similar to: [PATCH v9 0/2] s390: virtio: let arch validate VIRTIO features

Hi all, The goal of the series is to give a chance to the architecture to validate VIRTIO device features. I changed VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM to VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM I forgot in drivers/virtio/Kconfig, and put back the inclusion of virtio_config.h for the definition of the callback in arch/s390/mm/init.c I wrongly removed in the last series. Regards, Pierre Pierre Morel (2): virtio: let

Hi all, The goal of the series is to give a chance to the architecture to validate VIRTIO device features. I changed VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM to VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM I forgot in drivers/virtio/Kconfig, and put back the inclusion of virtio_config.h for the definition of the callback in arch/s390/mm/init.c I wrongly removed in the last series. Regards, Pierre Pierre Morel (2): virtio: let

Hi all, The goal of the series is to give a chance to the architecture to validate VIRTIO device features. The tests are back to virtio_finalize_features. No more argument for the architecture callback which only reports if the architecture needs guest memory access restrictions for VIRTIO. I renamed the callback to arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access, the config option to

Hi all, The goal of the series is to give a chance to the architecture to validate VIRTIO device features. The tests are back to virtio_finalize_features. No more argument for the architecture callback which only reports if the architecture needs guest memory access restrictions for VIRTIO. I renamed the callback to arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access, the config option to

Hi all, The goal of the series is to give a chance to the architecture to validate VIRTIO device features. The tests are back to virtio_finalize_features. No more argument for the architecture callback which only reports if the architecture needs guest memory access restrictions for VIRTIO. I renamed the callback to arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access, and the config option to

On Wed, 19 Aug 2020 18:23:18 +0200 Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> wrote: > If protected virtualization is active on s390, VIRTIO has retricted s/retricted/only restricted/ > access to the guest memory. > Define CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_VIRTIO_MEMORY_ACCESS and export > arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access to advertize VIRTIO if that's > the case,

Hi all, The goal of the series is to give a chance to the architecture to validate VIRTIO device features. in this respin: I use the original idea from Connie for an optional arch_has_restricted_memory_access. I renamed the callback accordingly, added the definition of ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_MEMORY_ACCESS inside the VIRTIO Kconfig and the selection in the PROTECTED_VIRTUALIZATION_GUEST config

On Wed, 19 Aug 2020 18:23:17 +0200 Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> wrote: > An architecture may restrict host access to guest memory. "e.g. IBM s390 Secure Execution or AMD SEV" Just to make clearer what you are referring to? > > Provide a new Kconfig entry the architecture can select, > CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_VIRTIO_MEMORY_ACCESS, when it provides >

Hi all, The goal of the series is to give a chance to the architecture to validate VIRTIO device features. in this respin: 1) I kept removed the ack from Jason as I reworked the patch @Jason, the nature and goal of the patch did not really changed please can I get back your acked-by with these changes? 2) I suppressed the unnecessary verbosity of the architecture specific

Hi all, The goal of the series is to give a chance to the architecture to validate VIRTIO device features. in this respin: 1) I kept removed the ack from Jason as I reworked the patch @Jason, the nature and goal of the patch did not really changed please can I get back your acked-by with these changes? 2) Rewording for warning messages Regards, Pierre Pierre Morel (2):

Hi all, The goal of the series is to give a chance to the architecture to validate VIRTIO device features. in this respin: 1) I kept removed the ack from Jason as I reworked the patch @Jason, the nature and goal of the patch did not really changed please can I get back your acked-by with these changes? 2) Rewording for warning messages Regards, Pierre Pierre Morel (2):

An architecture protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host access may want to enforce VIRTIO I/O device protection through the use of VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM. Let's give a chance to the architecture to accept or not devices without VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM. Pierre Morel (1): s390: virtio: let arch accept devices without IOMMU feature arch/s390/mm/init.c | 6 ++++++

On Tue, 18 Aug 2020 16:58:30 +0200 Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> wrote: > An architecture may need to validate the VIRTIO devices features > based on architecture specifics. > > Provide a new Kconfig entry, CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_MEMORY_ACCESS, > the architecture can select when it provides a callback named > arch_has_restricted_memory_access to validate the

On Tue, 18 Aug 2020 16:58:30 +0200 Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> wrote: > An architecture may need to validate the VIRTIO devices features > based on architecture specifics. > > Provide a new Kconfig entry, CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_MEMORY_ACCESS, > the architecture can select when it provides a callback named > arch_has_restricted_memory_access to validate the

An architecture protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host access may want to enforce VIRTIO I/O device protection through the use of VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM. Let's give a chance to the architecture to accept or not devices without VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM. Pierre Morel (1): s390: virtio: let arch accept devices without IOMMU feature arch/s390/mm/init.c | 6 ++++++

On 15.06.20 14:39, Pierre Morel wrote: > An architecture protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host > access may want to enforce VIRTIO I/O device protection through the > use of VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM. > > Let's give a chance to the architecture to accept or not devices > without VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM. > > Signed-off-by: Pierre Morel <pmorel at

On 15.06.20 14:39, Pierre Morel wrote: > An architecture protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host > access may want to enforce VIRTIO I/O device protection through the > use of VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM. > > Let's give a chance to the architecture to accept or not devices > without VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM. > > Signed-off-by: Pierre Morel <pmorel at

Hi all, I changed the patch subject to reflect the content, becoming more general. 1) I removed the ack from Christian and Jason even far as I understand they gave it for the functionality more than for the implementation. @Jason, @Christian, please can I get back your acked-by with these changes? 2) previous patch had another name: [PATCH v3 0/1] s390: virtio: let arch choose to

On Mon, 15 Jun 2020 14:39:24 +0200 Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> wrote: I find the subject (commit short) sub optimal. The 'arch' is already accepting devices 'without IOMMU feature'. What you are introducing is the ability to reject. > An architecture protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host > access may want to enforce VIRTIO I/O device

On Mon, 15 Jun 2020 14:39:24 +0200 Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> wrote: I find the subject (commit short) sub optimal. The 'arch' is already accepting devices 'without IOMMU feature'. What you are introducing is the ability to reject. > An architecture protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host > access may want to enforce VIRTIO I/O device