similar to: Certified Fraud Prep Exam

hello everyone. i am concerned about security to the PBX and i would like to discuss different fraud detection methods. Apart from making everything to secure the PBX (latest patches, iptables, firewalls, no outside users, strongs passwds,...) i would like to find out if there are any fraud detection techniques. As for my setup i do have a PBX running asterisk 11.4 and it has 3 sip trunks (over

Hi, Some days ago I spent about US$700,00 in a Tormenta III board in www.govarion.com. I used credit card. I didn't receive any answer for my emails and there is no telephone number to contact them.. Now, I'd like to cancel this order, because I couldn?t wait so long, and my credit card was billed. Is www.govarion.com a fraud ???? Does anybody know something about them ?? Thanks.

I?ve seen the following exploits of Asterisk / FreePBX boxes: 1) Default PlcmSpIp username and password for Polycom provisioning 2) Insecure SIP usernames and secrets 3) FreePBX GUI accessable from the internet 4) OS remote exploit (maybe ssh/ssl exploit) Mitigation options: 1) Don?t use an easy to guess or default password on provisioning servers. 2) Use secure secrets. Users never

hi, i have strange problem with call-limit/groupcount limiting. i set up limit of 2 calls. i'm using both methods but a for few times i have problem with successfull fraud with more calls than 2 asterisk is 1.8.22 someone with the same problem? any ideas how to solve or debug this problem? -- --------------------------------------- Marek =======================================

Hello all, Voisonics is pleased to introduce easySysAdmin, an automated support/security platform, designed to save your engineer's time and prevent hacking attempts and telecom fraud. It comprises of an online service run by us, and a lightweight and easy-to-install client on your side. Specifically of interest to Asterisk users is the monitoring of SIP registrations, and automatic blocking

Subject says it all... A Simple Asterisk Based Toll Fraud Prevention Script http://www.infiltrated.net/asterisk-ips.html Ramblings for admins/engineers to think about. Doesn't have to cost you umteen thousand dollars for stuff like IPS/IDS. Although a little on the crude side, quite effective. If you care to dabble with MySQL you can create quite an impressive hosts based IPS that is custom

It's very unlikely that this was an employee calling Mom for 66 hours (I'm assuming these calls appeared on a single bill). It's also unlikely that someone "inside" would benefit financially from making these calls. (Follow the money!) Don't discount the possibility that you've overlooked something in the firewall. Meanwhile, does the client need to do international

Did you have a look at the phone it self already? Is call forwarding activated or something and can you call the phone/extension from externally? I have seen this in the past where an employee enabled call forwarding on the phone and once at home he or family called the phone which forwarded the call to abroad. Good luck. Michel. Op 29-01-15 om 12:51 schreef dk at donkelly.biz: > It's

Is there a general recipe to avoid fraudulent calls under the following conditions? A receptionist transfers calls as a callee (customers are calling) and as a caller (boss asks to call and then transfer to him), i.e. the Dial cmd for the internal context contains "Tt". Then an outside call would operate as a Local channel in an internal context after the first transfer. If the

So I was bored yesterday and tried solving a few problems with one stone: 1) Notify me of potential brute forcers (multiple attempts to register multiple numbers from one address) 2) Notify me of (l)users who are having password issues So I whipped up a simple script to run in cron and notify me that UserX from X_IP_Space had X amout of password issues. I'm currently running this from cron

Le 28/01/2015 22:03, Steven McCann a ?crit : > Hello, Hi > > I'm investigating a situation where there was a hundreds of minutes of > calls from an internal SIP extension to an 855 number in Cambodia, > resulting in a crazy ($25,000+) bill from the phone company. I'm > investigating, but can anyone provide some feedback on what's happened > here? I'm

The Authenticate application will do this for you. https://wiki.asterisk.org/wiki/display/AST/Asterisk+13+Application_Authenticate You can either give it a single PIN to use for all calls, Authenticate using a value in the Asterisk Database, Or use a plain text file for the PIN's On Mon, Jul 6, 2015 at 2:43 PM, Motty Cruz <motty.cruz at gmail.com> wrote: > Hello All, > >

Sadly I am still seeing a loss of communication. I will check the device number to see if it has changed. Not sure what else to look at. I guess I could create a corn job to restart the driver multiple times a day. ---- On Fri, 22 May 2020 00:44:04 -0400 David Zomaya<David_Zomaya at tripplite.com> wrote ----Did it stay stable this time? It looks like the restart of the service restored

The loss of communication to USB devices has been discussed before on this list. I do not recall the particulars (& thus do not know if they're relevant to the situation at hand), but it seems to me that it was ultimately related to the USB libraries being used. Charles Lepple was instrumental in the thread I'm thinking of. Roger's suggestion of a more intelligent cron job sounds

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I worked on some ad data before and I found NYT article very biaised and not far from a fraud... Anyone knows if they got money from a - company - to play 'R'? Check out the title: R U Ready for R? Seems to me this title was stolen from XLSolutions www.xlsolutions-corp.com and they never mentioned XLSolutions in the article! They mentioned commercial R....never mentioned

Did it stay stable this time? It looks like the restart of the service restored communication. If it reoccurs: >>> Bus 001 Device 011: ID 09ae:3024 Tripp Lite I wonder if this is the same device number after? Something to keep an eye on Thank you, David Zomaya ________________________________ This message is for the addressee's use only. It may contain confidential information. If

You don't mention if the phone is remote, or local. Although you do mention it had a default user/pass. If the UI of the phone was/is accessible from the I'net, the GUI does have the ability to place a call from it, that is one way the calls could have been placed. From: asterisk-users-bounces at lists.digium.com [mailto:asterisk-users-bounces at lists.digium.com] On Behalf Of Steven

Hello, I would to allow users to place calls overseas such as India and Malaysia but only with a security code. if they don't have a security code I want to be able to drop the calls. can someone point me to a right direction to achieve this goal? Thanks, Motty -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL:

Hmm the calls are made during the day (and sometimes very early in the morning). Right now it looks like someone actually made these calls. If that is the case it's somewhat comforting to know the system wasn't compromised. However, the $25,000 phone bill still remains. Yikes. $6.25 per minute to Cambodia seems quite steep to me. On Wed, Jan 28, 2015 at 6:07 PM, Duncan Turnbull <duncan