search for: __net_init

....h > > net/ipv6/icmp.c > > net/ipv6/route.c ... > > diff --git a/net/ipv6/route.c b/net/ipv6/route.c > > index 64e873f5895f..51c6cdae8723 100644 > > --- a/net/ipv6/route.c > > +++ b/net/ipv6/route.c > > @@ -6447,14 +6447,19 @@ struct ctl_table * __net_init ipv6_route_sysctl_init(struct net *net) > > table[8].data = &net->ipv6.sysctl.ip6_rt_min_advmss; > > table[9].data = &net->ipv6.sysctl.ip6_rt_gc_min_interval; > > table[10].data = &net->ipv6.sysctl.skip_notify_on_dev_down; > > - > > -...

..., 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtable_broute.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtable_broute.c index 40d8258..70f656c 100644 --- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtable_broute.c +++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtable_broute.c @@ -64,9 +64,7 @@ static int ebt_broute(struct sk_buff *skb) static int __net_init broute_net_init(struct net *net) { net->xt.broute_table = ebt_register_table(net, &broute_table); - if (IS_ERR(net->xt.broute_table)) - return PTR_ERR(net->xt.broute_table); - return 0; + return PTR_RET(net->xt.broute_table); } static void __net_exit broute_net_exit(struct n...

...--git a/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c b/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c > > index 782273bb93c2..03f1edb948d7 100644 ... > > { > > struct ctl_table *table; > > + size_t table_size = ARRAY_SIZE(xfrm_table); > > __xfrm_sysctl_init(net); > > @@ -56,10 +57,13 @@ int __net_init xfrm_sysctl_init(struct net *net) > > table[3].data = &net->xfrm.sysctl_acq_expires; > > /* Don't export sysctls to unprivileged users */ > > - if (net->user_ns != &init_user_ns) > > + if (net->user_ns != &init_user_ns) { > > table[0]...

A malicious actor behind one bridge port may spam the kernel with packets with a random source MAC address, each of which will create an FDB entry, each of which is a dynamic allocation in the kernel. There are roughly 2^48 different MAC addresses, further limited by the rhashtable they are stored in to 2^31. Each entry is of the type struct net_bridge_fdb_entry, which is currently 128 bytes big.

Now that we have SCTP offload capabilities in the kernel, we can add them to virtio as well. First step is SCTP checksum. We need a new freature in virtio to negotiate this support since SCTP is excluded with the stardard checksum and requires a little bit extra. This series proposes VIRTIO_NET_F_SCTP_CSUM feature bit. As the "little bit extra", the kernel uses a new bit in the skb

Now that we have SCTP offload capabilities in the kernel, we can add them to virtio as well. First step is SCTP checksum. We need a new freature in virtio to negotiate this support since SCTP is excluded with the stardard checksum and requires a little bit extra. This series proposes VIRTIO_NET_F_SCTP_CSUM feature bit. As the "little bit extra", the kernel uses a new bit in the skb

Now that we have SCTP offload capabilities in the kernel, we can add them to virtio as well. First step is SCTP checksum. We need a new freature in virtio to negotiate this support since SCTP is excluded with the stardard checksum and requires a little bit extra. This series proposes VIRTIO_NET_F_SCTP_CSUM feature bit. As the "little bit extra", the kernel uses a new bit in the skb