similar to: Chrooted SFTP-only users along with normal SFTP

for the A nat B C connect back to A using -R 2222:localhost:22 pattern, (see diagram at https://github.com/daradib/sidedoor) I want to limit B's user to just what is needed to do the port forward. I am hoping this is documented, but I can't find much more than "you should future out how to secre it." I setup an ansible playbook to instal and configure sidedoor on A. I have

Hello List. ? i?m trying to setup a limited SSH server with SFTP. The requirements: -????????? There are users to whom only SFTP should be available. (sftp-only group) -????????? There are users to whom SFTP and shell access should be available (admin group) -????????? SFTP clients have to authenticate with username and password -????????? shell users have to authenticate with private key.

Hello everyone, We have some chrooted sftp-only users on a CentOS release 6.6 server. The server had been logging their actions, but after recent updates the logs have stopped. The server correctly logs non-chrooted users: Sep 14 17:47:24 vsecure4 sshd[1981]: Accepted publickey for jcours from 192.168.10.166 port 42545 ssh2 Sep 14 17:47:24 vsecure4 sshd[1981]: pam_unix(sshd:session):

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2048 Priority: P5 Bug ID: 2048 Assignee: unassigned-bugs at mindrot.org Summary: Make chrooted sftp more user friendly using bind mount (solution suggested) Severity: enhancement Classification: Unclassified OS: Linux Reporter: harviecz at gmail.com

I have a somewhat busy sftp server where the users are all chrooted into their home directory. In order to log all the commands they enter, I have to create a /dev/log entry and hard link in their home directory so that syslog works for their commands Match user * ForceCommand internal-sftp -f local1 -l verbose Everything works, but its a bit of a pain if someone restarts syslogd and forgets

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2618 Bug ID: 2618 Summary: net-misc/openssh-7.2_p2: Terribly slow Interactive Logon Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 7.2p2 Hardware: amd64 OS: Linux Status: NEW Severity: major Priority: P5 Component: sshd

I followed the instructions here for enabling EHEL: http://www.thegeekstuff.com/2012/06/enable-epel-repository/ And tried to do a yum gdisk install on a new CentOS 6.2 fully updated install. yum install gdisk Loaded plugins: fastestmirror, security Loading mirror speeds from cached hostfile * base: mirror.flhsi.com * epel: www.gtlib.gatech.edu * extras: mirror.us.leaseweb.net * rpmforge:

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1266 Summary: incompatibility between s/key and keys Autentification Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 4.4p1 Platform: ix86 OS/Version: Linux Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P2 Component: Miscellaneous AssignedTo: bitbucket at mindrot.org

And no sooner do I send the email than I spot the problem. Oops! Sorry about that. The sshd_config needed to contain a different internal-sftp line: Match User test-sftp-only ChrootDirectory /home/sftp/mcsosftp ForceCommand internal-sftp -f AUTHPRIV -l INFO PasswordAuthentication no AuthorizedKeysCommand /usr/local/bin/get_sftp_key That's gotten

On Sat, 11 Nov 2023, Bob Proulx wrote: > I am supporting a site that allows members to upload release files. I > have inherited this site which was previously existing. The goal is > to allow members to file transfer to and from their project area for > release distribution but not to allow general shell access and not to > allow access to other parts of the system. > >

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3662 Bug ID: 3662 Summary: Make logging of chrooted sftp sessions possible internally routed to local file, without /dev/log device Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 9.6p1 Hardware: amd64 OS: Linux Status: NEW Severity:

[Not subscribed to this list, so please respond directly if you need to speak to me] In man5/sshd_config.5, a permissible keyword in a 'Match' block is missing. It currently lists only: AllowTcpForwarding, Banner, ForceCommand, GatewayPorts, GSSApiAuthentication, KbdInteractiveAuthentication, KerberosAuthentication, PasswordAuthentication, PermitOpen, PermitRootLogin,

I am supporting a site that allows members to upload release files. I have inherited this site which was previously existing. The goal is to allow members to file transfer to and from their project area for release distribution but not to allow general shell access and not to allow access to other parts of the system. Currently rsync and old scp has been restricted using a restricted shell

Hi OpenSSH devs, I?m wondering if the following has any merit and can be done securely ... If you could match on principals in the sshd_config, then (for example) on a gateway machine, you could have something like /etc/ssh/authorized_keys/sshfwd: cert-authority,principals=?batcha-fwd,batchb-fwd? ... /etc/ssh/sshd_config containing: Match User sshfwd PubkeyAuthentication yes

AFAIK everything you described here could be done using the AuthorizedKeysCommand or AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand directives. These can emit authorized_keys options (inc. permitopen) as well as the allowed keys/principals. On Sun, 12 Nov 2023, Bret Giddings wrote: > Hi OpenSSH devs, > > I?m wondering if the following has any merit and can be done securely ... > > If you could

Hello Centos, I am getting an error that I am not familiar with when I restart ssh. [root at virtcent01:~] #service sshd restart Stopping sshd: [ OK ] Starting sshd:WARNING: initlog is deprecated and will be removed in a future release [ OK ] [root at virtcent01:~] # I was just

Hello, We'd like to allow passwords only from the local network, and allow public key auth from on-campus or off-campus. The server runs SuSE Linux, and we might do the same on RHEL/CentOS & Mac OS X if we can get it to work. Unfortunately, Match allows PasswordAuthentication but not ChallengeResponseAuthentication. Is there any reason ChallengeResponseAuthentication cannot be

Maybe I am not testing the signin correctly. Here is what I am doing. I sign into the client/workstation (hereafter referred to as C/W) via ssh as the local "admin" from another C/W so I can open many terminals to tail log files. Then "sudo -i" into "root". All testing is run as "root". When I sign into "root", I see this: > admin at lws4:~$

I've configured OpenSSH_5.3p1 to only allow sftp connections (openssh chroot functionality). i.e. Subsystem sftp internal-sftp Match group sftpusers ChrootDirectory /chroot/%u X11Forwarding no AllowTcpForwarding no ForceCommand internal-sftp So far everything works correctly with sftp but when a user ssh's or scp's to the box the login

On 12/03/2014 01:37:58 PM, Kevin Korb wrote: > As far as a backup provider goes I wouldn't expect them to use rsync > over SSL unless that were built into rsync in the future (and has > been > around long enough that most users would have it). > > I would expect them to either use rsync over ssh secured by rrsync or > rsyncd over ssh with them managing the rsyncd.conf