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Could people please test -current? We will be making a release fairly soon. -d -- | By convention there is color, \\ Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org> | By convention sweetness, By convention bitterness, \\ www.mindrot.org | But in reality there are atoms and space - Democritus (c. 400 BCE)

Hello, I came across an interoperability problem in OpenSSH 3.0p1 and 3.0.1p1 concerning the AFS token forwarding. That means that the new versions are not able to exchange AFS tokens (and Kerberos TGTs) with older OpenSSH releases (including 2.9p2) and with the old SSH 1.2.2x. In my opinion this problem already existed in Openssh 2.9.9p1, but I have never used this version (I only looked at the

Okay...I've got it narrowed down, just don't know why this is happening... In sshd.c, auth_mask is set to "supported authentication methods": /* Declare supported authentication types. */ auth_mask = 0; if (options.rhosts_authentication) auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS; if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication)

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2664 Bug ID: 2664 Summary: Boolean option parsing is excessively case-sensitive Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 7.4p1 Hardware: Other URL: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1656557 OS: Linux Status: NEW Severity: enhancement Priority:

Some time ago, Ben wrote about a PrintLastLog patch: > If the person who originally submitted it wants to write a complete > patch and submit it. Then we would be happy to debate if it will be > included. Well, here it is, because: "You Asked For It!" PS: I'm tired of maintaining my own version of Debian's ssh just to have this option available, so I hope you find

Because ForwardX11 and ForwardAgent are so useful but introduce risk when used to a not well-secured server, I added a "warn" value to the ForwardX11 and ForwardAgent options which causes the ssh client to print a big warning whenever the forwarding is actually used. I plan to make "ForwardX11=warn" the default in my ssh_config distribution. I'm not proposing that this

Hello, I going to use ssh with Kerberos V5 support along with support for AFS. I don't want to use Kerberos V4 or AFS token passing. The only thing I need from AFS is creating an AFS token (using appropriate function from krb5 API) after user's authentication. It seems to me that such scenario is not much supported by the current code. Rather it is assumed only Kerberos 4 will be used

We have a system on which users are given a very restricted environment (their shell is a menu) where they should not be able to run arbitrary commands. However, because their shell is not statically linked, ld.so provides a nice clutch of holes for them to exploit. The patch below adds a new configuration option to sshd which quashes their attempts to set LD_PRELOAD etc. using ~/.ssh/environment

Precedence: bulk Hi folks, It seemed to me that it would be useful to be able to control access to my server with the /etc/ssh_known_hosts file, using RSA authentication of the remote host. But the protocol only allows RSA host authentication in conjunction with rhosts, while I prefer RSA user authentication. I've made a patch to the server which adds a new configuration option:

I need a way to make sshd require S/KEY authentication to succeed before allowing either password or public-key authentication. Currently, we can only have S/KEY+password, by using PAM for authentication, and configuring PAM accordingly. But PAM of course can't handle SSH public keys. I thought for a while that ideally we could actually use PAM to tell sshd what methods of authentication to

This is a better approach to persistent control masters than my previous attempt. Instead of forking before we make the connection, do so only when the original session has closed -- much like the code for '~&' backgrounding already does. My earlier patch for 'ControlPath none' still applies and is required, btw. --- openssh/clientloop.c~ 2005-06-17 03:59:35.000000000 +0100

Here is a patch that does TIS auth via PAM. It's controlled by a switch in the sshd_config. You'd use it by having a PAM module that sets PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON. eg, you could use it with pam_skey or pam_smxs. The patch is against the 2.9.9p2 distribution. I'm not on the list, a reply if this patch is accepted would be great. (But not required, I know some folks have a distaste for

I'm trying to replace some sshv1 clients and servers in a modular way, and the "Server Lies" warning (when the server says the key has one more bit than it really has) is causing heartache. Per the FAQ, this is relatively benign. Here's a patch that allows an admin or user to disable the warning. - Morty diff -Nur openssh-3.7.1p2/readconf.c

Dear all, I want to add a new option "newoption" to the sshd server, I have just add some codes in servconf.h and servconf.c like the other options. But it seems that the "newoption" can not be enable,when i set the "newoption" to "yes" in sshd_config file. I have add a debug message in main function of sshd.c .... debug("main sshd

I've been trying to cut down the size of openssh so I can run it on my Nokia 770. One thing which helps a fair amount (and will help even more when I get '-ffunction-sections -fdata-sections --gc-sections' working) is to have the option of compiling out privilege separation... Is it worth me tidying this up and trying to make it apply properly to the OpenBSD version? Does the openbsd

Scenario: I have access to a semi-public (about 30 users) server where I keep my webpage. Occasionally, especially if I'm on the road. I use this as a bounce point to get to "secured" systems which only allow ssh from certian IP's. (Ignoring the discussion on spoofing, since we have host keys) But host keys are the problem. If anyone gets root on this hypothetical

Hi, We at BalaBit IT Security Ltd developed a patch against openssh 2.3.0p1 to support TIS authserv authentication. TIS authserv uses a simple protocol, and supports CryptoCard, SKey, password etc. authentication. The commercial versions of SSH support this protocol, OpenSSH implemented SKey on its own using the protocol primitives originally invented for TIS authentication. Our patch is an

Attached is a patch to allow a user to turn on TCP keepalives for port forwarded connections. It's mainly useful when the connections to the ssh listener are coming from many different boxes, some of which crash, leaving the service on the other side of the port forwarder waiting on connections indefinitely. It creates a new option named "KeepAliveForward" to control this behavior.

It would be useful to allow matching HostName entries against Host entries. That's to say, I would find it very convenient to have an ssh_config like: Host zeus HostName zeus.greek.gods User hades Host hera HostName hera.greek.gods # [ ... ] Host *.greek.gods User poseidon UserKnownHostsFile ~/.ssh/known_hosts.d/athens # [ Default settings for *.greek.gods ] where I

I looked around for a while, but couldn't find any code for requiring multiple authentication mechanisms in openssh. So I wrote an implemention. I thought at first I should change the PasswordAuthentication, PubkeyAuthentication, etc. keywords to allow no/yes/required. But there's some funky stuff in auth2.c with respect to keyboard interactive auth that would make this kind of