similar to: privsep lost sometime between 3.5p1 and 3.7.1p1?

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=423 Summary: Workaround for pw change in privsep mode (3.5.p1) Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 3.5p1 Platform: All OS/Version: All Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P2 Component: sshd AssignedTo: openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org ReportedBy:

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=419 Summary: HP-UX PAM problems with 3.5p1 Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: -current Platform: HPPA OS/Version: HP-UX Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P2 Component: sshd AssignedTo: openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org ReportedBy:

Hi. If sshd is configured to use PAM and UsePrivilegeSeparation=no or you are logging is as root, any messages returned by PAM session modules are not displayed to the user. (Even when the config file has privsep=yes, logging in as root disables privsep anyway since there's no point, so it behaves the same way as privsep=no). I think I've figured out why: when privsep=no,

Hello All. Attached is an update to my previous patch to make do_pam_chauthtok and privsep play nicely together. First, a question: does anybody care about these or the password expiration patches? Anyway, the "PRIVSEP(do_pam_hauthtok())" has been moved to just after the pty has been allocated but before it's made the controlling tty. This allows the child running chauthtok to

Hi, This is included in the release now; any feedback? Privilege separation, or privsep, is method in OpenSSH by which operations that require root privilege are performed by a separate privileged monitor process. Its purpose is to prevent privilege escalation by containing corruption to an unprivileged process. More information is available at:

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=329 Summary: gmake install prefix=... does not work with the privsep-path Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: -current Platform: MIPS OS/Version: IRIX Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P2 Component: Build system AssignedTo:

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=354 Summary: sshd with privsep doesn't do pam session setup properly Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: -current Platform: ix86 OS/Version: Linux Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P2 Component: sshd AssignedTo: openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org

Hello, We use USE_POSIX_THREADS in our HP-UX build of OpenSSH. When we connect a non-root user with PAM [pam-kerberos] then I get the following error. debug3: PAM: opening session debug1: PAM: reinitializing credentials PAM: pam_setcred(): Failure setting user credentials This is particularly for non-root users with PrivSep YES. When I connect to a root user with PrivSep YES or to a non-root

Hi all. I have a question regarding privsep. Firstly, the following is my understanding of what happens when privsep is enabled: The sshd daemon is running as root listing on 22(a). When a connection is accepted, a child is forked to handle the connection, this child becomes the monitor(b). The monitor forks the pre-auth privsep slave(c), which sheds it privs and hides in its chroot jail.

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=270 Summary: PrivSep breaks sshd on AIX for non-root users Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: -current Platform: PPC OS/Version: AIX Status: NEW Severity: major Priority: P2 Component: sshd AssignedTo: openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org ReportedBy:

Hi, I spent the last couple of hours scratching my head about a problem on FreeBSD 4.1.1 with OpenSSH 3.3p1. Without privsep: debug1: Trying rhosts with RSA host authentication for client user gert debug3: Trying to reverse map address 195.30.1.100. debug1: Rhosts RSA authentication: canonical host moebius2.space.net debug2: auth_rhosts2: clientuser gert hostname moebius2.space.net ipaddr

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=325 Summary: PermitRootLogin forced-commands-only & privsep - not working together Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: -current Platform: ix86 OS/Version: Linux Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P2 Component: sshd AssignedTo:

As I understand it, the idea behind privsep is to prevent malicious data from the client-side of a connection corrupting a server-side process running as root. To achieve that, it is important that post-auth privilege separation happen, ie, that the sshd process change uid to the (authenticated) user. But it is also true that this very same process can perform root-level work without risk of being

Tru64 patch will not make it into 3.5 (this is final) due to lack of willing people to test. I have given the Tru64/osf1 community almost a month to test it. And *ONE* person came forward to give me verification. And don't give me shit about "I don't have time." The person who tested it was LEAVING his employer with Tru64. He found time. IT IS YOUR GAWD DAMN PLATFORM. IF

what's the point of using a new message type if it's the same as RSAAuthentication? the stat() fails because the process that reads from the network is chrooted. check PRIVSEP() in auth-rsa.c to figure out how RSAAuthentication works with PRIVSEP. On Fri, Mar 28, 2003 at 03:42:06PM +0800, ???? ???? wrote: > > I added a new authentication method to openssh called

It was suggested to me that I forward this message to you. ---------- Forwarded Message ---------- Subject: privsep in ssh Date: Fri, 19 Sep 2003 12:22 From: Russell Coker <russell at coker.com.au> To: SE Linux <selinux at tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Colin Watson <cjwatson at debian.org> #ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING if (1) { #else if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 ||

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=544 Summary: sshd w/privsep fails on Linux 2.0, mm_receive_fd: expected type 1 got 1074276337 Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: -current Platform: ix86 OS/Version: Linux Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P2 Component: sshd

I've been trying to cut down the size of openssh so I can run it on my Nokia 770. One thing which helps a fair amount (and will help even more when I get '-ffunction-sections -fdata-sections --gc-sections' working) is to have the option of compiling out privilege separation... Is it worth me tidying this up and trying to make it apply properly to the OpenBSD version? Does the openbsd

Well, after digging around and thinking some more, I'm giving up on the idea of preallocating a TTY to get post-auth privsep working on Tru64. I don't think it will work, because just allocating a TTY doesn't fix the problem - there's no valid way to tie that TTY back to the client process (because it hasn't requested a TTY yet and may not ever do so). The problem is that the

Hi All. Attached is a patch that implements password expiry with PAM and privsep. It works by passing a descriptor to the tty to the monitor, which sets up a child with that tty as stdin/stdout/stderr, then runs chauthtok(). No setuid helpers. I used some parts of Michael Steffens' patch (bugid #423) to make it work on HP-UX. It's still rough but it works. Tested on Solaris 8 and