search for: l1e_empty

...e(addr); + else + { + unsigned long offset; + /* Undo the hacky two-frame contiguous map. */ + ASSERT(((unsigned long) addr & PAGE_MASK) == LDT_VIRT_START(v)); + offset = l1_linear_offset((unsigned long) addr); + l1e_write(&__linear_l1_table[offset], l1e_empty()); + l1e_write(&__linear_l1_table[offset + 1], l1e_empty()); + flush_tlb_all(); + } +} + +static int hvm_x86_emulate_cmpxchg( + struct vcpu *v, + unsigned long vaddr, + unsigned long old, + unsigned long new, + unsigned int bytes) +{ + void *addr; + unsign...

This patch series includes a series of bugs related to p2m, ept, and PoD code which were found as part of our XenServer product testing. Each of these fixes actual bugs, and the 3.4-based version of the patch has been tested thoroughly. (There may be bugs in porting the patches, but most of them are simple enough as to make it unlikely.) Each patch is conceptually independent, so they can each

...ntry = p2m_find_entry(table, &gfn_remainder, gfn, 0, L1_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES); ASSERT(p2m_entry); - if ( valid_mfn(mfn) ) + if ( mfn_valid(mfn) ) *p2m_entry = l1e_from_pfn(mfn_x(mfn), __PAGE_HYPERVISOR|_PAGE_USER); else *p2m_entry = l1e_empty(); /* Track the highest gfn for which we have ever had a valid mapping */ - if ( valid_mfn(mfn) && (gfn > d->arch.max_mapped_pfn) ) + if ( mfn_valid(mfn) && (gfn > d->arch.max_mapped_pfn) ) d->arch.max_mapped_pfn = gfn; /* The P2M can be sha...

...pl1e - cpu, + l1e_from_pfn(mfn, __PAGE_HYPERVISOR)); + flush_tlb_one_local(ptr); + return ptr; +} +static inline void fixunmap_domain_page(const void *ptr) +{ + unsigned int cpu = virt_to_fix((unsigned long)ptr) - FIX_PAE_HIGHMEM_0; + + l1e_write(fix_pae_highmem_pl1e - cpu, l1e_empty()); + this_cpu(make_cr3_timestamp) = this_cpu(tlbflush_time); +} +#else +#define fixmap_domain_page(mfn) mfn_to_virt(mfn) +#define fixunmap_domain_page(ptr) ((void)(ptr)) +#endif + int do_mmuext_op( XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(mmuext_op_t) uops, unsigned int count, @@ -2482,6 +2505,66 @@ int do_...

There has been some progress, but still no joy. Definitely not intended for inclusion at this point. Tim, Wei, I added a Xen command line toggle to disable IOMMU and P2M table sharing. Tim, I verified that changes to p2m-pt.c don''t break shadow mode (64bit hypervisor and Win 7 guest). Hongkaixing, I incorporated your suggestion in patch 2, so I should add your Signed-off-by eventually.

...pl1e - cpu, + l1e_from_pfn(mfn, __PAGE_HYPERVISOR)); + flush_tlb_one_local(ptr); + return ptr; +} +static inline void fixunmap_domain_page(const void *ptr) +{ + unsigned int cpu = virt_to_fix((unsigned long)ptr) - FIX_PAE_HIGHMEM_0; + + l1e_write(fix_pae_highmem_pl1e - cpu, l1e_empty()); + this_cpu(make_cr3_timestamp) = this_cpu(tlbflush_time); +} +#else +#define fixmap_domain_page(mfn) mfn_to_virt(mfn) +#define fixunmap_domain_page(ptr) ((void)(ptr)) +#endif + int do_mmuext_op( XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(mmuext_op_t) uops, unsigned int count, @@ -2701,6 +2724,66 @@ int do_...

Hi Keir: These two patches remove the need for netloop by performing the copying in netback and only if it is necessary. The rationale is that most packets will be processed without delay allowing them to be freed without copying at all. So instead of copying every packet destined to dom0 we''ll only copy those that linger longer than a specified amount of time (currently 0.5s). As it

1: correct LDT checks 2: add address validity check to guest_map_l1e() 3: use {rd,wr}{fs,gs}base when available 4: check for canonical address before doing page walks Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>

Today is my day! This is with Xen 4.4 (pulled today) when I build a kernel in dom0 and have two guests launching at the same time. This is what I get: (XEN) Assertion ''l1e_get_pfn(MAPCACHE_L1ENT(hashent->idx)) == hashent->mfn'' failed at domain_page.c:203 and it blows up. Here is the full log: \ \/ /___ _ __ | || | | || | _ _ _ __ ___| |_ __ _| |__ | | ___