similar to: Walking an HVM''s shadow page tables and other memory management questions.

Hi all, Recently, I read codes about the shadow page table. I''m wondering whether the kernel has provided the function to revoke write access of all the shadows of one domain. If you know one with this function, please tell me about it. Thanks. BTW, I have my own idea to implement this. My idea is as follows: void sh_revoke_write_access_all(struct domain *d) {

From: Zhang Xiantao <xiantao.zhang@intel.com> With virtual EPT support, L1 hyerpvisor can use EPT hardware for L2 guest''s memory virtualization. In this way, L2 guest''s performance can be improved sharply. According to our testing, some benchmarks can show > 5x performance gain. Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiantao <xiantao.zhang@intel.com> Zhang Xiantao (11):

This patch series restores the use of superpages when restoring or migrating a VM, while retaining efficient batching of 4k pages when superpages are not appropriate or available. Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com> _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel

Adjustments deemed necessary to properly support PAE (only compile-tested). Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com> Index: 2007-01-11/tools/libxc/xc_ptrace.c =================================================================== --- 2007-01-11.orig/tools/libxc/xc_ptrace.c 2006-12-14 22:49:56.000000000 +0100 +++ 2007-01-11/tools/libxc/xc_ptrace.c 2007-01-12 14:10:45.000000000 +0100 @@

Hi all, Can Xen hypervisor modify HVM domU's Shadow page table, under the dom0's context, like trapped from dom0's hypercall? I think it have to call 2 functions at least: guest_walk_tables() and flush_tlb_all(). Can these 2 functions called in dom0's context? In my test, if hypervisor tries to modify HVM's shadow page table, it will bring down the whole system. I am not

Just found this patch in house which I thought sent out already. :-) Still one thing remaining is to special case for UP guest which suffers overhead from this change... ---- Remove lock on first guest table walk Existing shadow fault path grabs big lock before walking guest tables, to ensure consistency with shadow content lest concurrent change from other vcpu in a bad OS. But this lock

Hi, V6: The only change from V5 is in patch #6: - changed comment to reflect autoxlate - removed a redundant ASSERT - reworked logic a bit so that get_page_from_gfn() is called with NULL for p2m type as before. arm has ASSERT wanting it to be NULL. Tim: patch 4 needs your approval. Daniel: patch 5 needs your approval. These patches implement PVH dom0. Patches 1 and 2

Is there any trouble with mailing list? I didn''t see my mail sent back after almost 8hrs. :-( Thanks, Kevin -----Original Message----- From: Tian, Kevin Sent: 2008年2月22日 10:33 To: ''Tim Deegan'' Cc: xen-devel@lists.xensource.com Subject: [PATCH][UPDATE]Remove lock on guest table walk >From: Tim Deegan >Sent: 2008年2月21日 22:13 >Hi, > >So, the idea seems

Hey everyone, I've searched through the archives and can find mention of the problem, but haven't been able to track down an answer. The problem is as follows, certain accounts can't login to the samba PDC server (can't login to the domain, check your password error), while other accounts can. The mystery becomes completely baffling to me when I look at the more recent PC's in

Dear R experts, I'm hoping someone can help me to interpret the results of building gam's with mgcv in R. Below are summaries of two gam's based on the same dataset. The first gam (named "gam.mod") has six predictor variables. The second gam (named "gam.mod2") is exactly the same except it is missing one of the predictor variables. What is confusing me is

While adding code to create the compatibility p2m table mappings it seemed to me that the creation of the native ones is restricted to memory below the 512G boundary - otherwise, additional L2 tables would need to be allocated (currently other memory following the one L2 page getting allocated would be blindly overwritten). While I realize that machines this big aren''t likely to be

Populate-on-demand: Check pages being returned by the balloon driver This patch series is the second result of my work last summer on decreasing fragmentation of superpages in a guests'' p2m when using populate-on-demand. This patch series is against 4.1; I''m posting it to get feedback on the viability of getting a ported version of this patch into 4.2. As with the previous

1: correct LDT checks 2: add address validity check to guest_map_l1e() 3: use {rd,wr}{fs,gs}base when available 4: check for canonical address before doing page walks Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>

2011/7/19 Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>: > CC''ing Tim and xen-devel > > On Mon, 18 Jul 2011, Jiageng Yu wrote: >> 2011/7/16 Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>: >> > On Fri, 15 Jul 2011, Jiageng Yu wrote: >> >> 2011/7/15 Jiageng Yu <yujiageng734@gmail.com>: >> >> > 2011/7/15

This patch series includes a series of bugs related to p2m, ept, and PoD code which were found as part of our XenServer product testing. Each of these fixes actual bugs, and the 3.4-based version of the patch has been tested thoroughly. (There may be bugs in porting the patches, but most of them are simple enough as to make it unlikely.) Each patch is conceptually independent, so they can each

There has been some progress, but still no joy. Definitely not intended for inclusion at this point. Tim, Wei, I added a Xen command line toggle to disable IOMMU and P2M table sharing. Tim, I verified that changes to p2m-pt.c don''t break shadow mode (64bit hypervisor and Win 7 guest). Hongkaixing, I incorporated your suggestion in patch 2, so I should add your Signed-off-by eventually.

Dear All: I am pretty new to xen-devel, please correct me in the following. Assume we have the following terms GPT: guest page table SPT: shadow page table (Question a) When guest OS is running, is it always using SPT for address translation? If it is the case, how does guest OS refer and modify its own GPT content? It seems that there is a page table entry in SPT for the GPT page. (Question

In p2m.c (line 197 and line 550), the code assumes the number of L3 P2M table entries is 8 (under PAE mode). According to Intel and AMD specs, it is 4. Could someone explain this discrepancy? Is it a bug? -Wei _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel

This is the latest version of a patch that adds hugepage support to the Xen hypervisor in a PV environment. It is against the latest xen-unstable tree on xenbits.xensource.com. I believe this version addresses the comments made about the previous version of the patch. Hugepage support must be enabled via the hypervisor command line option "allowhugepage". It assumes the guest

Hi, In many places xen uses "unsigned long" instead of the l*_pgentry_t types to pass around page table entries. Here is a patch which fixes this in a number of places (mostly in shadow mode code). Thats what I''ve trapped in so far, maybe more of these patches follow. Fixing this is needed for adding PAE support to xen. In PAE paging mode the page table entries are 64 bit