected access. >> >> Signed-off-...

On 2020-06-10 15:24, Cornelia Huck wrote: > On Wed, 10 Jun 2020 15:11:51 +0200 > Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> wrote: > >> Protected Virtualisation protects the memory of the guest and >> do not allow a the host to access all of its memory. >> >> Let's refuse a VIRTIO device which does not use IOMMU >> protected access. >> >> Signed-off-...

On Tue, 7 Jul 2020 10:44:36 +0200 Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> wrote: > An architecture may need to validate the VIRTIO devices features > based on architecture specificities. s/specifities/specifics/ > > Signed-off-by: Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> > --- > drivers/virtio/virtio.c | 19 ++++++++++...

On Tue, 7 Jul 2020 10:44:36 +0200 Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> wrote: > An architecture may need to validate the VIRTIO devices features > based on architecture specificities. s/specifities/specifics/ > > Signed-off-by: Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> > --- > drivers/virtio/virtio.c | 19 ++++++++++...

Protected Virtualisation protects the memory of the guest and do not allow a the host to access all of its memory. Let's refuse a VIRTIO device which does not use IOMMU protected access. Signed-off-by: Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> --- drivers/s390/virtio/virtio_ccw.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/s390/virtio/virtio_ccw.c b/drivers/s390/virtio/virtio_ccw.c index 5730572b52cd..06ffbc96587a 100644 --- a/drivers/s390/virtio/virtio_ccw.c +++ b/drivers/s390/virtio/virtio_ccw...

Protected Virtualisation protects the memory of the guest and do not allow a the host to access all of its memory. Let's refuse a VIRTIO device which does not use IOMMU protected access. Signed-off-by: Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> --- drivers/s390/virtio/virtio_ccw.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/s390/virtio/virtio_ccw.c b/drivers/s390/virtio/virtio_ccw.c index 5730572b52cd..06ffbc96587a 100644 --- a/drivers/s390/virtio/virtio_ccw.c +++ b/drivers/s390/virtio/virtio_ccw...

On Tue, 7 Jul 2020 10:44:37 +0200 Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> wrote: > S390, protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host access > needs to enforce VIRTIO I/O device protection through the use of > VIRTIO_F_VERSION_1 and VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM. Hm... what about: "If protected virtualization is active on s390, th...

On Tue, 7 Jul 2020 10:44:37 +0200 Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> wrote: > S390, protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host access > needs to enforce VIRTIO I/O device protection through the use of > VIRTIO_F_VERSION_1 and VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM. Hm... what about: "If protected virtualization is active on s390, th...

On Thu, 9 Jul 2020 10:39:19 +0200 Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> wrote: > If protected virtualization is active on s390, the virtio queues are > not accessible to the host, unless VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM has been > negotiated. Use the new arch_validate_virtio_features() interface to > fail probe if that's not the case, preve...

On Thu, 9 Jul 2020 10:39:19 +0200 Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> wrote: > If protected virtualization is active on s390, the virtio queues are > not accessible to the host, unless VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM has been > negotiated. Use the new arch_validate_virtio_features() interface to > fail probe if that's not the case, preve...

On Mon, 15 Jun 2020 14:39:24 +0200 Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> wrote: I find the subject (commit short) sub optimal. The 'arch' is already accepting devices 'without IOMMU feature'. What you are introducing is the ability to reject. > An architecture protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host > access may...

On Mon, 15 Jun 2020 14:39:24 +0200 Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> wrote: I find the subject (commit short) sub optimal. The 'arch' is already accepting devices 'without IOMMU feature'. What you are introducing is the ability to reject. > An architecture protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host > access may...

...y more than for the implementation. @Jason, @Christian, please can I get back your acked-by with these changes? 2) previous patch had another name: [PATCH v3 0/1] s390: virtio: let arch choose to accept devices without IOMMU feature id: Message-Id: <1592390637-17441-2-git-send-email-pmorel at linux.ibm.com> 3) The new version generalize the validation of the features by the architecture, making it not IOMMU_PLATFORM specific anymore inside virtio.c The architecture specific code for s390 is now testing the virtio features. 4) Since I reworked the patch I also moved...

On Tue, 16 Jun 2020 12:52:50 +0200 Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> wrote: > On 2020-06-16 11:52, Halil Pasic wrote: > > On Mon, 15 Jun 2020 14:39:24 +0200 > > Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> wrote: > >> @@ -162,6 +163,11 @@ bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev) > >> return is_prot_vir...

On Thu, 9 Jul 2020 10:39:18 +0200 Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> wrote: > An architecture may need to validate the VIRTIO devices features > based on architecture specifics. > > Signed-off-by: Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> > Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck at redhat.com> > Acked-by: Christian Bornt...

On Wed, 19 Aug 2020 18:23:18 +0200 Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> wrote: > If protected virtualization is active on s390, VIRTIO has retricted s/retricted/only restricted/ > access to the guest memory. > Define CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_VIRTIO_MEMORY_ACCESS and export > arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access to advertize VIR...

Hi all, The goal of the series is to give a chance to the architecture to validate VIRTIO device features. in this respin: The tests are back to virtio_finalize_features. No more argument for the architecture callback which only reports if the architecture needs guest memory access restrictions for VIRTIO. I renamed the callback to arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access, and the config

These patches implement the new read status command in qemu and bump the revision to 2 (as this ccw is currently the only thing new with that revision). Patches are on top of v2 of "virtio-1/virtio-ccw related patches". Pierre Morel (2): s390x/virtio-ccw: respond to READ_STATUS command s390x/virtio-ccw: set revision 2 as maximum revision number hw/s390x/virtio-ccw.c | 20

These patches implement the new read status command in qemu and bump the revision to 2 (as this ccw is currently the only thing new with that revision). Patches are on top of v2 of "virtio-1/virtio-ccw related patches". Pierre Morel (2): s390x/virtio-ccw: respond to READ_STATUS command s390x/virtio-ccw: set revision 2 as maximum revision number hw/s390x/virtio-ccw.c | 20

On Wed, 19 Aug 2020 18:23:17 +0200 Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> wrote: > An architecture may restrict host access to guest memory. "e.g. IBM s390 Secure Execution or AMD SEV" Just to make clearer what you are referring to? > > Provide a new Kconfig entry the architecture can select, > CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_VI...