I don''t get the purpose. What is wrong with hiding certain PCI devices from DomO and thus make them available in domU? Btw, you are sure all OSes "find an empty bus"? -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: Stefan Berger [mailto:stefanb@us.ibm.com] Gesendet: Mittwoch, 3. August 2005 22:47 An: xen-devel@lists.xensource.com Betreff: [Xen-devel] PCI bus emulation? Hello! I have seen that the Qemu code contains some nice code for PCI bus emulation. I wonder whether this code could be reused in XEN to fake a PCI bus by running the PCI emulation code in an exception handler in the hypervisor and setting a user domain''s IO privilege level appropriately to have all inb/outb''s intercepted. This could have potential benefits on the build process of user domains which could include the PCI code when built, but that code when probing the PCI bus would only find an empty bus and the probing of the drivers in the kernel would not start. Maybe this code could also be used to support driver domains. Is this a good idea? :-) Stefan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel
Something similar to this is done already: domains are forced to access the PCI configuration spaces (which describes what cards are present and how they''re configured) through hypercalls to Xen. The hiding / revealing stuff just tells Xen what devices to let the domains see through this interface. This is broken now because the PCI probing code has moved out of Xen, so dom0 can always see all of the PCI devices and will grab them for itself. What is needed is: a) a way of dom0 initialising the bus but not grabbing all the devices b) a way of allowing other domains to probe PCI config space via dom0 so it can control what devices they see a) will require some tweaks to the PCI code in dom0. b) will require some kind of virtualised PCI device (as Stefan described) that can control what the guest is allowed to see. Using emulation to implement b) would have the advantage that the current probing code shouldn''t need changing. OTOH, the overall system may be simpler if the guest detects it''s not allowed to access the hardware directly and explicitly talks to dom0 e.g. using Xenstore to probe its devices. Cheers, Mark> I don''t get the purpose. What is wrong with hiding certain PCI devices from > DomO and thus make them available in domU? > > Btw, you are sure all OSes "find an empty bus"? > > > -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- > Von: Stefan Berger [mailto:stefanb@us.ibm.com] > Gesendet: Mittwoch, 3. August 2005 22:47 > An: xen-devel@lists.xensource.com > Betreff: [Xen-devel] PCI bus emulation? > > Hello! > > I have seen that the Qemu code contains some nice code for PCI bus > emulation. I wonder whether this code could be reused in XEN to fake a PCI > bus by running the PCI emulation code in an exception handler in the > hypervisor and setting a user domain''s IO privilege level appropriately to > have all inb/outb''s intercepted. This could have potential benefits on the > build process of user domains which could include the PCI code when built, > but that code when probing the PCI bus would only find an empty bus and > the probing of the drivers in the kernel would not start. Maybe this code > could also be used to support driver domains. Is this a good idea? :-) > > Stefan > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Xen-devel mailing list > Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com > http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel > > _______________________________________________ > Xen-devel mailing list > Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com > http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel_______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel
Mark Williamson <mark.williamson@cl.cam.ac.uk> wrote on 08/04/2005 09:48:05 AM:> Something similar to this is done already: domains are forced to accessthe> PCI configuration spaces (which describes what cards are present and how> they''re configured) through hypercalls to Xen. The hiding / revealingstuff> just tells Xen what devices to let the domains see through thisinterface.> > This is broken now because the PCI probing code has moved out of Xen, sodom0> can always see all of the PCI devices and will grab them for itself.What is> needed is: > a) a way of dom0 initialising the bus but not grabbing all the devices > b) a way of allowing other domains to probe PCI config space via dom0 soit> can control what devices they see > > a) will require some tweaks to the PCI code in dom0. b) will requiresome> kind of virtualised PCI device (as Stefan described) that can controlwhat> the guest is allowed to see.It shuld be possible for domain 0 to read all devices from the bus and build its list. Then domain 0 could take the to-be-hidden devices out of that list and maybe ''program'' the virtualized PCI bus of a driver domain to show these devices (through sending a message to the HV about what to present). A driver domain would still have to be co-operative in that sense that it first starts out with a low privilege level (by default a domain would be created that way) to run into the exception handler and request to have its privilege level raised once it wants to access the raw hardware. Setting the individual privilege bits for a driver domain might be another possibility, but you''d need to know the list of ioports for each possible device.