similar to: fraud advice

When we designed our systems on asterisk we designed it to me multi-tenant. Se we use customer prefixes on all extensions. This allows us to have multiple customers using the same extension pools. It also reduces the hack foot print as hackers must know the prefix for a customer to try and brute force things. All passwords use 8+ characters with alfa/numeric and special characters. As I see

hello everyone. i am concerned about security to the PBX and i would like to discuss different fraud detection methods. Apart from making everything to secure the PBX (latest patches, iptables, firewalls, no outside users, strongs passwds,...) i would like to find out if there are any fraud detection techniques. As for my setup i do have a PBX running asterisk 11.4 and it has 3 sip trunks (over

Hi, I've cross-posted this to freedesktop@, as the xdg@ list is only used for actual specification development. On Mon, 22 Oct 2018 at 00:36, Jacob Lifshay <programmerjake at gmail.com> wrote: > Hi, we were thinking of asking if freedesktop would host Kazan (https://github.com/kazan-3d/kazan) for us, however some of our community members have objections with how freedesktop's

I worked on some ad data before and I found NYT article very biaised and not far from a fraud... Anyone knows if they got money from a - company - to play 'R'? Check out the title: R U Ready for R? Seems to me this title was stolen from XLSolutions www.xlsolutions-corp.com and they never mentioned XLSolutions in the article! They mentioned commercial R....never mentioned

Hi, Some days ago I spent about US$700,00 in a Tormenta III board in www.govarion.com. I used credit card. I didn't receive any answer for my emails and there is no telephone number to contact them.. Now, I'd like to cancel this order, because I couldn?t wait so long, and my credit card was billed. Is www.govarion.com a fraud ???? Does anybody know something about them ?? Thanks.

Did you have a look at the phone it self already? Is call forwarding activated or something and can you call the phone/extension from externally? I have seen this in the past where an employee enabled call forwarding on the phone and once at home he or family called the phone which forwarded the call to abroad. Good luck. Michel. Op 29-01-15 om 12:51 schreef dk at donkelly.biz: > It's

Hi, I've recently had a fairly prolonged SIP registration attack, 18 hours in this case and often with 200 attempts per second, and suspect I've had a number of these in the past. The main symptom I noticed previously was, because Asterisk was responding to each registration request it received, it was very quickly using up my 448 kbps upload limit for my home ADSL connection: any

Hello, I'm investigating a situation where there was a hundreds of minutes of calls from an internal SIP extension to an 855 number in Cambodia, resulting in a crazy ($25,000+) bill from the phone company. I'm investigating, but can anyone provide some feedback on what's happened here? I'm investigating how this happened as well as what types of arrangements can be made with the

hi, i have strange problem with call-limit/groupcount limiting. i set up limit of 2 calls. i'm using both methods but a for few times i have problem with successfull fraud with more calls than 2 asterisk is 1.8.22 someone with the same problem? any ideas how to solve or debug this problem? -- --------------------------------------- Marek =======================================

Hello all, Voisonics is pleased to introduce easySysAdmin, an automated support/security platform, designed to save your engineer's time and prevent hacking attempts and telecom fraud. It comprises of an online service run by us, and a lightweight and easy-to-install client on your side. Specifically of interest to Asterisk users is the monitoring of SIP registrations, and automatic blocking

> Hmm the calls are made during the day (and sometimes very early in the > morning). Right now it looks like someone actually made these calls. If > that is the case it's somewhat comforting to know the system wasn't > compromised. However, the $25,000 phone bill still remains. Yikes. $6.25 > per minute to Cambodia seems quite steep to me. Since the Mitel had a default

You don't mention if the phone is remote, or local. Although you do mention it had a default user/pass. If the UI of the phone was/is accessible from the I'net, the GUI does have the ability to place a call from it, that is one way the calls could have been placed. From: asterisk-users-bounces at lists.digium.com [mailto:asterisk-users-bounces at lists.digium.com] On Behalf Of Steven

Hi, in case, anyone is interested... I have started compiling a blacklist of hosts and networks from which SIP fraud attempts occur. My criteria currently are: To block an IP: - Minimum 3 attacks within one week from the same IP To block a network: - Attacks from minimum 3 IPs from that network within 2 weeks Common criteria: - Provider does not react to complaints OR - Provider sends autoreply

Hello All, I will like to configure Asterisk to use PIN Code for all outgoing international calls. Also, any suggestions as to when should I prompt users for code prior to dialing the number or after dialing the number? can someone provide with a example on how to accomplish this goal? I am a bit confuse by this :

Hi, Got some great news a few days ago from Sandro Gauci (@SandroGauci) and we'll be talking about this with him this Friday at 1PM. SIPVicious, the free security tools for SIP scanning, now include a new tool: svcrash. It is aimed at helping system administrators stop bandwidth consuming scans making use of svwar and svcrack. Here is the announcement on SIPViscious blog:

Do you have DISA setup? We're seeing lots of attackers running scripts that send digits until they strike a DISA, misconfigured mailbox, etc. (Assuming it wasn't a stupid employee forwarding an inbound call to a 9xxxxxxx number etc). Have a look at SecAst (www.generationd.com) - it detects callers sending too many digits, monitors digit dialing speeds, etc. to help identify and block

... using it as a tool and understanding what it does... So one part of it's toolset identifys valid SIP accounts - and I was under the impression that alwaysauthreject=yes was supposed to stop this... However, it sends a request for a highly probably non-existent account, then sends requests for probably existing accounts and I guess compares the results - account not found vs. bad

After a quick glance, it looks like that older version of the INTERNET750U supports only a few controls Shutdown of the inverter, cancelling that shutdown, setting the delay for the shutdown timer, and enabling/disabling a USB watchdog function. My *guess* is that Network UPS Tools is just exposing the shutdown command as one command. Does that help? Note to users with the same model but

Hi, Given the recent increase in SIP brute force attacks, I've had a little idea. The standard scripts that block after X attempts work well to prevent you actually being compromised, but once you've been 'found' then the attempts seem to keep coming for quite some time. Older versions of sipvicious don't appear to stop once you start sending un-reachables (or straight

I charge my customers through PayPal, but recently faced a fraud which previously had only heard about. Somebody registered a few accounts, paid online with paypal (as my service is only prepaid) and started making expensive long distance calls. In fact the IP registering the accounts was from Florida, and IPs making calls were from Africa. After about 20 minutes the first payment was reversed.