Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-Oct-12 20:59 UTC
[PATCH v5 16/16] x86/tdx: Add cmdline option to force use of ioremap_host_shared
On Tue, Oct 12, 2021 at 10:55:20AM -0700, Andi Kleen wrote:> > > I mean ... it's already wide spread. > > > I meant wide spread usage with confidential guests. > > > If we support it with TDX > > it will be used with TDX. > > It has some security trade offs. The main reason to use TDX is security. > Also when people take the VT-d tradeoffs they might be ok with the BIOS > trade offs too. > > -AndiInteresting. VT-d tradeoffs ... what are they? Allowing hypervisor to write into BIOS looks like it will trivially lead to code execution, won't it? -- MST
Andi Kleen
2021-Oct-12 21:18 UTC
[PATCH v5 16/16] x86/tdx: Add cmdline option to force use of ioremap_host_shared
> Interesting. VT-d tradeoffs ... what are they?The connection to the device is not encrypted and also not authenticated. This is different that even talking to the (untrusted) host through shared memory where you at least still have a common key.> Allowing hypervisor to write into BIOS looks like it will > trivially lead to code execution, won't it?This is not about BIOS code executing. While the guest firmware runs it is protected of course. This is for BIOS structures like ACPI tables that are mapped by Linux. While AML can run byte code it can normally not write to arbitrary memory. The risk is more that all the Linux code dealing with this hasn't been hardened to deal with malicious input. -Andi