similar to: [PATCH] avoid duplication of domain ID in messages

- introduce local variables (shortcuts for frequently used <dom>->grant_table) - adjust first parameter of mapcount() - drop lock acquisition from gnttab_get_version() - remove hard tabs and adjust formatting Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Tested-by: Andrew Thomas <andrew.thomas@oracle.com> --- a/xen/common/grant_table.c +++ b/xen/common/grant_table.c @@

With the lake of iommu, dom0 must have a 1:1 memory mapping for all these guest physical address. When the ballon decides to give back a page to the kernel, this page must have the same address as previously. Otherwise, we will loose the 1:1 mapping and will break DMA-capable device. Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org> CC: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org> CC: Jan Beulich

This set of patches adds the support for acceleration plugins to the netfront/netback drivers. These plugins are intended to support virtualisable network hardware that can be directly accessed from the guest, bypassing dom0. This is in response to the RFC we posted to xen-devel with an outline of our approach at the end of September. To follow will be another set of patches to provide our

Signed-off-by: Kieran Mansley <kmansley@solarflare.com> Allow iomem permissions to be set up through grant table ops diff -r 749b60ccc177 xen/arch/x86/mm.c --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c Wed Jul 25 14:03:08 2007 +0100 +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c Wed Jul 25 14:03:12 2007 +0100 @@ -594,6 +594,14 @@ get_##level##_linear_pagetable( return 1; \ } + +int iomem_page_test(unsigned long mfn,

Now that the feature is officially documented (see http://support.amd.com/us/Processor_TechDocs/24593.pdf), I think it makes sense to also allow HVM guests to make use of it. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com> Cc: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@amd.com> --- 2010-05-04.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c 2010-04-22 14:43:25.000000000 +0200 +++ 2010-05-04/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c

In testing our implementation of the hypervisor copy based backend- >frontend networking changes, we see what I believe are spurious warning messages during the shutdown of the frontend domain: (XEN) /export/build/schuster/xvm-gate/xen.hg/xen/include/asm/mm.h: 189:d0 Error pfn 30e290: rd=ffff830000fcf100, od=ffff830000fcf100, caf=00000000, taf=0000000000000000 (XEN) Xen call trace:

Add SMP support to Xen host S3 Signed-off-by Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com> diff -r 1539f5a2b3ba xen/arch/x86/acpi/power.c --- a/xen/arch/x86/acpi/power.c Tue Jun 26 18:05:22 2007 -0400 +++ b/xen/arch/x86/acpi/power.c Tue Jun 26 19:44:36 2007 -0400 @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include <xen/sched.h> #include <xen/domain.h> #include <xen/console.h> +#include

- use __clear_bit() rather than clear_bit() - use switch statements instead of long series of if-s - eliminate pointless casts (Applies cleanly only on top of the previously sent SVM/EFER patch.) Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com> Index: 2007-08-08/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c =================================================================== ---

TPR shadow/threshold feature is important to speedup the boot time for Windows guest. Besides, it is a must feature for certain VMM. We map virtual APIC page address and TPR threshold from L1 VMCS, and synch it into shadow VMCS in virtual vmentry. If TPR_BELOW_THRESHOLD VM exit is triggered by L2 guest, we inject it into L1 VMM for handling. Besides, this commit fixes an issue for apic access

"Jan Beulich" <JBeulich at suse.com> writes: #Okay, this at least clarifies there is a (relatively big) RMRR. There is #a change to the handling of these among the ones that'll become #4.3.3 - mind giving #http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=xen.git;a=commitdiff;h=6c63041428cc348bcb2887afabd606bc4bd5523f #a try on top of your 4.3.2 (or trying the tip of the stable-4.3 branch)? #

While looking at the origin of very frequently executed hypercalls (as usual, kernel builds are what''s being measured), I realized that the high page accessor functions in Linux would be good candidates to handle in the hypervisor - clearing or copying to/from a high page is a pretty frequent operation (provided there''s enough memory). However, the measured results

>>> On 22.05.14 at 19:19, <mike at estone.ca> wrote: > "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich at suse.com> writes: > #Okay, this at least clarifies there is a (relatively big) RMRR. There is > #a change to the handling of these among the ones that'll become > #4.3.3 - mind giving > #http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=xen.git;a=commitdiff;h=6c63041428cc348bcb2 >

While looking at the origin of very frequently executed hypercalls I realized that the high page accessor functions in Linux would be good candidates to handle in the hypervisor - clearing or copying to/from a high page is a pretty frequent operation (provided there''s enough memory in the domain). While prior to the first submission I only measured kernel builds (where the results are not

Otherwise we may leak memory when setting up nHVM fails half way. This implies that the individual destroy functions will have to remain capable (in the VMX case they first need to be made so, following 26486:7648ef657fe7 and 26489:83a3fa9c8434) of being called for a vCPU that the corresponding init function was never run on. Once at it, also remove a redundant check from the corresponding

Basic infrastructure for Xen S3 support with a common CPU context save/restore logic for both 32bit and 64bit. Wakeup code is split into two parts: - the first locates after trampoline code, to share all the tricks on the latter, like relocation base and identy mapping - the 2nd part locates in xen code segment, to do the actual CPU context restore Signed-off-by Ke Yu

patch revision history ---------------------- v1: Initial patch to handle this issue involving changing the hypercall interface v2:Totally handled inside hypervisor. v3:Change some logics of handling msi-x pending unmask operations. v4:Some changes related to coding style according to Andrew Cooper''s comments v5:Some changes according to Jan''s comments, including a) remove

Detect invalid/unsupported configurations in iommu_alloc() - offsets read from hardware must not lead to exceeding a single page (since only that much gets mapped). This covers the apparently not uncommon case of the address pointed to by a DMAR reading as all ones (Linux for example also checks for this). Further correct error handling of that function: Without storing the allocated "struct

Dom0 uses this hypercall to pass ACPI information to Xen. It is not very uncommon for more cpus to be listed in the ACPI tables than are present on the system, particularly on systems with a common BIOS for a 2 and 4 socket server varients. As Dom0 does not control the number of entries in the ACPI tables, and is required to pass everything it finds to Xen, reduce the ERR to an INFO.

... rather than per booting CPU. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c @@ -249,7 +249,8 @@ static int vmx_init_vmcs_config(void) if ( (_vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING) && ple_gap == 0 ) { - printk("Disable Pause-Loop Exiting.\n"); +

Folks -- One more time with the PAE request, this time I''ve brought up the Linux kernel w/ a very recent version of Xen. (Just yesterday I pulled and updated my hg tree.) I still can''t set breakpoints within the guest domain: # gdb vmlinux GNU gdb 6.4-debian <...> (gdb) target remote roti.lab.netapp.com:9999 Remote debugging using roti.lab.netapp.com:9999 [New