> > Using emulation to implement b) would have the advantage that thecurrent> probing code shouldn''t need changing. OTOH, the overall system may be > simpler if the guest detects it''s not allowed to access thehardwaredirectly> and explicitly talks to dom0 e.g. using Xenstore to probe its devices.I also think that it would have the advantage of being able to build a user domain independently of whether it will become a driver domain or not. All the difference would be in the virtualized PCI bus presenting devices or being empty. Stefan> > Cheers, > Mark > > > I don''t get the purpose. What is wrong with hiding certain PCI devicesfrom> > DomO and thus make them available in domU? > > > > Btw, you are sure all OSes "find an empty bus"? > > > > > > -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- > > Von: Stefan Berger [mailto:stefanb@us.ibm.com] > > Gesendet: Mittwoch, 3. August 2005 22:47 > > An: xen-devel@lists.xensource.com > > Betreff: [Xen-devel] PCI bus emulation? > > > > Hello! > > > > I have seen that the Qemu code contains some nice code for PCI bus > > emulation. I wonder whether this code could be reused in XEN to fake aPCI> > bus by running the PCI emulation code in an exception handler in the > > hypervisor and setting a user domain''s IO privilege levelappropriately to> > have all inb/outb''s intercepted. This could have potential benefits onthe> > build process of user domains which could include the PCI code whenbuilt,> > but that code when probing the PCI bus would only find an empty busand> > the probing of the drivers in the kernel would not start. Maybe thiscode> > could also be used to support driver domains. Is this a good idea? :-) > > > > Stefan > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Xen-devel mailing list > > Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com > > http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Xen-devel mailing list > > Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com > > http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel_______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel
> It shuld be possible for domain 0 to read all devices from the bus and > build its list. Then domain 0 could take the to-be-hidden devices out of > that listYep. Do you think it''s possible to simply chop these devices out of the list after initialisation but before passing up to the generic PCI layer? That''d be excellent.> and maybe ''program'' the virtualized PCI bus of a driver domain > to show these devices (through sending a message to the HV about what to > present).I''d be inclined to have this purely implemented at kernel level using interdomain comms, rather than having Xen know anything about it.> A driver domain would still have to be co-operative in that > sense that it first starts out with a low privilege level (by default a > domain would be created that way) to run into the exception handler and > request to have its privilege level raised once it wants to access the raw > hardware. Setting the individual privilege bits for a driver domain might > be another possibility, but you''d need to know the list of ioports for > each possible device.Right now we do just that: domains never get access to the PCI controller, so config space accesses must always be mediated by Xen. Domains are assigned direct access to the devices they control using IO port bits (although I''m not entirely happy with that, since it allows applications in the domain access to the device - fine for a driver domain but not good for partitioning the hardware) and controlled mapping of IO memory. This works now because Xen can read the required IO port / memory ranges out of PCI config space and enable them as appropriate. To make this work with the unstable tree, we''d need to have dom0''s kernel somehow get this information out...> > Using emulation to implement b) would have the advantage that the > > current > > > probing code shouldn''t need changing. OTOH, the overall system may be > > simpler if the guest detects it''s not allowed to access the > > hardwaredirectly > > > and explicitly talks to dom0 e.g. using Xenstore to probe its devices. > > I also think that it would have the advantage of being able to build a > user domain independently of whether it will become a driver domain or > not. All the difference would be in the virtualized PCI bus presenting > devices or being empty.I definitely think we should retain the ability to build one kernel that works in all possible domains. The startinfo does contain flags that tell the domain if it''s dom0 (and therefore controls the PCI bus) or not. Cheers, Mark> Stefan > > > Cheers, > > Mark > > > > > I don''t get the purpose. What is wrong with hiding certain PCI devices > > from > > > > DomO and thus make them available in domU? > > > > > > Btw, you are sure all OSes "find an empty bus"? > > > > > > > > > -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- > > > Von: Stefan Berger [mailto:stefanb@us.ibm.com] > > > Gesendet: