similar to: missing use of FOREIGNDOM?

While looking at the origin of very frequently executed hypercalls (as usual, kernel builds are what''s being measured), I realized that the high page accessor functions in Linux would be good candidates to handle in the hypervisor - clearing or copying to/from a high page is a pretty frequent operation (provided there''s enough memory). However, the measured results

While looking at the origin of very frequently executed hypercalls I realized that the high page accessor functions in Linux would be good candidates to handle in the hypervisor - clearing or copying to/from a high page is a pretty frequent operation (provided there''s enough memory in the domain). While prior to the first submission I only measured kernel builds (where the results are not

1: correct LDT checks 2: add address validity check to guest_map_l1e() 3: use {rd,wr}{fs,gs}base when available 4: check for canonical address before doing page walks Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>

Hi all, this patch series makes the necessary changes to make sure that the current ARM hypercall ABI can be used as-is on 64 bit ARM platforms: - it defines xen_ulong_t as uint64_t on ARM; - it introduces a new macro to handle guest pointers, called XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM (that has size 4 bytes on aarch and is going to have size 8 bytes on aarch64); - it replaces all the occurrences of

Hi all, this patch series makes the necessary changes to make sure that the current ARM hypercall ABI can be used as-is on 64 bit ARM platforms: - it defines xen_ulong_t as uint64_t on ARM; - it introduces a new macro to handle guest pointers, called XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM (that has size 4 bytes on aarch and is going to have size 8 bytes on aarch64); - it replaces all the occurrences of

Finally I got around to breaking up the similarly named monolithic patch that caused a regression shortly before the 4.2 release and got therefore reverted. This series consists of the broken up pieces that - according to my testing - don''t expose the reported lockup; the 7th will need debugging to understand what''s wrong there. 1: use RTC_* names instead of literal numbers 2:

During debugging of another problem I found that in x2APIC mode, the destination field of the low address value wasn''t passed back correctly. While this is benign in most cases (as the value isn''t being used anywhere), it can be confusing (and misguiding) when printing the value read or when comparing it to the one previously passed into the inverse function. Signed-off-by: Jan

1: IOMMU: properly check whether interrupt remapping is enabled 2: AMD IOMMU: only disable when certain IVRS consistency checks fail 3: VT-d: deal with 5500/5520/X58 errata Patch 1 and 2 are version 2 of a previously submitted, then withdrawn patch following up after XSA-36. Patch 3 is version 3 of a patch previously sent by Malcolm and Andrew. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich

Otherwise 'modprobe -r' on a module having a dependency on bridge will implicitly unload bridge, bringing down all connectivity that was using bridges. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com> net/bridge/br_if.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) --- linux-2.6.23-rc8/net/bridge/br_if.c 2007-09-26 09:23:54.000000000 +0200 +++

It has never been used for anything, and Linux 3.7 doesn''t propagate this information anymore. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> --- Konrad, on the pv-ops side it may be better to pass zero rather than leaving the field completely uninitialized. --- a/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpu_idle.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpu_idle.c @@ -935,7 +935,6 @@ static void set_cx( }

The hypervisor side changes for XSA-46 require the tool stack to now always map the guest pIRQ before granting access permission to the underlying host IRQ (GSI). This in particular requires that pciif.py no longer can skip this step (assuming qemu would do it) for HVM guests. This in turn exposes, however, an inconsistency between xend and qemu: The former wants to always establish 1:1 mappings

Commit 111e7b15cf10f6 ("x86/ioperm: Extend IOPL config to control ioperm() as well") reworked the iopl syscall to use I/O bitmaps. Unfortunately this broke Xen PV domains using that syscall as there is currently no I/O bitmap support in PV domains. Add I/O bitmap support via a new paravirt function update_io_bitmap which Xen PV domains can use to update their I/O bitmaps via a

Commit 111e7b15cf10f6 ("x86/ioperm: Extend IOPL config to control ioperm() as well") reworked the iopl syscall to use I/O bitmaps. Unfortunately this broke Xen PV domains using that syscall as there is currently no I/O bitmap support in PV domains. Add I/O bitmap support via a new paravirt function update_io_bitmap which Xen PV domains can use to update their I/O bitmaps via a

1: x86/mwait_idle: remove assumption of one C-state per MWAIT flag 2: x86/mwait_idle: export both C1 and C1E 3: x86/mwait_idle: initial C8, C9, C10 support Signed-off-by: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>

Can someone provide instructions and the necessary environment/toolchain support needed to get Xen to build and boot on a native EFI system (i.e. with no CSM/legacy support)? Joe

This applies to both SVM and VMX. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/vmcb.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/vmcb.c @@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ static struct keyhandler vmcb_dump_keyha .desc = "dump AMD-V VMCBs" }; -void setup_vmcb_dump(void) +void __init setup_vmcb_dump(void) { register_keyhandler(''v'',

v6 changes: - Check compiler before using [0] or []. v5 changes: - Fix prototypes in v4v.h for do_v4v_op - Add padding to make sure all the structures are 64 bits aligned - Replace [0] with [] v4 changes: - Stop using ssize_t, use long instead - Return -MSGSIZE for message bigger than 2GB - Fixup size handling - Rename

The first patch really isn''t as much of a follow-up than what triggered the security issues to be noticed in the first place. 1: x86: preserve FPU selectors for 32-bit guest code 2: x86: fix XCR0 handling 3: x86/xsave: adjust state management 4: x86/fxsave: bring in line with recent xsave adjustments The first two I would see as candidates for 4.3 (as well as subsequent backporting,

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> --- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown +++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown @@ -785,6 +785,19 @@ Specify the per-cpu trace buffer size in > `= unstable | skewed` ### ucode +> `= <integer>` + +Specify the CPU microcode update blob module index. When positive, this +specifies the n-th module (in the GrUB entry, zero based)

Another bundle of issues from Coverity triage. The first one is in x86/mm, and looks scarier than it is. The others are all in xen/drivers and AFAICT are pretty minor. Cheers, Tim.