similar to: [LLVMdev] A question about LLVM and x86 instruction mapping

Release Announcements --------------------- This is the last bugfix release of the Samba 4.10 release series. There will be security releases only beyond this point. Changes since 4.10.13 --------------------- o Jeremy Allison <jra at samba.org> * BUG 14239: s3: lib: nmblib. Clean up and harden nmb packet processing. * BUG 14283: s3: VFS: full_audit. Use system session_info if

Release Announcements --------------------- This is the last bugfix release of the Samba 4.10 release series. There will be security releases only beyond this point. Changes since 4.10.13 --------------------- o Jeremy Allison <jra at samba.org> * BUG 14239: s3: lib: nmblib. Clean up and harden nmb packet processing. * BUG 14283: s3: VFS: full_audit. Use system session_info if

Hi, SafeStack currently relies on address randomization to protect the safe stack. If the location of a safe stack is somehow revealed and a corrupted pointer references it, then a safe stack can be corrupted. The creators of SafeStack envisioned the possibility of using X86 segmentation to further harden SafeStack against such corruption (see the comment near the top of

Hello everyone, I encounter a segfault problem in my LLVM function pass. I think the problem is that I dereference an uninitialized pointer from an array of Instruction* elements which results in undefined behavior. The array is : Instruction** ifsInstrArray = new Instruction*[100]; The problem appears only sometimes (during runOnFunction && visiting BasicBlocks and Instructions).

On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 7:48 AM, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov at google.com> wrote: > On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 4:39 PM, Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin at virtuozzo.com> wrote: >> On 03/06/2018 08:58 PM, Will Deacon wrote: >>> Hi all, >>> >>> As part of some recent work to harden the Kernel Address Space Layout >>> Randomisation (KASLR) implementation in

Release Announcements --------------------- This is the latest stable release of the Samba 4.11 release series. Changes since 4.11.6: --------------------- o Jeremy Allison <jra at samba.org> * BUG 14239: s3: lib: nmblib. Clean up and harden nmb packet processing. * BUG 14283: s3: VFS: full_audit. Use system session_info if called from a temporary share definition. o Andrew

Release Announcements --------------------- This is the latest stable release of the Samba 4.11 release series. Changes since 4.11.6: --------------------- o Jeremy Allison <jra at samba.org> * BUG 14239: s3: lib: nmblib. Clean up and harden nmb packet processing. * BUG 14283: s3: VFS: full_audit. Use system session_info if called from a temporary share definition. o Andrew

Thanks for the replies. Some comments below. On Wed, Mar 07, 2018 at 11:40:41AM -0800, Evgenii Stepanov wrote: > On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 7:48 AM, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov at google.com> wrote: > > On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 4:39 PM, Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin at virtuozzo.com> wrote: > >> On 03/06/2018 08:58 PM, Will Deacon wrote: > >>> Hi all, > >>>

On 2/7/2017 20:02, Kostya Serebryany wrote: > ... > > My understanding is that BNDCU is the cheapest possible instruction, > just like XOR or ADD, > so the overhead should be relatively small. > Still my guesstimate would be >= 5% since stores are very numerous. > And such overhead will be on top of whatever overhead SafeStack has. > Do you have any measurements to

> In nv17_tv_get_hd_modes(), the return value of drm_mode_duplicate() is > assigned to mode, which will lead to a possible NULL pointer dereference > on failure of drm_mode_duplicate(). The same applies to drm_cvt_mode(). > Add a check to avoid null pointer dereference. Can a wording approach (like the following) be a better change description? A null pointer is stored in the local

We're running Fedora Core and Samba-3.0.8-0.pre1.3 and we're authenticating our Windows XP users against Active Directory running on Windows 2003. Everything works fine! But now we're trying to secure and harden our WinXP machines and now when any user logged into a secured WinXP they get the errormessage "The account is not authorized to log in from this station". I browsed

On Thu, Mar 8, 2018 at 9:11 AM, Will Deacon <will.deacon at arm.com> wrote: > Thanks for the replies. Some comments below. > > On Wed, Mar 07, 2018 at 11:40:41AM -0800, Evgenii Stepanov wrote: >> On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 7:48 AM, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov at google.com> wrote: >> > On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 4:39 PM, Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin at virtuozzo.com>

Hi James, > Is it possible to add edges to the CFG from instructions that reference > memory to exception landing pads? I want to do this so that I can > convert SEGV signals into exceptions that can be safely unwound and > caught. My compiler's existing code generator handles this by having a > combined memory dereference and jump on null instruction. LLVM doesn't

On Mon, Jul 25, 2011 at 11:16 PM, Chris Lattner <clattner at apple.com> wrote: > On Jul 25, 2011, at 10:58 PM, Talin wrote: > > To handle the fact that types do not (and can not, at least as long as we >> intend to support obscure languages like "C" :) have linkage, the the linker >> uses a "best effort" approach. It attempts to merge types and

On Tue, Jan 14, 2014 at 1:22 PM, Bob Gleitsmann <rjgleits at bellsouth.net> wrote: > I should have mentioned that this applies to Linus' 3.13.0-rc7 and rc8 > git. Maybe it's obvious. Hey Bob, Thanks for reporting this. Can you try the attached patch instead and report if it helps you? Ben. > > Sorry about that. > > Bob > -------- Forwarded Message --------

Hello all, I've been working for the last month or so on a comprehensive mitigation approach to variant #1 of Spectre. There are a bunch of reasons why this is desirable: - Critical software that is unlikely to be easily hand-mitigated (or where the performance tradeoff isn't worth it) will have a compelling option. - It gives us a baseline on performance for hand-mitigation. - Combined

On Jul 26, 2011, at 8:11 AM, Talin wrote: >> >> If that's true, then it means that we're back to the case where every type has to be fully defined down to the leaf level. > > I'm not sure what you mean. LLVM is perfectly fine with opaque structs so long as you don't "deference" them, GEP into them, need their size, etc. > > Let me try with

On Fri, Jan 27, 2023 at 02:47:55PM +0200, Alexander Shishkin wrote: > "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst at redhat.com> writes: > > > On Fri, Jan 27, 2023 at 01:55:43PM +0200, Alexander Shishkin wrote: > >> "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst at redhat.com> writes: > >> > >> > On Thu, Jan 19, 2023 at 10:13:18PM +0200, Alexander Shishkin

On 09/18/2014 11:04 AM, David Hildenbrand wrote: > This patch should fix the bug reported in https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/9/11/249. > > We have to initialize at least the atomic_flags and the cmd_flags when > allocating storage for the requests. > > Otherwise blk_mq_timeout_check() might dereference uninitialized pointers when > racing with the creation of a request. >

On 09/18/2014 11:04 AM, David Hildenbrand wrote: > This patch should fix the bug reported in https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/9/11/249. > > We have to initialize at least the atomic_flags and the cmd_flags when > allocating storage for the requests. > > Otherwise blk_mq_timeout_check() might dereference uninitialized pointers when > racing with the creation of a request. >