similar to: page ref/type count overflows

With the lake of iommu, dom0 must have a 1:1 memory mapping for all these guest physical address. When the ballon decides to give back a page to the kernel, this page must have the same address as previously. Otherwise, we will loose the 1:1 mapping and will break DMA-capable device. Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org> CC: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org> CC: Jan Beulich

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> CC: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org> CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> CC: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org> CC: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com> CC: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com> --- misc/coverity_model.c | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 70 insertions(+)

While adding code to create the compatibility p2m table mappings it seemed to me that the creation of the native ones is restricted to memory below the 512G boundary - otherwise, additional L2 tables would need to be allocated (currently other memory following the one L2 page getting allocated would be blindly overwritten). While I realize that machines this big aren''t likely to be

I am confused with a problem: I have a blade with 64 physical CPUs and 64G physical RAM, and defined only one VM with 1 CPU and 40G RAM. For the first time I started the VM, it just took 3s, But for the second starting it took 30s. After studied it by printing log, I have located a place in the hypervisor where cost too much time, occupied 98% of the whole starting time. xen/common/page_alloc.c

This patch series includes a series of bugs related to p2m, ept, and PoD code which were found as part of our XenServer product testing. Each of these fixes actual bugs, and the 3.4-based version of the patch has been tested thoroughly. (There may be bugs in porting the patches, but most of them are simple enough as to make it unlikely.) Each patch is conceptually independent, so they can each

Call update_domain_wallclock_time on hvm_latch_shinfo_size even if the bitness of the guest has already been set, this fixes the problem with the wallclock not being set for PVHVM guests on resume from migration. Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> Cc: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org> Cc: George Dunlap

During debugging of another problem I found that in x2APIC mode, the destination field of the low address value wasn''t passed back correctly. While this is benign in most cases (as the value isn''t being used anywhere), it can be confusing (and misguiding) when printing the value read or when comparing it to the one previously passed into the inverse function. Signed-off-by: Jan

The DMI checks that force the use of the bigsmp APIC driver are for systems that are no longer supported by Xen (32-bit x86). Signed-off-by: Matt Wilson <msw@amazon.com> Cc: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org> Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> --- xen/arch/x86/genapic/bigsmp.c | 30 +----------------------------- 1 files changed, 1

All, in the light of erratum #573 I''m wondering if we need to tweak or conditionally suppress fsincos emulation. The question is whether there is any possibility for getting the emulator to hit this instruction on AMD (as no real mode emulation ought to be taking place there), i.e. whether there are places where emulation gets continued eagerly in anticipation of the need for emulation

Coverity IDs 1054956, 1054957 Coverity pointed out that we applying array operations based on an expression which yielded singleton pointers. The problem is actually that the externs were typed incorrectly. Correct the extern declaration to prevent straying into undefined behaviour, and relying on the lenience of GCC to work. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> CC:

Can someone provide instructions and the necessary environment/toolchain support needed to get Xen to build and boot on a native EFI system (i.e. with no CSM/legacy support)? Joe

A number of build problems crept in once again. Fix them. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> --- a/xen/common/memory.c +++ b/xen/common/memory.c @@ -683,7 +683,7 @@ long do_memory_op(unsigned long cmd, XEN mfn = get_gfn_untyped(d, xrfp.gpfn); if ( mfn_valid(mfn) ) - guest_physmap_remove_page(d, xrfp.gpfn, mfn, PAGE_ORDER_4K); +

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com> Index: 2008-09-19/xen/arch/x86/platform_hypercall.c =================================================================== --- 2008-09-19.orig/xen/arch/x86/platform_hypercall.c 2008-09-19 14:12:02.000000000 +0200 +++ 2008-09-19/xen/arch/x86/platform_hypercall.c 2008-09-19 14:12:56.000000000 +0200 @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ #include <xen/acpi.h>

Is it intentional that - under SVM, 32-bit guests can freely set EFER.LME - under VMX, 32-bit guests can''t access EFER at all? Thanks, Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel

This series consists of improvements to Xen''s ability to print traces of its own stack, and specifically for the stack overflow case to be able to use frame pointers in a debug build. I have dev tested the series in debug and non-debug cases, with and without memory guards, and I believe that all the stack traces look correct. However, I would greatly appreciate a second opinion on the

The first patch really isn''t as much of a follow-up than what triggered the security issues to be noticed in the first place. 1: x86: preserve FPU selectors for 32-bit guest code 2: x86: fix XCR0 handling 3: x86/xsave: adjust state management 4: x86/fxsave: bring in line with recent xsave adjustments The first two I would see as candidates for 4.3 (as well as subsequent backporting,

This applies to both SVM and VMX. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/vmcb.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/vmcb.c @@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ static struct keyhandler vmcb_dump_keyha .desc = "dump AMD-V VMCBs" }; -void setup_vmcb_dump(void) +void __init setup_vmcb_dump(void) { register_keyhandler(''v'',

The series "HVM firmware passthrough" series in Jan 2013 from Ross Philipson cause two regressions for HVM guests which sadly found their way into the Xen 4.3 release. The first regression causes an incorrect count of tables to be placed in the main header, and can be seen by running dmidecode in any applicable HVM domain. The second regression found its way into the public ABI, making

.. is out of sync on i386 and x86-64 - should it be allowed on i386, or should it be suppressed on x86-64? Since Xen fails ill accesses, I would assume enabling it on i386 is fine. Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel

We''ve got reports of that change causing HVM data corruption issues. While I can''t see what''s wrong with the patch, I''d suggest at least reverting it from the 3.3 tree (which is what our code is based upon) for the time being. Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com