Wei Huang
2010-May-17 18:57 UTC
[Xen-devel] [PATCH] Fix for AMD erratum 383 on Family 10h CPUs
This patches implements the workaround of AMD erratum 383 on family 10h CPUs. It destroys the guest VM when a MC error with a special pattern is detected. Without this patch, a guest VM failure can potentially crash Xen hypervisor and the whole system. The erratum will be published in next version of guide. Signed-off-by: Wei Huang <wei.huang2@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Christoph Egger <christoph.egger@amd.com> _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel
Jan Beulich
2010-May-19 11:55 UTC
Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] Fix for AMD erratum 383 on Family 10h CPUs
>>> Wei Huang <wei.huang2@amd.com> 17.05.10 20:57 >>> >This patches implements the workaround of AMD erratum 383 on family 10h >CPUs. It destroys the guest VM when a MC error with a special pattern is >detected. Without this patch, a guest VM failure can potentially crash >Xen hypervisor and the whole system. The erratum will be published in >next version of guide.While I realize that the patch has already been applied, I still have some reservations: - It fiddles with bit 47 of MSR_AMD64_DC_CFG *and* marks that the erratum is present. Normally I would expect that MSR modifications are done to work around an erratum, but here it is completely unclear what the modification is good for. - It clears all MCi_STATUS registers, despite (as I understand it) the problem only involving bank 0. - It flushes the TLBs for the affected domain - shouldn''t this be done globally, if it is necessary at all? - Is it guaranteed that the #MC cannot happen when a #VMEXIT is already being processed by the CPU? Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel