flight 15445 xen-4.2-testing real [real]
http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~xensrcts/logs/15445/
Regressions :-(
Tests which did not succeed and are blocking,
including tests which could not be run:
test-i386-i386-pv 14 guest-localmigrate/x10 fail REGR. vs. 15434
test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-intel 11 leak-check/check fail REGR. vs. 15434
test-amd64-i386-qemut-win 12 guest-localmigrate/x10 fail REGR. vs. 15434
test-amd64-i386-xend-winxpsp3 12 guest-localmigrate/x10 fail REGR. vs. 15434
test-amd64-i386-win 7 windows-install fail REGR. vs. 15434
test-amd64-amd64-win 7 windows-install fail REGR. vs. 15434
test-i386-i386-qemut-win 7 windows-install fail REGR. vs. 15434
test-i386-i386-win 11 guest-localmigrate.2 fail REGR. vs. 15434
test-amd64-i386-qemut-win-vcpus1 7 windows-install fail REGR. vs. 15434
test-amd64-i386-win-vcpus1 7 windows-install fail REGR. vs. 15434
test-amd64-i386-xend-qemut-winxpsp3 7 windows-install fail REGR. vs. 15434
test-amd64-amd64-qemut-win 7 windows-install fail REGR. vs. 15434
Regressions which are regarded as allowable (not blocking):
test-amd64-amd64-xl-sedf-pin 10 guest-saverestore fail like 15434
Tests which did not succeed, but are not blocking:
build-armhf 4 xen-build fail never pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl-pcipt-intel 9 guest-start fail never pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 9 guest-localmigrate fail never pass
test-i386-i386-xl-qemut-win 13 guest-stop fail never pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl-win7-amd64 13 guest-stop fail never pass
test-amd64-i386-xl-win7-amd64 13 guest-stop fail never pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl-win 13 guest-stop fail never pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 13 guest-stop fail never pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-winxpsp3 13 guest-stop fail never pass
test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3-vcpus1 13 guest-stop fail never pass
test-i386-i386-xl-winxpsp3 13 guest-stop fail never pass
test-i386-i386-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3 9 guest-localmigrate fail never pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win 13 guest-stop fail never pass
test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 13 guest-stop fail never pass
test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win-vcpus1 13 guest-stop fail never pass
test-i386-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3 13 guest-stop fail never pass
test-amd64-i386-xl-win-vcpus1 13 guest-stop fail never pass
test-amd64-i386-xl-winxpsp3-vcpus1 13 guest-stop fail never pass
test-i386-i386-xl-win 13 guest-stop fail never pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl-winxpsp3 13 guest-stop fail never pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3 9 guest-localmigrate fail never pass
version targeted for testing:
xen c713f1f7d3c1
baseline version:
xen b8a523d9f14c
------------------------------------------------------------
People who touched revisions under test:
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@amd.com>
David Scott <dave.scott@eu.citrix.com>
Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
------------------------------------------------------------
jobs:
build-amd64 pass
build-armhf fail
build-i386 pass
build-amd64-oldkern pass
build-i386-oldkern pass
build-amd64-pvops pass
build-i386-pvops pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl pass
test-amd64-i386-xl pass
test-i386-i386-xl pass
test-amd64-i386-rhel6hvm-amd pass
test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-amd pass
test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-amd pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 fail
test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 fail
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 fail
test-amd64-amd64-xl-win7-amd64 fail
test-amd64-i386-xl-win7-amd64 fail
test-amd64-i386-xl-credit2 pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl-pcipt-intel fail
test-amd64-i386-rhel6hvm-intel pass
test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-intel pass
test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-intel fail
test-amd64-i386-xl-multivcpu pass
test-amd64-amd64-pair pass
test-amd64-i386-pair pass
test-i386-i386-pair pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl-sedf-pin fail
test-amd64-amd64-pv pass
test-amd64-i386-pv pass
test-i386-i386-pv fail
test-amd64-amd64-xl-sedf pass
test-amd64-i386-win-vcpus1 fail
test-amd64-i386-qemut-win-vcpus1 fail
test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win-vcpus1 fail
test-amd64-i386-xl-win-vcpus1 fail
test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3-vcpus1 fail
test-amd64-i386-xl-winxpsp3-vcpus1 fail
test-amd64-amd64-win fail
test-amd64-i386-win fail
test-i386-i386-win fail
test-amd64-amd64-qemut-win fail
test-amd64-i386-qemut-win fail
test-i386-i386-qemut-win fail
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win fail
test-i386-i386-xl-qemut-win fail
test-amd64-amd64-xl-win fail
test-i386-i386-xl-win fail
test-amd64-i386-xend-qemut-winxpsp3 fail
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-winxpsp3 fail
test-i386-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3 fail
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3 fail
test-i386-i386-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3 fail
test-amd64-i386-xend-winxpsp3 fail
test-amd64-amd64-xl-winxpsp3 fail
test-i386-i386-xl-winxpsp3 fail
------------------------------------------------------------
sg-report-flight on woking.cam.xci-test.com
logs: /home/xc_osstest/logs
images: /home/xc_osstest/images
Logs, config files, etc. are available at
http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~xensrcts/logs
Test harness code can be found at
http://xenbits.xensource.com/gitweb?p=osstest.git;a=summary
Not pushing.