Mittwoch, 3. August 2005 22:47 > > > An: xen-devel@lists.xensource.com > > > Betreff: [Xen-devel] PCI bus emulation? > > > > > > Hello! > > > > > > I have seen that the Qemu code contains some nice code for PCI bus > > > emulation. I wonder whether this code could be reused in XEN to fake a > > PCI > > > > bus by running the PCI emulation code in an exception handler in the > > > hypervisor and setting a user domain''s IO privilege level > > appropriately to > > > > have all inb/outb''s intercepted. This could have potential benefits on > > the > > > > build process of user domains which could include the PCI code when > > built, > > > > but that code when probing the PCI bus would only find an empty bus > > and > > > > the probing of the drivers in the kernel would not start. Maybe this > > code > > > > could also be used to support driver domains. Is this a good idea? :-) > > > > > > Stefan > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Xen-devel mailing list > > > Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com > > > http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Xen-devel mailing list > > > Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com > > > http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel_______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel
> -----Original Message----- > From: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xensource.com [mailto:xen-devel- > bounces@lists.xensource.com] On Behalf Of Mark Williamson > Sent: 04 August 2005 16:42 > To: Stefan Berger > Cc: Retzki, Sascha [Xplain]; xen-devel@lists.xensource.com > Subject: Re: AW: [Xen-devel] PCI bus emulation? > > > It shuld be possible for domain 0 to read all devices from the bus and > > build its list. Then domain 0 could take the to-be-hidden devices out of > > that list > > Yep. Do you think it''s possible to simply chop these devices out of the > list > after initialisation but before passing up to the generic PCI layer? > That''d > be excellent.A while back I had a look at this and it didn''t look as if it would be very straight forward by just using arch specific code but probably doable using the hooks provided.> > > and maybe ''program'' the virtualized PCI bus of a driver domain > > to show these devices (through sending a message to the HV about what to > > present). > > I''d be inclined to have this purely implemented at kernel level using > interdomain comms, rather than having Xen know anything about it.I''m not entirely convinced that this is the right way to do. Once the devices are set up by dom0 xen wouldn''t have to do that much and intercepting pci config read/writes in xen using the instruction emulator might be better and create less dependencies on Dom0. The code in Xen 2.x dealing with PCI config reads/writes by device driver domains is actually quite small. Extending this to use the instruction decoder should be quite straight forward and less complex than doing a PCI config space frontend/backend type thing. And it would make changes to guests smaller than they already are in 2.x rolf> > A driver domain would still have to be co-operative in that > > sense that it first starts out with a low privilege level (by default a > > domain would be created that way) to run into the exception handler and > > request to have its privilege level raised once it wants to access the > raw > > hardware. Setting the individual privilege bits for a driver domain > might > > be another possibility, but you''d need to know the list of ioports for > > each possible device. > > Right now we do just that: domains never get access to the PCI controller, > so > config space accesses must always be mediated by Xen. Domains are > assigned > direct access to the devices they control using IO port bits (although I''m > not entirely happy with that, since it allows applications in the domain > access to the device - fine for a driver domain but not good for > partitioning > the hardware) and controlled mapping of IO memory. > > This works now because Xen can read the required IO port / memory ranges > out > of PCI config space and enable them as appropriate. To make this work > with > the unstable tree, we''d need to have dom0''s kernel somehow get this > information out... > > > > Using emulation to implement b) would have the advantage that the > > > > current > > > > > probing code shouldn''t need changing. OTOH, the overall system may be > > > simpler if the guest detects it''s not allowed to access the > > > > hardwaredirectly > > > > > and explicitly talks to dom0 e.g. using Xenstore to probe its devices. > > > > I also think that it would have the advantage of being able to build a > > user domain independently of whether it will become a driver domain or > > not. All the difference would be in the virtualized PCI bus presenting > > devices or being empty. > > I definitely think we should retain the ability to build one kernel that > works > in all possible domains. The startinfo does contain flags that tell the > domain if it''s dom0 (and therefore controls the PCI bus) or not. > > Cheers, > Mark > > > Stefan > > > > > Cheers, > > > Mark > > > > > > > I don''t get the purpose. What is wrong with hiding