search for: datahaven

...0101) init_special_inode: bogus i_mode (115140) init_special_inode: bogus i_mode (117302) init_special_inode: bogus i_mode (111700) EXT3-fs error (device sda1): ext3_readdir: bad entry in directory #143278260: rec_len % 4 != 0 - offset=0, inode=1857588108, rec_len=8466, name_len=34 Dec 22 14:25:03 datahaven kernel: init_special_inode: bogus i_mode (111501) Dec 22 14:25:03 datahaven kernel: init_special_inode: bogus i_mode (113301) Dec 22 14:25:03 datahaven kernel: init_special_inode: bogus i_mode (170101) Dec 22 14:25:03 datahaven kernel: init_special_inode: bogus i_mode (115140) Dec 22 14:25:19 datah...

...ing my users correctly? Another thing is, that if I authenticate now as root or Administrator a new share with the name of the entered user appears with the basedir set to the defined /homes dir. Why? wbinfo -t shows: "Secret is good" wbinfo -u shows all users which reside in the Domain Datahaven. But I wonder why they are listed as: user1 user2 etc instead of: Datahaven+user1 Datahaven+user2 etc Here's my smbd.conf: # Global parameters [global] workgroup = DATAHAVEN netbios name = MORGANA security = DOMAIN encrypt passwords = Yes null passwo...

If it''s any help, here''s a sed script that is reasonably good at pulling out suspicious-looking items generated by various daemons. Fix appropriately... _H* ========== # this should match a buncha different stuff / [Pp]ermi/b ff / PERMI/b ff / [Rr]efuse/b ff / REFUSE/b ff / [Dd]en[yi]/b ff / DEN[YI]/b ff /[Rr]eject/b ff /REJECT/b ff /[Bb]ogus/b ff /[Pp]assw/b ff /PASSW/b ff

Are there any known vulnerabilities in portmap (redhat''s portmap-4.0-7b)? I''ve been receiving a lot of attempts to access the portmap port on some linuxppc machines I administer by various machines which clearly have no business with mine, and I wonder if this is an attempt to break in to my machines. I''ve searched some archives, but I haven''t yet found any

hi the problem : ssh lets ordinary users=A0forward reserved ports (see Debian bug report logs - #12763 ssh 1.2.20-3 /sshd vulnerable ) in connection with: lpd lets people who have access to its reserved port (ie people from hosts in /etc/hosts.{lpd,allow}) create delete and exec files = (see Secure Networks Inc. Security Advisory October 2, 1997 as reported thru

...o know about. Is there a standard for people to syslog possible security violations? This would make it easier to find them in huge log files with swatch or other monitoring tools. [mod: Except for the LOG_AUTH "priority" field, probably not.... -- REW] -- -Matt (panzer@dhp.com) -- DataHaven Project - http://www.dhp.com/ "That which can never be enforced should not be prohibited."

...5.970116144453.18239A-100000@dhp.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII On Thu, 16 Jan 1997, Christopher Hicks wrote: > What''s wrong with swatch 2.2? 2.2 changed how it handled signals, in such a way as to not work on linux. -Matt (panzer@dhp.com) -- DataHaven Project - http://www.dhp.com/ "That which can never be enforced should not be prohibited."