similar to: Random source ports in FreeBSD?

Displaying 20 results from an estimated 800 matches similar to: "Random source ports in FreeBSD?"

2005 May 17
4
HOW TO Enable IPSec for FreeBSD.......???
Hi, I have tried to enable IPSec support for my FreeBSD( 4.11-RELEASE) system. First, I copied the generic kernel configuration file to a file I called MYKERNEL: #cp /usr/src/sys/i386/conf/GENERIC /usr/src/sys/i386/conf/MYKERNEL Then, I added the following three lines to the options section of /usr/src/sys/i386/conf/MYKERNEL: options IPSEC options IPSEC_ESP options
2005 May 11
3
icmp problem
hi i have a problem with my icmp, i have a router that performs nat. i cannot ping to internet hosts from more than one stations situated behind NAT at once. if i want to ping from another station i have to stop the ping that was initiated from the first host, and after a few seconds i can ping from another station.i've checked firewll and i have no ipfw rules that could stop icmp traffic.
2003 Mar 31
5
rfc3514 - Security Flag in the IPv4 Header
Any chance of this being implemented in fbsd? Could be usefull ;-) ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc3514.txt -- :{ andyf@speednet.com.au Andy Farkas System Administrator Speednet Communications http://www.speednet.com.au/
2003 Aug 30
4
Heads up: panics should be fixed!
As others have noted, Tor's patch appears to be a total solution to the recent instability the PAE patch introduced. So, if you're experiencing panics with a recent kernel, or are in a position to stress a machine, please cvsup and give it a test! Thanks, Mike "Silby" Silbersack ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Sat, 30 Aug 2003 08:39:08 -0700 (PDT) From: Tor Egge
2006 Jul 18
7
Port scan from Apache?
Hi everyone, today I got an e-mail from a company claiming that my server is doing port scans on their firewall machine. I found that hard to believe so I started checking the box. The company rep told me that the scan was originating at port 80 with destination port 8254 on their machine. I couldn't find any hints as to why that computer was subject to the alleged port scans. Searching
2004 Dec 08
2
Center for Internet Security "scoring tool"
Hello, Has anyone tried out the security scoring tool at http://www.cisecurity.org/bench_freebsd.html? Any thoughts or opinions? Regards, stheg __________________________________ Do you Yahoo!? Yahoo! Mail - 250MB free storage. Do more. Manage less. http://info.mail.yahoo.com/mail_250
2004 Nov 21
1
mac_portacl and automatic port allocation
Hello, I really like the idea behind mac_portacl but I find it difficult to use it because of one issue. When an unprivileged program binds to high automatic port with a call to bind(2) and port number set to 0 the system chooses the port to bind to itself. This mechanismus is used by number of programs, most commonly by ftp clients in active mode. Unfortunately this 0 is checked by the
2004 Feb 29
5
mbuf vulnerability
In http://docs.freebsd.org/cgi/mid.cgi?200402260743.IAA18903 it seems RELENG_4 is vulnerable. Is there any work around to a system that has to have ports open ? Version: 1 2/18/2004@03:47:29 GMT >Initial report > <<https://ialert.idefense.com/KODetails.jhtml?irId=207650>https://ialert.idefense.com/KODetails.jhtml?irId=207650; >ID#207650: >FreeBSD Memory Buffer
2008 Jul 24
0
cvs commit: src/contrib/pf/pfctl parse.y src/lib/libc/sys Symbol.map getsockopt.2 src/sbin/ipfw ipfw.8 ipfw2.c src/sys/conf NOTES options src/sys/contrib/ipfilter/netinet ip_fil_freebsd.c src/sys/contrib/pf/net pf.c pf_ioctl.c src/sys/kern init_sysent.c
This looks like a very cool feature addition to RELENG_7! Are there any performance penalties that you know of with this built in ? ---Mike At 09:13 PM 7/23/2008, Julian Elischer wrote: >julian 2008-07-24 01:13:22 UTC > > FreeBSD src repository > > Modified files: (Branch: RELENG_7) > contrib/pf/pfctl parse.y > lib/libc/sys
2004 Apr 20
3
[Full-Disclosure] IETF Draft - Fix for TCP vulnerability (fwd)
Forwarded message: > From full-disclosure-admin@lists.netsys.com Wed Apr 21 11:49:12 2004 > To: full-disclosure@lists.netsys.com > From: Darren Bounds <dbounds@intrusense.com> > Subject: [Full-Disclosure] IETF Draft - Fix for TCP vulnerability > Date: Tue, 20 Apr 2004 18:19:58 -0400 > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > >
2003 Apr 08
3
fstack protector
hi is there any way to build 4.8 release with this fstack protection? or atleast some ports is there any good info on this? the only page i found was that ibm page but it seemed outdated. //martin
2014 Nov 12
2
[LLVMdev] [llvm][SelectionDAG] trivial patch: fix misprint in SelectionDAGLegalize::ExpandInsertToVectorThroughStack
Hi Owen! The "First store the whole vector" is without uses and will be deleted later. I've attached trivial patch to fix it. I have no commit access so if patch is OK, please, commit it . Danil. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: <http://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/attachments/20141112/52592eeb/attachment.html>
2014 Nov 12
2
[LLVMdev] [llvm][SelectionDAG] trivial patch: fix misprint in SelectionDAGLegalize::ExpandInsertToVectorThroughStack
I detected this bug using test case from platform which is not currently supported on llvm targets. (Our team is porting llvm on new target). Creating the test case will take some extra time. I'll try to do it ASAP. Have you any ideas about the test case? (targets using ExpandInsertToVectorThroughStack, etc...) On Wed, Nov 12, 2014 at 8:29 PM, Owen Anderson <resistor at mac.com> wrote:
2005 Apr 04
1
Strange messages in dmesg after DDoS-attack.
Dear list, A few days ago one of my machines were attacked by a DDoS-attack using UDP on random ports.. When I later on analyzed the logs, I found this in my dmesg: xl0: initialization of the rx ring failed (55) xl0: initialization of the rx ring failed (55) xl0: initialization of the rx ring failed (55) I tried to find out on google what it ment, but without any luck. What does that mean and
2014 Nov 17
2
[LLVMdev] [llvm][SelectionDAG] trivial patch: fix misprint in SelectionDAGLegalize::ExpandInsertToVectorThroughStack
Alright, go ahead with it. —Owen > On Nov 17, 2014, at 4:58 AM, Daniil Troshkov <troshkovdanil at gmail.com> wrote: > > Hi! > > I have not found test case. (It is because we have no target using "ExpandInsertToVectorThroughStack"). > But I tested it for target currently not included in llvm trunk. > > This fix correct and trivial, so I'm offering
2003 Aug 10
2
Heads up: New if_xl committed
As promised, the updated if_xl with full busdma support / other improvements has been MFC'd to 4.8-stable. While I have put this driver through extensive testing, it is possible that there may be bugs which are either present in the -current version or that I added in the MFC process. So, if you cvsup to -stable anytime in the future and notice problems with if_xl, please tell me ASAP!
2005 Mar 17
1
no patch whats going on
it was said: >>On Fri, Mar 18, 2005 at 08:52:30AM +1000, Timothy Smith wrote: >> http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/12825/info/ > >That URL doesn't seem to have any details. > >> openbsd and netbsd have taken action on this, but i see no >>movment in >> the freebsd camp.... > >Well, you wouldn't, on the freebsd-questions list. Security
2007 Dec 25
3
ProPolice/SSP in 7.0
Hi there, I'm still running 6.2 on various servers without any tweaks (GENERIC kernel, binary updates via freebsd-update etc.) but lots of ports (apache, postgresql, diablo-jdk etc.) and would like to use stack smashing protection in order to harden my boxes and avoid many potential exploits. I've known about ProPolice/SSP for a while now (from the Gentoo world) and am aware that
2003 Sep 16
3
Release Engineering Status Report
Mike Silbersack wrote: > On Tue, 16 Sep 2003, Scott Long wrote: > > >>Patches have been floated on the mailing list that revert PAE in its >>various stages. Maybe those need to be brought back up. Silby? Tor? >> >>Scott > > > I believe that Tor's commit on August 30th resolved the PAE-related > problems, so there is no need for a reversion.
2004 Apr 23
1
Proposed RST patch
Here's my proposed patch to change RST handling so that ESTABLISHED connections are subject to strict RST checking, but connections in other states are only subject to the "within the window" check. Part 2 of the patch is simply a patch to netstat so that it displays the statistic. As expected, it's very straightforward, the only real question is what to call the statistic...