certain PCI > devices > > > > from > > > > > > DomO and thus make them available in domU? > > > > > > > > Btw, you are sure all OSes "find an empty bus"? > > > > > > > > > > > > -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- > > > > Von: Stefan Berger [mailto:stefanb@us.ibm.com] > > > > Gesendet: Mittwoch, 3. August 2005 22:47 > > > > An: xen-devel@lists.xensource.com > > > > Betreff: [Xen-devel] PCI bus emulation? > > > > > > > > Hello! > > > > > > > > I have seen that the Qemu code contains some nice code for PCI bus > > > > emulation. I wonder whether this code could be reused in XEN to fake > a > > > > PCI > > > > > > bus by running the PCI emulation code in an exception handler in the > > > > hypervisor and setting a user domain''s IO privilege level > > > > appropriately to > > > > > > have all inb/outb''s intercepted. This could have potential benefits > on > > > > the > > > > > > build process of user domains which could include the PCI code when > > > > built, > > > > > > but that code when probing the PCI bus would only find an empty bus > > > > and > > > > > > the probing of the drivers in the kernel would not start. Maybe this > > > > code > > > > > > could also be used to support driver domains. Is this a good idea? > :-) > > > > > > > > Stefan > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > Xen-devel mailing list > > > > Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com > > > > http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > Xen-devel mailing list > > > > Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com > > > > http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel > > _______________________________________________ > Xen-devel mailing list > Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com > http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel_______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel
[hiding PCI devices]> A while back I had a look at this and it didn''t look as if it would be very > straight forward by just using arch specific code but probably doable using > the hooks provided.OK. I personally think we could (one day) argue its utility to the PCI core but we probably don''t want to try and merge changes to that upstream at the same time.> > > and maybe ''program'' the virtualized PCI bus of a driver domain > > > to show these devices (through sending a message to the HV about what > > > to present). > > > > I''d be inclined to have this purely implemented at kernel level using > > interdomain comms, rather than having Xen know anything about it. > > I''m not entirely convinced that this is the right way to do. Once the > devices are set up by dom0 xen wouldn''t have to do that much and > intercepting pci config read/writes in xen using the instruction emulator > might be better and create less dependencies on Dom0.How would config space writes work? Does Xen 3 understand enough about PCI to implement those itself?> The code in Xen 2.x dealing with PCI config reads/writes by device driver > domains is actually quite small. Extending this to use the instruction > decoder should be quite straight forward and less complex than doing a PCI > config space frontend/backend type thing. And it would make changes to > guests smaller than they already are in 2.xI did wonder if the PCI back/front could be implemented entirely using communications in the store - that could make them simpler. Requiring no modifications to the read / write code would be a nice feature to have, though. Cheers, Mark> rolf > > > > A driver domain would still have to be co-operative in that > > > sense that it first starts out with a low privilege level (by default a > > > domain would be created that way) to run into the exception handler and > > > request to have its privilege level raised once it wants to access the > > > > raw > > > > > hardware. Setting the individual privilege bits for a driver domain > > > > might > > > > > be another possibility, but you''d need to know the list of ioports for > > > each possible device. > > > > Right now we do just that: domains never get access to the PCI > > controller, so > > config space accesses must always be mediated by Xen. Domains are > > assigned > > direct access to the devices they control using IO port bits (although > > I''m not entirely happy with that, since it allows applications in the > > domain access to the device - fine for a driver domain but not good for > > partitioning > > the hardware) and controlled mapping of IO memory. > > > > This works now because Xen can read the required IO port / memory ranges > > out > > of PCI config space and enable them as appropriate. To make this work > > with > > the unstable tree, we''d need to have dom0''s kernel somehow get this > > information out... > > > > > > Using emulation to implement b) would have the advantage that the > > > > > > current > > > > > > > probing code shouldn''t need changing. OTOH, the overall system may > > > > be simpler if the guest detects it''s not allowed to access the > > > > > > hardwaredirectly > > > > > > > and explicitly talks to dom0 e.g. using Xenstore to probe its > > > > devices. > > > > > > I also think that it would have the advantage of being able to build a > > > user domain independently of whether it will become a driver domain or > > > not. All the difference would be in the virtualized PCI bus presenting > > > devices or being empty. > > > > I definitely think we should retain the ability to build one kernel that > > works > > in all possible domains. The startinfo does contain flags that tell the > > domain if it''s dom0 (and therefore controls the PCI bus) or not. > > > > Cheers, > > Mark > > > > > Stefan > > > > > > > Cheers, > > > > Mark > > > > > > > > > I don''t get the purpose. What is wrong with hiding certain PCI > > > > devices > > > > > from > > > > > > > > DomO and thus make them available in domU? > > > > > > > > > > Btw, you are sure all OSes "find an empty bus"? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- > > > > > Von: Stefan Berger [mailto:stefanb@us.ibm.com] > > > > > Gesendet: Mittwoch, 3. August 2005 22:47 > > > > > An: xen-devel@lists.xensource.com > > > > > Betreff: [Xen-devel] PCI bus emulation? > > > > > > > > > > Hello! > > > > > > > > > > I have seen that the Qemu code contains some nice code for PCI > > > > > bus emulation. I wonder whether this code could be reused in XEN to > > > > > fake > > > > a > > > > > PCI > > > > > > > > bus by running the PCI emulation code in an exception handler in > > > > > the hypervisor and setting a user domain''s IO privilege level > > > > > > appropriately to > > > > > > > > have all inb/outb''s intercepted. This could have potential benefits > > > > on > > > > > the > > > > > > > > build process of user domains which could include the PCI code when > > > > > > built, > > > > > > > > but that code when probing the PCI bus would only find an empty bus > > > > > > and > > > > > > > > the probing of the drivers in the kernel would not start. Maybe > > > > > this > > > > > > code > > > > > > > > could also be used to support driver domains. Is this a good idea? > > : > > :-) > > : > > > > > Stefan > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > > Xen-devel mailing list > > > > > Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com > > > > > http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > > Xen-devel mailing list > > > > > Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com > > > > > http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Xen-devel mailing list > > Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com > > http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel_______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel
> -----Original Message----- > From: Mark Williamson [mailto:mark.williamson@cl.cam.ac.uk] > Sent: 05 August 2005 01:11 > To: Neugebauer, Rolf > Cc: Stefan Berger; Retzki, Sascha [Xplain]; xen-devel@lists.xensource.com > Subject: Re: AW: [Xen-devel] PCI bus emulation? > > [hiding PCI devices] > > A while back I had a look at this and it didn''t look as if it would be > very > > straight forward by just using arch specific code but probably doable > using > > the hooks provided. > > OK. I personally think we could (one day) argue its utility to the PCI > core > but we probably don''t want to try and merge changes to that upstream at > the > same time. > > > > > and maybe ''program'' the virtualized PCI bus of a driver domain > > > > to show these devices (through sending a message to the HV about > what > > > > to present). > > > > > > I''d be inclined to have this purely implemented at kernel level using > > > interdomain comms, rather than having Xen know anything about it. > > > > I''m not entirely convinced that this is the right way to do. Once the > > devices are set up by dom0 xen wouldn''t have to do that much and > > intercepting pci config read/writes in xen using the instruction > emulator > > might be better and create less dependencies on Dom0. > > How would config space writes work? Does Xen 3 understand enough about > PCI to > implement those itself?If I remember correctly in 2.0 we don''t allow writes to the config space bu emulate them through very simple state machine. For normal linux guests the only writes done through probing was the code which figured out the size of the io memory regions, ie, read base, write all 1s, read again to find zeroed bits and write back original base value (or something along those lines). Obviously for this to work in Xen 3 xen would have to know a little about the config space but once set up this should be relatively easy. The other thing the backend/xen emulation would have to do is fake out some bus "hierarchy" for device driver domains. Some of that code already exists in 2.x> > The code in Xen 2.x dealing with PCI config reads/writes by device > driver > > domains is actually quite small. Extending this to use the instruction > > decoder should be quite straight forward and less complex than doing a > PCI > > config space frontend/backend type thing. And it would make changes to > > guests smaller than they already are in 2.x > > I did wonder if the PCI back/front could be implemented entirely using > communications in the store - that could make them simpler. Requiring no > modifications to the read / write code would be a nice feature to have, > though.It''s a tradeoff and I think you can