flight 17235 xen-4.1-testing real [real]
http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~xensrcts/logs/17235/
Failures and problems with tests :-(
Tests which did not succeed and are blocking,
including tests which could not be run:
test-amd64-i386-pv 3 host-install(3) broken REGR. vs. 17208
Tests which did not succeed, but are not blocking:
build-armhf 4 xen-build fail never pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl-pcipt-intel 9 guest-start fail never pass
test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3-vcpus1 13 guest-stop fail never pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 13 guest-stop fail never pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl-win7-amd64 13 guest-stop fail never pass
test-amd64-i386-xl-win7-amd64 13 guest-stop fail never pass
test-i386-i386-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3 13 guest-stop fail never pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 13 guest-stop fail never pass
test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 13 guest-stop fail never pass
test-i386-i386-xl-winxpsp3 13 guest-stop fail never pass
test-amd64-i386-xl-winxpsp3-vcpus1 13 guest-stop fail never pass
test-amd64-i386-xend-qemut-winxpsp3 16 leak-check/check fail never pass
test-amd64-i386-xend-winxpsp3 16 leak-check/check fail never pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-winxpsp3 13 guest-stop fail never pass
test-i386-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3 13 guest-stop fail never pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl-winxpsp3 13 guest-stop fail never pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3 13 guest-stop fail never pass
version targeted for testing:
xen b56fe0b46f98afe918455bae193d543d3ffc4598
baseline version:
xen ab01d96364683bb10619b794611b9244ba5ea227
------------------------------------------------------------
People who touched revisions under test:
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Juergen Gross <juergen.gross@ts.fujitsu.com>
Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
------------------------------------------------------------
jobs:
build-amd64 pass
build-armhf fail
build-i386 pass
build-amd64-oldkern pass
build-i386-oldkern pass
build-amd64-pvops pass
build-i386-pvops pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl pass
test-amd64-i386-xl pass
test-i386-i386-xl pass
test-amd64-i386-rhel6hvm-amd pass
test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-amd pass
test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-amd pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 fail
test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 fail
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 fail
test-amd64-amd64-xl-win7-amd64 fail
test-amd64-i386-xl-win7-amd64 fail
test-amd64-i386-xl-credit2 pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl-pcipt-intel fail
test-amd64-i386-rhel6hvm-intel pass
test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-intel pass
test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-intel pass
test-amd64-i386-xl-multivcpu pass
test-amd64-amd64-pair pass
test-amd64-i386-pair pass
test-i386-i386-pair pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl-sedf-pin pass
test-amd64-amd64-pv pass
test-amd64-i386-pv broken
test-i386-i386-pv pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl-sedf pass
test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3-vcpus1 fail
test-amd64-i386-xl-winxpsp3-vcpus1 fail
test-amd64-i386-xend-qemut-winxpsp3 fail
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-winxpsp3 fail
test-i386-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3 fail
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3 fail
test-i386-i386-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3 fail
test-amd64-i386-xend-winxpsp3 fail
test-amd64-amd64-xl-winxpsp3 fail
test-i386-i386-xl-winxpsp3 fail
------------------------------------------------------------
sg-report-flight on woking.cam.xci-test.com
logs: /home/xc_osstest/logs
images: /home/xc_osstest/images
Logs, config files, etc. are available at
http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~xensrcts/logs
Test harness code can be found at
http://xenbits.xensource.com/gitweb?p=osstest.git;a=summary
Not pushing.
------------------------------------------------------------
commit b56fe0b46f98afe918455bae193d543d3ffc4598
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Date: Tue Mar 12 16:46:09 2013 +0100
x86/MSI: add mechanism to fully protect MSI-X table from PV guest accesses
This adds two new physdev operations for Dom0 to invoke when resource
allocation for devices is known to be complete, so that the hypervisor
can arrange for the respective MMIO ranges to be marked read-only
before an eventual guest getting such a device assigned even gets
started, such that it won''t be able to set up writable mappings for
these MMIO ranges before Xen has a chance to protect them.
This also addresses another issue with the code being modified here,
in that so far write protection for the address ranges in question got
set up only once during the lifetime of a device (i.e. until either
system shutdown or device hot removal), while teardown happened when
the last interrupt was disposed of by the guest (which at least allowed
the tables to be writable when the device got assigned to a second
guest [instance] after the first terminated).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master changeset: 4245d331e0e75de8d1bddbbb518f3a8ce6d0bb7e
master date: 2013-03-08 14:05:34 +0100
commit 672c075ab39e2dea517a75d5e6091e6df82c3f71
Author: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Date: Tue Mar 12 16:30:41 2013 +0100
credit1: Use atomic bit operations for the flags structure
The flags structure is not protected by locks (or more precisely,
it is protected using an inconsistent set of locks); we therefore need
to make sure that all accesses are atomic-safe. This is particulary
important in the case of the PARKED flag, which if clobbered while
changing the YIELD bit will leave a vcpu wedged in an offline state.
Using the atomic bitops also requires us to change the size of the
"flags"
element.
Spotted-by: Igor Pavlikevich <ipavlikevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
master changeset: be6507509454adf3bb5a50b9406c88504e996d5a
master date: 2013-03-04 13:37:39 +0100
commit d8f9d5b8b98de7d035c5064fe99a44f0a383842f
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Date: Tue Mar 12 16:30:04 2013 +0100
x86: defer processing events on the NMI exit path
Otherwise, we may end up in the scheduler, keeping NMIs masked for a
possibly unbounded period of time (until whenever the next IRET gets
executed). Enforce timely event processing by sending a self IPI.
