similar to: [Bug 2559] New: Warnings from reading moduli file, refer to primes file

On Fri 2015-05-22 00:06:29 -0400, Darren Tucker wrote: > On Thu, May 21, 2015 at 11:26 PM, Matthew Vernon <matthew at debian.org> wrote: >> >> You will be aware of https://weakdh.org/ by now, I presume; the >> take-home seems to be that 1024-bit DH primes might well be too weak. >> I'm wondering what (if anything!) you propose to do about this issue, >>

From: Christian Hesse <mail at eworm.de> Both files can be used, so mention both in error messages. Signed-off-by: Christian Hesse <mail at eworm.de> --- dh.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/dh.c b/dh.c index 4c639ac..450f5c4 100644 --- a/dh.c +++ b/dh.c @@ -153,8 +153,8 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max) if ((f =

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2047 Priority: P5 Bug ID: 2047 Assignee: unassigned-bugs at mindrot.org Summary: Definition of Sophie Germain primes is wrong in manual moduli.5 Severity: normal Classification: Unclassified OS: Linux Reporter: plautrba at redhat.com

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1372 Summary: sshd(8) and ssh-keygen(1) refer to non-existent moduli(5) Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 4.7p1 Platform: All OS/Version: All Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P2 Component: Documentation AssignedTo: bitbucket at

Hi, You will be aware of https://weakdh.org/ by now, I presume; the take-home seems to be that 1024-bit DH primes might well be too weak. I'm wondering what (if anything!) you propose to do about this issue, and what Debian might do for our users? openssh already prefers ECDH, which must reduce the impact somewhat, although the main Windows client (PuTTY) doesn't support ECDH yet. But

On Tue 2015-05-26 14:02:07 -0400, Hubert Kario wrote: > On Tuesday 26 May 2015 13:43:13 Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: >> On Tue 2015-05-26 12:57:05 -0400, Hubert Kario wrote: >> > creating composites that will pass even 100000 rounds of Miller-Rabin is >> > relatively simple.... >> > (assuming the values for M-R tests are picked randomly) >> >> Can you

On Tue 2015-05-26 12:57:05 -0400, Hubert Kario wrote: > creating composites that will pass even 100000 rounds of Miller-Rabin is > relatively simple.... > (assuming the values for M-R tests are picked randomly) Can you point me to the algorithms for doing that? This would suggest that we really do want primality proofs (and a good way to verify them). Do those algorithms hold for

> Can this be addressed in ssh_config/sshd_config with the KexAlgorithms setting? weakdh.org/sysadmin.html recommends adding: KexAlgorithms curve25519-sha256 at libssh.org But this thread makes it sound as if it's not necessary. Can anyone confirm? Personally I'm on openssh-6.7. - Grant > You will be aware of https://weakdh.org/ by now, I presume; the take-home seems to be

if [ ! -f /opt/sldx/slwo/openssh-3.1p1/openssh-3.1p1/contrib/solaris/package/usr/local/etc/moduli ]; then \ if [ -f /opt/sldx/slwo/openssh-3.1p1/openssh-3.1p1/contrib/solaris/package/usr/local/etc/primes ]; then \ echo "moving /opt/sldx/slwo/openssh-3.1p1/openssh-3.1p1/contrib/solaris/package/usr/local/etc/primes to /opt/sldx/

Hi folks, This applies to src/share/man/man5/moduli.5 in the OpenBSD source tree, and doesn't seem to apply to the portable OpenSSH, so I've sent this change here instead of via Bugzilla. The wording of moduli(5) implies that sshd puts more thought about which modulus it selects than it really does. The following patch corrects this. Simon. -- Simon Burge

Hi, my question is related to the kex algorithm diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 and moduli generation. I've seen that through ssh-keygen, I'm able to re-generate my moduli file used by DH but I'm note sure to understand one point in the ssh-keygen manpage : "Screened DH groups may be installed in /etc/ssh/moduli. It is important that this file contains moduli of a range of

On Wed 2015-05-27 05:23:41 -0400, Hubert Kario wrote: > On Tuesday 26 May 2015 15:10:01 Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: >> On Tue 2015-05-26 14:02:07 -0400, Hubert Kario wrote: >> > OEIS A014233 >> >> Hm, this is a sequence, but not an algorithm. It looks to me like it is >> not exhaustive, just a list of those integers which are known to have >> the stated

Hi, Can anybody briefly explain the significance of the updated moduli file? Is this a critical update? Should all existing installations update their moduli file? Thanks in advance, -- Dan

Hello all, I propose the following patch to ssh-keygen.c for openssh version 4.5. It allows to redirect output of the moduli operations to stdout, to do something like e.g.: $ ssh-keygen -G - -b 2048 | ssh-keygen -T - -f - >moduli Best regards, Christian --- ssh/ssh-keygen.c.old 2007-03-01 12:43:06.000000000 +0100 +++ ssh/ssh-keygen.c 2007-03-01 12:47:32.000000000 +0100 @@ -1270,13

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=612 Summary: moduli.5 documentation doesn't match ssh code (off by 1) Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: -current Platform: All OS/Version: All Status: NEW Severity: trivial Priority: P2 Component: sshd AssignedTo: openssh-bugs at mindrot.org

I'm not nearly knowledgeable enough in crypto to fully understand your answer, but I will try. I wonder why moduli are not automatically generated the first time sshd is started though. That would make much more sense than shipping a default moduli file but also asking everyone to replace it with their own. On Fri, Feb 15, 2019 at 5:50 AM Mark D. Baushke <mdb at juniper.net> wrote: >

Ben, I am trying to create a package for Openssh.3-1p1, but the /contrib/solaris/buildpkg.sh script failes with the following errors: ./mkinstalldirs /tools/OpenSSH/openssh-3.1p1/contrib/solaris/package/usr/local/b in mkdir /tools/OpenSSH/openssh-3.1p1/contrib/solaris/package/usr/local/bin ./mkinstalldirs /tools/OpenSSH/openssh-3.1p1/contrib/solaris/package/usr/local/s bin mkdir

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2614 Bug ID: 2614 Summary: ssh-keygen: Moduli generation not accepting start line and count options Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 7.2p1 Hardware: amd64 OS: Linux Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P5 Component:

Also, how are default moduli shipped with OpenSSH for use in diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1/sha256 chosen? Are they chosen randomly by developers or are they chosen for security properties? If they are random, why not use moduli from RFC 7919 instead, like Mozilla recommends? On Fri, Feb 15, 2019 at 3:48 AM Mark D. Baushke <mdb at juniper.net> wrote: > > Yegor Ievlev <koops1997

Hello, I was re-generating the moduli for SSH, and during that process I noticed that, when running the following command: ssh-keygen -M screen -O prime-tests=600 -O generator=3 -f moduli-2048-01.candidates moduli-2048-01c It does not produce any errors, only the following: ebug2: ???1467763: (4) Sophie-Germain debug2: ???1467763: generator 0 != 3 debug2: ???1467764: (4) Sophie-Germain