Displaying 5 results from an estimated 5 matches for "infoleaks".
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infoleak
2020 Mar 03
0
[PATCH v11 00/11] x86: PIE support to extend KASLR randomization
...; >
> > If I remember well, it makes it easier/better but I haven't seen a
> > recent update on that. Is that accurate Kees?
>
> I believe this patchset is valuable if people are trying to brute force
> guess the kernel location, but not so awesome in the event of
> infoleaks. In the case of the current fgkaslr implementation, we only
> randomize within the existing text segment memory area - so with PIE
> the text segment base can move around more, but within that it wouldn't
> strengthen anything. So, if you have an infoleak, you learn the base
> insta...
2020 Mar 03
4
[PATCH v11 00/11] x86: PIE support to extend KASLR randomization
On Thu, Feb 27, 2020 at 04:00:45PM -0800, Thomas Garnier wrote:
> Minor changes based on feedback and rebase from v10.
>
> Splitting the previous serie in two. This part contains assembly code
> changes required for PIE but without any direct dependencies with the
> rest of the patchset.
>
> Note: Using objtool to detect non-compliant PIE relocations is not yet
> possible
2020 Mar 03
4
[PATCH v11 00/11] x86: PIE support to extend KASLR randomization
On Thu, Feb 27, 2020 at 04:00:45PM -0800, Thomas Garnier wrote:
> Minor changes based on feedback and rebase from v10.
>
> Splitting the previous serie in two. This part contains assembly code
> changes required for PIE but without any direct dependencies with the
> rest of the patchset.
>
> Note: Using objtool to detect non-compliant PIE relocations is not yet
> possible
2020 Mar 04
2
[PATCH v11 00/11] x86: PIE support to extend KASLR randomization
...member well, it makes it easier/better but I haven't seen a
> > > recent update on that. Is that accurate Kees?
> >
> > I believe this patchset is valuable if people are trying to brute force
> > guess the kernel location, but not so awesome in the event of
> > infoleaks. In the case of the current fgkaslr implementation, we only
> > randomize within the existing text segment memory area - so with PIE
> > the text segment base can move around more, but within that it wouldn't
> > strengthen anything. So, if you have an infoleak, you learn the...
2020 Mar 04
2
[PATCH v11 00/11] x86: PIE support to extend KASLR randomization
...member well, it makes it easier/better but I haven't seen a
> > > recent update on that. Is that accurate Kees?
> >
> > I believe this patchset is valuable if people are trying to brute force
> > guess the kernel location, but not so awesome in the event of
> > infoleaks. In the case of the current fgkaslr implementation, we only
> > randomize within the existing text segment memory area - so with PIE
> > the text segment base can move around more, but within that it wouldn't
> > strengthen anything. So, if you have an infoleak, you learn the...