similar to: Updating to 11.7.0

If you just need the name of the system it may be contained in the variable ${SYSTEMNAME}. This is assuming you have the systemname set in asterisk.conf https://wiki.asterisk.org/wiki/display/AST/Asterisk+Main+Configuration+File That said, for SHELL support you probably need to set : live_dangerously = yes Also in your asterisk.conf

hello there. i am running debian 8 in my swerver and i would like to run asterisk as non root. i did follow the https://www.voip-info.org/wiki-Asterisk+non-root without any success. when i issue root at PBX: ~ $ asterisk -U asterisk -G asterisk Privilege escalation protection disabled! See https://wiki.asterisk.org/wiki/x/1gKfAQ for more details. Unable to access the running directory (Permission

Asterisk Project Security Advisory - AST-2013-007 Product Asterisk Summary Asterisk Manager User Dialplan Permission Escalation Nature of Advisory Permission Escalation Susceptibility Remote Authenticated Sessions Severity Minor

Asterisk Project Security Advisory - AST-2013-007 Product Asterisk Summary Asterisk Manager User Dialplan Permission Escalation Nature of Advisory Permission Escalation Susceptibility Remote Authenticated Sessions Severity Minor

root at PBX: /var/www/html $ /etc/init.d/asterisk start [ ok ] Starting asterisk (via systemctl): asterisk.service. root at PBX: /var/www/html $ ps aux | grep asterisk asterisk 1007 0.7 2.3 67128 23748 ? Ssl Apr19 8:49 /usr/sbin/asterisk -U asterisk -G asterisk root 4186 0.0 0.1 4192 1992 pts/0 S+ 17:30 0:00 grep asterisk root at PBX: /var/www/html $

Hello, Reload extensions.conf works well both in CLI and excute `asterisk -x reload` in shell. But it does not working with `while` expression. I use fish shell but it also does not working in bash. ``` while inotifywait -e MOVE_SELF /etc/asterisk/extensions.conf asterisk -x 'help core reload' asterisk -x 'core reload' asterisk -x 'dialplan

Asterisk Project Security Advisory - AST-2014-018 Product Asterisk Summary AMI permission escalation through DB dialplan function Nature of Advisory Permission Escalation Susceptibility Remote

Asterisk Project Security Advisory - AST-2014-018 Product Asterisk Summary AMI permission escalation through DB dialplan function Nature of Advisory Permission Escalation Susceptibility Remote

Asterisk Project Security Advisory - AST-2014-017 Product Asterisk Summary Permission escalation through ConfBridge actions/dialplan functions Nature of Advisory Permission Escalation Susceptibility Remote

Asterisk Project Security Advisory - AST-2014-017 Product Asterisk Summary Permission escalation through ConfBridge actions/dialplan functions Nature of Advisory Permission Escalation Susceptibility Remote

On Thu, 2017-02-02 at 12:18 -0800, Gordon Messmer wrote: > I apologize if my intent was unclear. I was providing you with the text > that you should use in your bug report. I am not explaining the problem > to you, I am showing you a clear way to explain the problem in the bug > report. You should use the appropriate parts of the text I provided, > and basically nothing else.

The Asterisk Development Team has announced security releases for Certified Asterisk 1.8.15, 11.2, and Asterisk 1.8, 10, and 11. The available security releases are released as versions 1.8.15-cert4, 11.2-cert3, 1.8.24.1, 10.12.4, 10.12.4-digiumphones, and 11.6.1. These releases are available for immediate download at http://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/asterisk/releases The release of

The Asterisk Development Team has announced security releases for Certified Asterisk 1.8.15, 11.2, and Asterisk 1.8, 10, and 11. The available security releases are released as versions 1.8.15-cert4, 11.2-cert3, 1.8.24.1, 10.12.4, 10.12.4-digiumphones, and 11.6.1. These releases are available for immediate download at http://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/asterisk/releases The release of

On Thu, 2017-02-02 at 13:40 -0800, Gordon Messmer wrote: > Escalation *requires* attacking a program in a security context other > than your own. Not necessarily. Suppose the adversary is aware of a root exploit/privilege escalation in a random library. Then the heap spraying allows this attacker to easily trigger this exploit because he is able to initialize the entire contents of the

Bill Moran wrote: > This report seems pretty vague. I'm unsure as to whether the alleged > "bug" gives the user any more permissions than he'd already have? Anyone > know any details? This is a local denial of service bug, which was fixed 6 weeks ago in HEAD and RELENG_6. There is no opportunity for either remote denial of service or any privilege escalation. >

Hello, I'm aware of the fact that ChrootDirectory requires that the target directory is root-owned, and I think I've mostly understood why that is necessary, at least within the context of someone who has full shell access. However, I am wondering if that possibility for privilege escalation still exists with a configuration like this: Match Group sftp ForceCommand internal-sftp

Source: xen Version: 4.1.2-2 Severity: critical Tags: security Justification: allows PV domains to escape into the dom0 context Hi, I realize you're most likely pretty well aware of that problem already, but Debian's Xen versions are vulnerable to a PV privilege escalation [1]. The issue is tracked as CVE-2012-0217 and public as of today. Therefore I am filing this bug for coordination

Hello Warren, On Thu, 2017-02-09 at 14:22 -0700, Warren Young wrote: > There are two serious problems with this argument: > > 1. Give me a scenario where this attacker can execute *only* pkcheck > in order to exploit this hypothetical library?s flaw, but where the > attacker cannot simply provide their own binary to do the same > exploit. Short of something insane like

hey.. I talked to my sysadmins about getting access to the dtrace_kernel role, and they said they were hesitant to give this out because they thought it was a security risk - ie: that you could use it for privilege escalation. How true is this? Is there a way to make it user safe? If not, why is it offered as an option for regular users? Thanks much, Ed -- This message posted from

On Fri, 2015-02-06 at 10:50 +1100, Kahlil Hodgson wrote: > On 6 February 2015 at 10:23, Always Learning <centos at u64.u22.net> wrote: > > Logically ? > > > > 1. to change the permissions on shadow from -rw-x------ or from > > ---------- to -rw-r--r-- requires root permissions ? > > > > 2. if so, then what is the advantage of changing those permissions