search for: infoleak

Displaying 5 results from an estimated 5 matches for "infoleak".

Did you mean: infoleaks
2020 Mar 03
0
[PATCH v11 00/11] x86: PIE support to extend KASLR randomization
...; > > > If I remember well, it makes it easier/better but I haven't seen a > > recent update on that. Is that accurate Kees? > > I believe this patchset is valuable if people are trying to brute force > guess the kernel location, but not so awesome in the event of > infoleaks. In the case of the current fgkaslr implementation, we only > randomize within the existing text segment memory area - so with PIE > the text segment base can move around more, but within that it wouldn't > strengthen anything. So, if you have an infoleak, you learn the base > inst...
2020 Mar 03
4
[PATCH v11 00/11] x86: PIE support to extend KASLR randomization
On Thu, Feb 27, 2020 at 04:00:45PM -0800, Thomas Garnier wrote: > Minor changes based on feedback and rebase from v10. > > Splitting the previous serie in two. This part contains assembly code > changes required for PIE but without any direct dependencies with the > rest of the patchset. > > Note: Using objtool to detect non-compliant PIE relocations is not yet > possible
2020 Mar 03
4
[PATCH v11 00/11] x86: PIE support to extend KASLR randomization
On Thu, Feb 27, 2020 at 04:00:45PM -0800, Thomas Garnier wrote: > Minor changes based on feedback and rebase from v10. > > Splitting the previous serie in two. This part contains assembly code > changes required for PIE but without any direct dependencies with the > rest of the patchset. > > Note: Using objtool to detect non-compliant PIE relocations is not yet > possible
2020 Mar 04
2
[PATCH v11 00/11] x86: PIE support to extend KASLR randomization
...member well, it makes it easier/better but I haven't seen a > > > recent update on that. Is that accurate Kees? > > > > I believe this patchset is valuable if people are trying to brute force > > guess the kernel location, but not so awesome in the event of > > infoleaks. In the case of the current fgkaslr implementation, we only > > randomize within the existing text segment memory area - so with PIE > > the text segment base can move around more, but within that it wouldn't > > strengthen anything. So, if you have an infoleak, you learn the...
2020 Mar 04
2
[PATCH v11 00/11] x86: PIE support to extend KASLR randomization
...member well, it makes it easier/better but I haven't seen a > > > recent update on that. Is that accurate Kees? > > > > I believe this patchset is valuable if people are trying to brute force > > guess the kernel location, but not so awesome in the event of > > infoleaks. In the case of the current fgkaslr implementation, we only > > randomize within the existing text segment memory area - so with PIE > > the text segment base can move around more, but within that it wouldn't > > strengthen anything. So, if you have an infoleak, you learn the...