Of course it''s open for discussion whether to always use the
straight
exit path from handle_ist_exception.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
master changeset: d463b005bbd6475ed930a302821efe239e1b2cf9
master date: 2013-03-04 10:19:34 +0100
commit 16c0caad7d44e80535d44c0690a691d22f74d378
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Date: Tue Mar 12 16:29:11 2013 +0100
SEDF: avoid gathering vCPU-s on pCPU0
The introduction of vcpu_force_reschedule() in 14320:215b799fa181 was
incompatible with the SEDF scheduler: Any vCPU using
VCPUOP_stop_periodic_timer (e.g. any vCPU of half way modern PV Linux
guests) ends up on pCPU0 after that call. Obviously, running all PV
guests'' (and namely Dom0''s) vCPU-s on pCPU0 causes
problems for those
guests rather sooner than later.
So the main thing that was clearly wrong (and bogus from the beginning)
was the use of cpumask_first() in sedf_pick_cpu(). It is being replaced
by a construct that prefers to put back the vCPU on the pCPU that it
got launched on.
However, there''s one more glitch: When reducing the affinity of a
vCPU
temporarily, and then widening it again to a set that includes the pCPU
that the vCPU was last running on, the generic scheduler code would not
force a migration of that vCPU, and hence it would forever stay on the
pCPU it last ran on. Since that can again create a load imbalance, the
SEDF scheduler wants a migration to happen regardless of it being
apparently unnecessary.
Of course, an alternative to checking for SEDF explicitly in
vcpu_set_affinity() would be to introduce a flags field in struct
scheduler, and have SEDF set a "always-migrate-on-affinity-change"
flag.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
master changeset: e6a6fd63652814e5c36a0016c082032f798ced1f
master date: 2013-03-04 10:17:52 +0100
commit 44e4100a138b2caf6a0947ad7ddef65c7678dbf3
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Date: Tue Mar 12 16:24:58 2013 +0100
x86: make certain memory sub-ops return valid values
When a domain''s shared info field "max_pfn" is zero,
domain_get_maximum_gpfn() so far returned ULONG_MAX, which
do_memory_op() in turn converted to -1 (i.e. -EPERM). Make the former
always return a sensible number (i.e. zero if the field was zero) and
have the latter no longer truncate return values.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
master changeset: 7ffc9779aa5120c5098d938cb88f69a1dda9a0fe
master date: 2013-03-04 10:16:04 +0100
commit 6b2f399604ba0d46203855658b72b9fcba76a7ac
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Date: Tue Mar 12 16:23:55 2013 +0100
fix compat memory exchange op splitting
A shift with a negative count was erroneously used here, yielding
undefined behavior.
Reported-by: Xi Wang <xi@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
master changeset: 53decd322157e922cac2988e07da6d39538c8033
master date: 2013-03-01 16:59:49 +0100
commit 0ad719247a5072f3a1af6c77faf203e724acf2fd
Author: Juergen Gross <juergen.gross@ts.fujitsu.com>
Date: Tue Mar 12 16:23:15 2013 +0100
Avoid stale pointer when moving domain to another cpupool
When a domain is moved to another cpupool the scheduler private data
pointers
in vcpu and domain structures must never point to an already freed memory
area.
While at it, simplify sched_init_vcpu() by using DOM2OP instead VCPU2OP.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <juergen.gross@ts.fujitsu.com>
This also required commit dbfa7bba0f213b1802e1900b71bc34837c30ee52:
xen, cpupools: Fix cpupool-move to make more consistent
The full order for creating new private data structures when moving
from one pool to another is now:
* Allocate all new structures
- Allocate a new private domain structure (but don''t point there
yet)
- Allocate per-vcpu data structures (but don''t point there yet)
* Remove old structures
- Remove each vcpu, freeing the associated data structure
- Free the domain data structure
* Switch to the new structures
- Set the domain to the new cpupool, with the new private domain
structure
- Set each vcpu to the respective new structure, and insert
This is in line with a (fairly reasonable) assumption in credit2 that
the private structure of the domain will be the private structure
pointed to by the per-vcpu private structure.
Also fix a bug, in which insert_vcpu was called with the *old* vcpu
ops rather than the new ones.
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
master changeset: 482300def7d08e773ccd2a0d978bcb9469fdd810
master date: 2013-02-28 14:56:45 +0000
commit 677c9126023e79cb8e0a74bc002bd7af06b53214
Author: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Date: Tue Mar 12 16:22:03 2013 +0100
vmx: fix handling of NMI VMEXIT.
Call do_nmi() directly and explicitly re-enable NMIs rather than
raising an NMI through the APIC. Since NMIs are disabled after the
VMEXIT, the raised NMI would be blocked until the next IRET
instruction (i.e. the next real interrupt, or after scheduling a PV
guest) and in the meantime the guest will spin taking NMI VMEXITS.
Also, handle NMIs before re-enabling interrupts, since if we handle an
interrupt (and therefore IRET) before calling do_nmi(), we may end up
running the NMI handler with NMIs enabled.
Signed-off-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master changeset: 7dd3b06ff031c9a8c727df16c5def2afb382101c
master date: 2013-02-28 14:00:18 +0000
(qemu changes not included)