(I was personally not sure about this one: it seems to allow someone to
watch a ''private'' path and receive confirmation of its
existence, which
previously was prevented. However, it looks like this is what Keir is
suggesting in the following discussion:
http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.emulators.xen.devel/31710/focus=31711
Of course I''m far from an expert on how xenstore''s permissions
system is
supposed to work, and the patch certainly fixes a real problem.)
regards
john
# HG changeset patch
# User john.levon@sun.com
# Date 1162947187 28800
# Node ID 8b9a88f3b4070bae7892f1e36bcbb7ad896ce674
# Parent 98aaea71c6312dfc80c07194a9b7e1de7f021c94
Fire watch for non-dom0 backend when frontend is removed from xenstore in a
transaction.
Signed-off-by: Max Zhen <max.zhen@sun.com>
diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c
--- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c
+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ static void add_event(struct connection
if (!check_event_node(name)) {
/* Can this conn load node, or see that it doesn''t exist? */
struct node *node = get_node(conn, name, XS_PERM_READ);
- if (!node && errno != ENOENT)
+ if (!node && errno != ENOENT && errno != EACCES)
return;
}
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