Displaying 5 results from an estimated 5 matches for "d41761".
2018 Jul 11
3
RFC: Speculative Load Hardening (a Spectre variant #1 mitigation)
...ake any integer or pointer value "speculation-safe", i.e. the
> intrinsic
> returns the value of its only parameter when correctly speculating, and
> returns
> 0 when miss-speculating.
> The intrinsic is close to what Philip Reames suggested on
> https://reviews.llvm.org/D41761.
>
Cool, we'll definitely need *some* intrinsic in the IR to help model source
annotations. I still need to think a bit about the interface and model for
this...
>
> Then a later patch (D49072) adds automatic mitigation by inserting the
> intrinsic
> in necessary locations.
&g...
2018 Jan 05
0
FYI, we've posted a component of Spectre mitigation on llvm-commits
Thanks for the notification, Chandler.
I also wanted to note that I’ve just posted another component for Spectre mitigation (variant 1), see https://reviews.llvm.org/D41760 and https://reviews.llvm.org/D41761.
I believe this is completely complementary to the retpoline mitigation you pointed to at https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723#, which is targeted at mitigating variant 2.
Thanks,
Kristof
On 4 Jan 2018, at 11:23, Chandler Carruth via llvm-dev <llvm-dev at lists.llvm.org<mailto:llvm-dev at lists...
2018 Jan 05
1
FYI, we've posted a component of Spectre mitigation on llvm-commits
..., 2018 at 6:15 AM Kristof Beyls <Kristof.Beyls at arm.com> wrote:
> Thanks for the notification, Chandler.
>
> I also wanted to note that I’ve just posted another component for Spectre
> mitigation (variant 1), see https://reviews.llvm.org/D41760 and
> https://reviews.llvm.org/D41761.
> I believe this is completely complementary to the retpoline mitigation you
> pointed to at https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723#, which is targeted at
> mitigating variant 2.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Kristof
>
> On 4 Jan 2018, at 11:23, Chandler Carruth via llvm-dev <
> llvm-d...
2018 Jan 04
6
FYI, we've posted a component of Spectre mitigation on llvm-commits
Sending a note here as this seems likely to be of relatively broad interest.
Thread:
http://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-commits/Week-of-Mon-20180101/513630.html
Review link:
https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723#
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2018 Mar 23
5
RFC: Speculative Load Hardening (a Spectre variant #1 mitigation)
Hello all,
I've been working for the last month or so on a comprehensive mitigation
approach to variant #1 of Spectre. There are a bunch of reasons why this is
desirable:
- Critical software that is unlikely to be easily hand-mitigated (or where
the performance tradeoff isn't worth it) will have a compelling option.
- It gives us a baseline on performance for hand-mitigation.
- Combined