------------------------------------------------------------
changeset: 25979:c713f1f7d3c1
tag: tip
user: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
date: Thu Feb 07 14:24:08 2013 +0000
oxenstored: Enforce a maximum message size of 4096 bytes
The maximum size of a message is part of the protocol spec in
xen/include/public/io/xs_wire.h
Before this patch a client which sends an overly large message can
cause a buffer read overrun.
Note if a badly-behaved client sends a very large message
then it will be difficult for them to make their connection
work again-- they will probably need to reboot.
This is a security issue, part of XSA-38 / CVE-2013-0215.
Signed-off-by: David Scott <dave.scott@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 26522:ffd30e7388ad
Backport-requested-by: security@xen.org
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
changeset: 25978:b150d8787a05
user: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
date: Thu Feb 07 14:23:56 2013 +0000
tools/ocaml: oxenstored: Be more paranoid about ring reading
oxenstored makes use of the OCaml Xenbus bindings, in which the
function xs_ring_read in tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xs_ring_stubs.c is used
to read from the shared memory Xenstore ring.
This function does not correctly handle all possible (prod, cons)
states when MASK_XENSTORE_IDX(prod) > MASK_XENSTORE_IDX(cons).
The root cause is the use of the unmasked values of prod and cons to
calculate to_read. If prod is set to an out-of-range value, the ring
peer can cause to_read to be too large or even negative. This allows
the ring peer to force oxenstored to read and write out of range for
the buffers leading to a crash or possibly to privilege escalation.
Correct this by masking the values of cons and prod at the start, so
we only deal with masked values. This makes the logic simpler, as
semantically inappropriate values of the upper bits of the ring
pointers are simply ignored.
The same vulnerability does not exist in the ring writer because the
only use made of the unmasked value is the check which prevents the
prod pointer overtaking the cons pointer. A ring peer which defeats
this check will suffer only lost data.
However, additionally, precautions need to be taken to ensure that
req_cons and req_prod are only read once in each function. Without
the use of volatile or some asm construct, the compiler can
"prove"
that req_cons and req_prod do not change unexpectedly and is permitted
to "amplify" the read of (say) req_cons into two reads at
different
times, giving two different values for use as cons, and then use the
two sources of cons interchangeably. (The use of xen_mb() does not
forbid this.)
Therefore do the reads of req_cons and req_prod through a volatile
pointer in both xs_ring_read and xs_ring_write.
This is currently believed to be a theoretical vulnerability as we are
not aware of any compilers which amplify reads in this way.
This is a security issue, part of XSA-38 / CVE-2013-0215.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Tested-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 26521:2c0fd406f02c
Backport-requested-by: security@xen.org
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
changeset: 25977:b8a523d9f14c
user: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@amd.com>
date: Tue Feb 05 15:30:59 2013 +0100
AMD,IOMMU: Make per-device interrupt remapping table default
Using global interrupt remapping table may be insecure, as
described by XSA-36. This patch makes per-device mode default.
This is XSA-36 / CVE-2013-0153.
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@amd.com>
Moved warning in amd_iov_detect() to location covering all cases.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 26519:1af531e7bc2f
xen-unstable date: Tue Feb 5 14:22:11 UTC 2013
=======================================commit
ad6cb8a6550d0f0550252db4e05c305086ea9a65
Author: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Date: Thu Jan 17 15:52:16 2013 +0000
e1000: fix compile warning introduced by security fix, and debugging
e33f918c19e393900b95a2bb6b10668dfe96a8f2, the fix for XSA-41,
and its cherry picks in 4.2 and 4.1 introduced this compiler warning:
hw/e1000.c:641: warning: ''return'' with a value, in
function returning void
In upstream qemu (where this change came from), e1000_receive returns
a value used by queueing machinery to decide whether to try
resubmitting the packet later. Returning "size" means that the
packet
has been dealt with and should not be retried.
In this old branch (aka qemu-xen-traditional), this machinery is
absent and e1000_receive returns void. Fix the return statement.
Also add a debugging statement along the lines of the others in this
function.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2a1354d655d816feaad7dbdb8364f40a208439c1)