easily argue either way. I think the crucial bit is the to find a clean solution for the dom0 issue. The config space virtualization is probably reasonably straight forward either way. rolf> Cheers, > Mark > > > rolf > > > > > > A driver domain would still have to be co-operative in that > > > > sense that it first starts out with a low privilege level (by > default a > > > > domain would be created that way) to run into the exception handler > and > > > > request to have its privilege level raised once it wants to access > the > > > > > > raw > > > > > > > hardware. Setting the individual privilege bits for a driver domain > > > > > > might > > > > > > > be another possibility, but you''d need to know the list of ioports > for > > > > each possible device. > > > > > > Right now we do just that: domains never get access to the PCI > > > controller, so > > > config space accesses must always be mediated by Xen. Domains are > > > assigned > > > direct access to the devices they control using IO port bits (although > > > I''m not entirely happy with that, since it allows applications in the > > > domain access to the device - fine for a driver domain but not good > for > > > partitioning > > > the hardware) and controlled mapping of IO memory. > > > > > > This works now because Xen can read the required IO port / memory > ranges > > > out > > > of PCI config space and enable them as appropriate. To make this work > > > with > > > the unstable tree, we''d need to have dom0''s kernel somehow get this > > > information out... > > > > > > > > Using emulation to implement b) would have the advantage that the > > > > > > > > current > > > > > > > > > probing code shouldn''t need changing. OTOH, the overall system > may > > > > > be simpler if the guest detects it''s not allowed to access the > > > > > > > > hardwaredirectly > > > > > > > > > and explicitly talks to dom0 e.g. using Xenstore to probe its > > > > > devices. > > > > > > > > I also think that it would have the advantage of being able to build > a > > > > user domain independently of whether it will become a driver domain > or > > > > not. All the difference would be in the virtualized PCI bus > presenting > > > > devices or being empty. > > > > > > I definitely think we should retain the ability to build one kernel > that > > > works > > > in all possible domains. The startinfo does contain flags that tell > the > > > domain if it''s dom0 (and therefore controls the PCI bus) or not. > > > > > > Cheers, > > > Mark > > > > > > > Stefan > > > > > > > > > Cheers, > > > > > Mark > > > > > > > > > > > I don''t get the purpose. What is wrong with hiding certain PCI > > > > > > devices > > > > > > > from > > > > > > > > > > DomO and thus make them available in domU? > > > > > > > > > > > > Btw, you are sure all OSes "find an empty bus"? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- > > > > > > Von: Stefan Berger [mailto:stefanb@us.ibm.com] > > > > > > Gesendet: Mittwoch, 3. August 2005 22:47 > > > > > > An: xen-devel@lists.xensource.com > > > > > > Betreff: [Xen-devel] PCI bus emulation? > > > > > > > > > > > > Hello! > > > > > > > > > > > > I have seen that the Qemu code contains some nice code for PCI > > > > > > bus emulation. I wonder whether this code could be reused in XEN > to > > > > > > fake > > > > > > a > > > > > > > PCI > > > > > > > > > > bus by running the PCI emulation code in an exception handler in > > > > > > the hypervisor and setting a user domain''s IO privilege level > > > > > > > > appropriately to > > > > > > > > > > have all inb/outb''s intercepted. This could have potential > benefits > > > > > > on > > > > > > > the > > > > > > > > > > build process of user domains which could include the PCI code > when > > > > > > > > built, > > > > > > > > > > but that code when probing the PCI bus would only find an empty > bus > > > > > > > > and > > > > > > > > > > the probing of the drivers in the kernel would not start. Maybe > > > > > > this > > > > > > > > code > > > > > > > > > > could also be used to support driver domains. Is this a good > idea? > > > : > > > :-) > > > : > > > > > > Stefan > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > > > Xen-devel mailing list > > > > > > Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com > > > > > > http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > > > Xen-devel mailing list > > > > > > Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com > > > > > > http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Xen-devel mailing list > > > Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com > > > http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel_______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel
> > How would config space writes work? Does Xen 3 understand enough about > > PCI to > > implement those itself? > > If I remember correctly in 2.0 we don''t allow writes to the config space bu > emulate them through very simple state machine.IIRC we only emulate those for those parts of config space that describe the locations of IO registers - other parts of the config space aren''t standardised so we have to pass them through. Cheers, Mark _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel