Michael Gilbert
2011-Feb-06 22:52 UTC
[Secure-testing-team] For discussion: security support strategy for the wheezy kernel
Hi, Now that squeeze is released, I''ve started thinking about how to improve the quality of security support for testing. The biggest problem I saw during the squeeze development cycle was that kernel security update transitions were extremely slow due to unrelated RC bugs. This was bad since it left testing users vulnerable to issues for much larger periods of time than stable/unstable users. Another issue was that a lot of vulnerabilities that were found in that time frame were actually flaws in new kernel code, so testing/unstable were vulnerable, but the stable kernel itself was unaffected, so it was a bit safer to be running the stable kernel since the code was older (i.e. there was more time to find and fix issues). For example, the vulnerability for one of the local privilege escalations that was exploited in the wild was introduced in 2.6.30, so lenny wasn''t affected, but testing/unstable were. I''d like to propose a solution to these two problems: only upload known rock solid longterm cadence upstream supported kernels into testing/unstable. This will hopefully reduce the amount of transition delay since the longterm kernels should have fewer RC issues (after they''ve had a little time to cook of course). There are, of course, some undesirable consequences to this plan. One is that a certain subset of testing users expect the latest shiny all the time; but they can easily get their fix from the experimental kernels instead, so that isn''t really a problem (I think). The second issue is that testing d-i will not support the latest and greatest hardware and features. I think this can be solved by providing two sets of d-i media for testing (one that uses the longterm testing kernel and one that uses newer experimental kernel). Of course this means that some d-i development will need to move to experimental to make use of the newer kernel feature, but I don''t think that would really be a problem. A benefit to this proposal is that there will be reduced work for those currently supporting kernel security updates since the same package can be uploaded to both stable-security and unstable. Also, there should be no RC issues that prevent transitions to testing since for example the 2.6.32 kernel is so well-tested already. Anyway, I think this would go a long way toward improving the quality of security support in testing and thus reducing the common advice/meme that users should avoid testing if they''re concerned about security. So, my proposal in a nutshell is to only upload upstream 2.6.32 point releases to wheezy/sid for the next 12-18 months. At that time, reevaluate and determine what the next longterm cadence kernel will be, and then once that is reasonable stabilized in experimental, finally upload it to unstable for the final stages of wheezy development (perhaps a few months before the freeze). Looking forward to thoughts and discussion on the matter. Best wishes, Mike Disclaimer: note that I haven''t participated in kernel packaging or applied kernel security patches directly myself (yet), but I have been triaging and tracking kernel security issues for about a year and a half now [0], so I have a pretty good understanding of the status quo. [0] http://svn.debian.org/wsvn/kernel-sec/?op=log
Joey Hess
2011-Feb-07 01:58 UTC
[Secure-testing-team] For discussion: security support strategy for the wheezy kernel
Well, I have a few horses in this race in between testing-security, d-i, and CUT, as well as having been a Release Assistant in the past, and I think this proposal stinks from every perspective. Michael Gilbert wrote:> The biggest problem I saw during the squeeze development cycle was that > kernel security update transitions were extremely slow due to unrelated > RC bugs. This was bad since it left testing users vulnerable to issues > for much larger periods of time than stable/unstable users.Which proves nicely that not all RC bugs are equally RC, and that britney''s old_rc_count <= new_rc_count is a flawed heuristic whose main virtue is that it''s probably the best a machine can do with the available information. Which is why the release team has override files..> Another issue was that a lot of vulnerabilities that were found in that > time frame were actually flaws in new kernel code, so testing/unstable > were vulnerable, but the stable kernel itself was unaffected, so it was > a bit safer to be running the stable kernel since the code was older > (i.e. there was more time to find and fix issues). For example, the > vulnerability for one of the local privilege escalations that was > exploited in the wild was introduced in 2.6.30, so lenny wasn''t > affected, but testing/unstable were.LWN''s analysis of age of introduction of kernel security holes in 2010 doesn''t seem to agree? http://lwn.net/Articles/410606/ | So, in a sense, the above-mentioned kernel hacker was correct - an | awful lot of the vulnerabilities fixed over the last year predate the | git era, and are thus over five years old. At best, you seem to be grossly oversimplifying. In the immortal words of FaceBook, "it''s complicated".> I''d like to propose a solution to these two problems: only upload known > rock solid longterm cadence upstream supported kernels into > testing/unstable. This will hopefully reduce the amount of transition > delay since the longterm kernels should have fewer RC issues (after > they''ve had a little time to cook of course). > > There are, of course, some undesirable consequences to this plan. One > is that a certain subset of testing users expect the latest shiny all > the time; but they can easily get their fix from the experimental > kernels instead, so that isn''t really a problem (I think).I feel that unstable is heading in much too stable a direction already. I think that Bdale mentioned this (as a possible negative feature of CUT) at DebConf. If testing is as stale as stable, why would anyone want to bother with CUT?> The second issue is that testing d-i will not support the latest and > greatest hardware and features. I think this can be solved by > providing two sets of d-i media for testing (one that uses the longterm > testing kernel and one that uses newer experimental kernel).This seems likely to increase the workload of the d-i (and CD..) team significantly. And wouldn''t it result in either an installed system that used unstable''s old kernel and so didn''t work, or used experimental''s kernel and so didn''t auto-upgrade to fix security holes? Also, what are teams like the X team to do, when their packages depend on new kernel features? How are we supposed to ever integrate support for the new kernel distribution-wide if unstable constantly has an old version? Should the whole distribution lag years behind the state of the art?> Anyway, I think this would go a long way toward improving the quality > of security support in testing and thus reducing the common advice/meme > that users should avoid testing if they''re concerned about security.A meme that is not founded in truth, as you can see if you compare existing known security holes in stable and in testing at most points in the release cycle. Perhaps the project should consider how it allows these types of myths to stand up when their foundations are so easily disproven? -- see shy jo -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 828 bytes Desc: Digital signature URL: <http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/secure-testing-team/attachments/20110206/c76e7710/attachment.pgp>
Moritz Mühlenhoff
2011-Feb-07 18:12 UTC
[Secure-testing-team] For discussion: security support strategy for the wheezy kernel
Michael Gilbert <michael.s.gilbert at gmail.com> schrieb:> Hi,> So, my proposal in a nutshell is to only upload upstream 2.6.32 point > releases to wheezy/sid for the next 12-18 months. At that time, > reevaluate and determine what the next longterm cadence kernel will be, > and then once that is reasonable stabilized in experimental, finally > upload it to unstable for the final stages of wheezy development > (perhaps a few months before the freeze).No way. The idea of unstable is to get the current upstream code in shape and that won''t be achieved with staying with an old kernel. Whatever the technical solution to testing-security kernel might be, it needs to be based on following the upstream kernel development. Cheers, Moritz
Ben Hutchings
2011-Feb-07 21:14 UTC
[Secure-testing-team] For discussion: security support strategy for the wheezy kernel
On Mon, Feb 07, 2011 at 07:12:48PM +0100, Moritz M?hlenhoff wrote:> Michael Gilbert <michael.s.gilbert at gmail.com> schrieb: > > Hi, > > > So, my proposal in a nutshell is to only upload upstream 2.6.32 point > > releases to wheezy/sid for the next 12-18 months. At that time, > > reevaluate and determine what the next longterm cadence kernel will be, > > and then once that is reasonable stabilized in experimental, finally > > upload it to unstable for the final stages of wheezy development > > (perhaps a few months before the freeze). > > No way. The idea of unstable is to get the current upstream code in > shape and that won''t be achieved with staying with an old kernel. > > Whatever the technical solution to testing-security kernel might be, > it needs to be based on following the upstream kernel development.Totally agreed. We should be tracking current upstream releases, and not just in experimental (which can now be used for upstream release candidates). Ben. -- Ben Hutchings We get into the habit of living before acquiring the habit of thinking. - Albert Camus
Michael Gilbert
2011-Feb-07 21:28 UTC
[Secure-testing-team] For discussion: security support strategy for the wheezy kernel
On Mon, 7 Feb 2011 19:12:48 +0100, Moritz M?hlenhoff wrote:> Michael Gilbert <michael.s.gilbert at gmail.com> schrieb: > > Hi, > > > So, my proposal in a nutshell is to only upload upstream 2.6.32 point > > releases to wheezy/sid for the next 12-18 months. At that time, > > reevaluate and determine what the next longterm cadence kernel will be, > > and then once that is reasonable stabilized in experimental, finally > > upload it to unstable for the final stages of wheezy development > > (perhaps a few months before the freeze). > > No way. The idea of unstable is to get the current upstream code in > shape and that won''t be achieved with staying with an old kernel.I''m not sure if there''s a precise definition of unstable other than the statement at [0], but it seems to be whatever teams make of it. It''s perfectly ok to upload only stable versions (if that''s what the team wants to do), and its perfectly ok to upload the most unstable thing ever, but then the consequences of that have to be dealt with. I guess what I''m saying is that each team can decide specifically how they want to use unstable, so the kernel team can deviate from the status quo if they decide to; that is if I can make a sufficiently convincing argument. Also, my suggestion does involve eventually moving to a newer kernel in the wheezy development cycle; just a while from now, rather than rushing in to things.> Whatever the technical solution to testing-security kernel might be, > it needs to be based on following the upstream kernel development.2.6.32.x is in fact an upstream kernel currently being developed ;) Best wishes, Mike [0] http://www.debian.org/releases/unstable/
Michael Gilbert
2011-Feb-07 22:08 UTC
[Secure-testing-team] For discussion: security support strategy for the wheezy kernel
2011/2/7 Ben Hutchings wrote:> On Mon, Feb 07, 2011 at 07:12:48PM +0100, Moritz M?hlenhoff wrote: >> Michael Gilbert <michael.s.gilbert at gmail.com> schrieb: >> > Hi, >> >> > So, my proposal in a nutshell is to only upload upstream 2.6.32 point >> > releases to wheezy/sid for the next 12-18 months. ?At that time, >> > reevaluate and determine what the next longterm cadence kernel will be, >> > and then once that is reasonable stabilized in experimental, finally >> > upload it to unstable for the final stages of wheezy development >> > (perhaps a few months before the freeze). >> >> No way. The idea of unstable is to get the current upstream code in >> shape and that won''t be achieved with staying with an old kernel. >> >> Whatever the technical solution to testing-security kernel might be, >> it needs to be based on following the upstream kernel development. > > Totally agreed. ?We should be tracking current upstream releases, > and not just in experimental (which can now be used for upstream > release candidates).What about introducing a new linux-2.6-stable kernel package as a compromise? That way users that want stability and security support in testing continue to have that as an option. Also, I will assume responsibility as the maintainer, so there will be hopefully very little impact to any other part of Debian. Also, I can look at generating d-i media for this kernel. Any thoughts on that? The only downside I can think of right away is introducing a huge code copy into the archive. Best wishes, Mike
Julien Cristau
2011-Feb-07 22:09 UTC
[Secure-testing-team] For discussion: security support strategy for the wheezy kernel
On Mon, Feb 7, 2011 at 16:28:31 -0500, Michael Gilbert wrote:> On Mon, 7 Feb 2011 19:12:48 +0100, Moritz M?hlenhoff wrote: > > Michael Gilbert <michael.s.gilbert at gmail.com> schrieb: > > > Hi, > > > > > So, my proposal in a nutshell is to only upload upstream 2.6.32 point > > > releases to wheezy/sid for the next 12-18 months. At that time, > > > reevaluate and determine what the next longterm cadence kernel will be, > > > and then once that is reasonable stabilized in experimental, finally > > > upload it to unstable for the final stages of wheezy development > > > (perhaps a few months before the freeze). > > > > No way. The idea of unstable is to get the current upstream code in > > shape and that won''t be achieved with staying with an old kernel. > > I''m not sure if there''s a precise definition of unstable other than > the statement at [0], but it seems to be whatever teams make of it.unstable is where debian development work happens.> It''s perfectly ok to upload only stable versions (if that''s what the > team wants to do), and its perfectly ok to upload the most unstable > thing ever, but then the consequences of that have to be dealt with. I > guess what I''m saying is that each team can decide specifically how > they want to use unstable, so the kernel team can deviate from the > status quo if they decide to; that is if I can make a sufficiently > convincing argument. > > Also, my suggestion does involve eventually moving to a newer kernel in > the wheezy development cycle; just a while from now, rather than > rushing in to things. >What does that buy us? It means instead of dealing with bugs on an ongoing basis, you get them all at the same time and get to bisect along many kernel versions at once instead of just one. It means problems don''t get reported (and fixed) upstream until it''s too late. It means any package that could use a newer kernel interface doesn''t get any testing. I''m sure there''s plenty of others.> > Whatever the technical solution to testing-security kernel might be, > > it needs to be based on following the upstream kernel development. > > 2.6.32.x is in fact an upstream kernel currently being developed ;) >No it''s not. Go read the definition of development. I''m sorry, but your proposal is insane. Cheers, Julien -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 836 bytes Desc: Digital signature URL: <http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/secure-testing-team/attachments/20110207/5148342c/attachment.pgp>
Michael Gilbert
2011-Feb-07 22:12 UTC
[Secure-testing-team] For discussion: security support strategy for the wheezy kernel
On Mon, Feb 7, 2011 at 5:08 PM, Michael Gilbert wrote:> What about introducing a new linux-2.6-stable kernel package as a > compromise? ?That way users that want stability and security support > in testing continue to have that as an option. ?Also, I will assume > responsibility as the maintainer, so there will be hopefully very > little impact to any other part of Debian. ?Also, I can look at > generating d-i media for this kernel. > > Any thoughts on that? ?The only downside I can think of right away is > introducing a huge code copy into the archive.Also the same effect can be achieved by apt-pinning the squeeze kernel. Best wishes, Mike
Michael Gilbert
2011-Feb-07 22:15 UTC
[Secure-testing-team] For discussion: security support strategy for the wheezy kernel
On Mon, Feb 7, 2011 at 5:09 PM, Julien Cristau wrote:> What does that buy us? ?It means instead of dealing with bugs on an > ongoing basis, you get them all at the same time and get to bisect along > many kernel versions at once instead of just one. ?It means problems > don''t get reported (and fixed) upstream until it''s too late. ?It means > any package that could use a newer kernel interface doesn''t get any > testing. ?I''m sure there''s plenty of others.Bugs can be submitted and dealt with in experimental just as well as in unstable.>> > Whatever the technical solution to testing-security kernel might be, >> > it needs to be based on following the upstream kernel development. >> >> 2.6.32.x is in fact an upstream kernel currently being developed ;) >> > No it''s not. ?Go read the definition of development. > > I''m sorry, but your proposal is insane.Is this kind of negativity really necessary? I''m trying to guide a discussion on a real problem, and I''m an engineer, so I never present problems without at least an idea about a solution. It may not be the best, but you start at something and work toward bettering it until you have something good. Best wishes, Mike
Michael Gilbert
2011-Feb-08 03:54 UTC
[Secure-testing-team] For discussion: security support strategy for the wheezy kernel
Hi Joey, Thank you so much for your very thoughtful reply. On Sun, 6 Feb 2011 21:58:08 -0400, Joey Hess wrote:> Michael Gilbert wrote: > > Another issue was that a lot of vulnerabilities that were found in that > > time frame were actually flaws in new kernel code, so testing/unstable > > were vulnerable, but the stable kernel itself was unaffected, so it was > > a bit safer to be running the stable kernel since the code was older > > (i.e. there was more time to find and fix issues). For example, the > > vulnerability for one of the local privilege escalations that was > > exploited in the wild was introduced in 2.6.30, so lenny wasn''t > > affected, but testing/unstable were. > > LWN''s analysis of age of introduction of kernel security holes in 2010 > doesn''t seem to agree? http://lwn.net/Articles/410606/ > > | So, in a sense, the above-mentioned kernel hacker was correct - an > | awful lot of the vulnerabilities fixed over the last year predate the > | git era, and are thus over five years old.LWN''s analysis is far from comprehensive, and the conclusions are not based in sufficiently rigorous analysis, but instead on the usual numbers game. Their reporting is however very useful as a basis for further research. The first fact that they completely miss is that not all CVEs are created equal. A memory info disclosure gets a CVE just like a privilege escalation that has known exploits, but both are on the same playing field in the numbers game. Annecdotally, CVE-2010-3301 and CVE-2010-1146 had an exploit in the wild, and 2.6.26 was never affected. The only issue that had an in-the-wild exploit affecting lenny in that list (that I''m aware of) was CVE-2010-3081 (and lenny would have sidestepped that too if it had had been even more conservative and gone with the older/stabler 2.6.25). Even playing the numbers game with a bit more thoughtful analysis with the LWN data, lenny looks a lot better. It can be seen that lenny (2.6.26) was vulnerable to 69% (36 out of 52) of the vulnerabilities listed there, and squeeze (2.6.32) was vulnerable to 98% (51 out of 52). In my opinion that''s a rather substantial difference, and thus a problem worth pondering.> At best, you seem to be grossly oversimplifying. In the immortal words > of FaceBook, "it''s complicated".Yes, I have taken a hard problem (that of improving overall testing security), and divided it into a specifically manageable part that I want to attempt to conquer. That process can indeed be called simplifying, but it is an inevitable consequence of problem solving, and not something to be treated as a flaw.> > I''d like to propose a solution to these two problems: only upload known > > rock solid longterm cadence upstream supported kernels into > > testing/unstable. This will hopefully reduce the amount of transition > > delay since the longterm kernels should have fewer RC issues (after > > they''ve had a little time to cook of course). > > > > There are, of course, some undesirable consequences to this plan. One > > is that a certain subset of testing users expect the latest shiny all > > the time; but they can easily get their fix from the experimental > > kernels instead, so that isn''t really a problem (I think). > > I feel that unstable is heading in much too stable a direction already. > I think that Bdale mentioned this (as a possible negative feature of CUT) > at DebConf.Why is that such a bad thing? Perhaps the current state is simply an inevitable consequence of progress, or in the terminology of the fashion industry, "experimental is the new unstable".> > The second issue is that testing d-i will not support the latest and > > greatest hardware and features. I think this can be solved by > > providing two sets of d-i media for testing (one that uses the longterm > > testing kernel and one that uses newer experimental kernel). > > This seems likely to increase the workload of the d-i (and CD..) team > significantly.Yes, there will of course be a larger workload to maintain two sets of testing d-i media, although only one (the one based off experimental) would be likely to have any breakage, so the stable one won''t need too much attention.> And wouldn''t it result in either an installed system that > used unstable''s old kernel and so didn''t work, or used experimental''s > kernel and so didn''t auto-upgrade to fix security holes?The experimental media would be provided with zero claimed security support, the other media would get full security support. I don''t see why you think that would be broken though; it would be using the current set of packages so it should remain stable (as long as all d-i development moves to experimental).> Also, what are teams like the X team to do, when their packages depend > on new kernel features? How are we supposed to ever integrate support > for the new kernel distribution-wide if unstable constantly has an old > version? Should the whole distribution lag years behind the state of the > art?That can certainly still happen; it will just be close to the freeze, rather than right now. In the meantime, they can stage their updates in experimental (or provide a compatibility layer).> > Anyway, I think this would go a long way toward improving the quality > > of security support in testing and thus reducing the common advice/meme > > that users should avoid testing if they''re concerned about security. > > A meme that is not founded in truth, as you can see if you compare > existing known security holes in stable and in testing at most points in > the release cycle. Perhaps the project should consider how it allows > these types of myths to stand up when their foundations are so easily > disproven?The meme actually continues to be true, but to a lesser degree than in the past. That''s thanks to the herculean and thankless efforts of members of the testing security team such as Moritz Muehlenhoff, Nico Golde, Raphael Geissert, and many others for the past couple years. Let''s take the freedom made available by the new cycle to try to address one of the biggest remaining offenders. Best wishes, Mike
Michael Gilbert
2011-Feb-08 04:03 UTC
[Secure-testing-team] For discussion: security support strategy for the wheezy kernel
On Mon, 7 Feb 2011 22:54:53 -0500 Michael Gilbert wrote:> Even playing the numbers game with a bit more thoughtful analysis with > the LWN data, lenny looks a lot better. It can be seen that lenny > (2.6.26) was vulnerable to 69% (36 out of 52) of the vulnerabilities > listed there, and squeeze (2.6.32) was vulnerable to 98% (51 out of > 52). In my opinion that''s a rather substantial difference, and thus a > problem worth pondering.Minor correction: lenny was vulnerable to 67% (35 out of 51) and squeeze was vulnerable to 98% (50 out of 51). I had missed the issue that was fixed in 2.6.20 and didn''t affect either releases. Best wishes, Mike
Mark Brown
2011-Feb-08 13:03 UTC
[Secure-testing-team] For discussion: security support strategy for the wheezy kernel
On Mon, Feb 07, 2011 at 05:15:07PM -0500, Michael Gilbert wrote:> On Mon, Feb 7, 2011 at 5:09 PM, Julien Cristau wrote: > > What does that buy us? ??It means instead of dealing with bugs on an > > ongoing basis, you get them all at the same time and get to bisect along > > many kernel versions at once instead of just one. ??It means problems > > don''t get reported (and fixed) upstream until it''s too late. ??It means > > any package that could use a newer kernel interface doesn''t get any > > testing. ??I''m sure there''s plenty of others.> Bugs can be submitted and dealt with in experimental just as well as > in unstable.Realistically people don''t generally go randomly installing things from experimental so the testing coverage we get from having unstable and testing is substantially reduced - we get to deal with everything in the freeze instead, plus all the effects of running an old kernel which isn''t being actively developed.
Michael Gilbert
2011-Feb-18 22:24 UTC
[Secure-testing-team] For discussion: security support strategy for the wheezy kernel
On Mon, 7 Feb 2011 22:54:53 -0500 Michael Gilbert wrote:> On Sun, 6 Feb 2011 21:58:08 -0400, Joey Hess wrote: > > Michael Gilbert wrote: > > > Another issue was that a lot of vulnerabilities that were found in that > > > time frame were actually flaws in new kernel code, so testing/unstable > > > were vulnerable, but the stable kernel itself was unaffected, so it was > > > a bit safer to be running the stable kernel since the code was older > > > (i.e. there was more time to find and fix issues). For example, the > > > vulnerability for one of the local privilege escalations that was > > > exploited in the wild was introduced in 2.6.30, so lenny wasn''t > > > affected, but testing/unstable were. > > > > LWN''s analysis of age of introduction of kernel security holes in 2010 > > doesn''t seem to agree? http://lwn.net/Articles/410606/ > > > > | So, in a sense, the above-mentioned kernel hacker was correct - an > > | awful lot of the vulnerabilities fixed over the last year predate the > > | git era, and are thus over five years old. > > LWN''s analysis is far from comprehensive, and the conclusions are not > based in sufficiently rigorous analysis, but instead on the usual > numbers game. Their reporting is however very useful as a basis for > further research. > > The first fact that they completely miss is that not all CVEs are > created equal. A memory info disclosure gets a CVE just like a > privilege escalation that has known exploits, but both are on the same > playing field in the numbers game. Annecdotally, CVE-2010-3301 and > CVE-2010-1146 had an exploit in the wild, and 2.6.26 was never > affected. The only issue that had an in-the-wild exploit affecting > lenny in that list (that I''m aware of) was CVE-2010-3081 (and lenny > would have sidestepped that too if it had had been even more > conservative and gone with the older/stabler 2.6.25). > > Even playing the numbers game with a bit more thoughtful analysis with > the LWN data, lenny looks a lot better. It can be seen that lenny > (2.6.26) was vulnerable to 69% (36 out of 52) of the vulnerabilities > listed there, and squeeze (2.6.32) was vulnerable to 98% (51 out of > 52). In my opinion that''s a rather substantial difference, and thus a > problem worth pondering.So, now that I''ve had some time to contemplate the replies on this issue, I have a much better appreciation of the need to keep unstable closely in line with upstream development, and thus don''t want to push the original solution anymore. Also 2.6.37 is in unstable now, so that idea is impossible, which is OK. However, as I justify above, there is still a problem, and I think it can still be solved relatively easily and without too much impact. This time I suggest blocking 2.6.37 so 2.6.32 remains in testing for a while. This will allow it to get updates in sync with stable kernel security updates (without any additional effort by Dann, Moritz, and other kernel team members other than the package upload to testing as well). This will also help to provide a bit more stability for CUT [0]. Over a 1.5-year period (the non-freeze timeframe) roughly 6 new upstream kernels will be released, and each new kernel comes along with a high probability of introducing breakage. I''m trying to provide CUT releases once a month, so every 3 months I will be looking at a likely broken CUT release (or 25% of the time). However, if there is just one kernel transition in testing development cycle, then there is only 1 likely broken period (or 4% of the time). Anyway, I know that the fact that this may have a future effect on my efforts isn''t a great argument, but this does impact whether CUT will be successful, which impacts the whole project. I wonder if we can at least try it for a few months, and if there really are problems with keeping the old kernel in testing, then we can just end this experiment and unblock the newer upstream version. If there is some concurrence on this, I''ll submit an RC blocker bug on the kernel. Note there are only 8 days to discuss before the transition is automatic (I think the current RC blocker [1] may disappear by then). Best wishes, Mike [0] http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/cut-team/2011-February/000195.html [1] http://qa.debian.org/excuses.php?package=linux-2.6
Lucas Nussbaum
2011-Feb-19 06:47 UTC
[Secure-testing-team] [cut-team] For discussion: security support strategy for the wheezy kernel
On 18/02/11 at 17:24 -0500, Michael Gilbert wrote:> On Mon, 7 Feb 2011 22:54:53 -0500 Michael Gilbert wrote: > > On Sun, 6 Feb 2011 21:58:08 -0400, Joey Hess wrote: > > > Michael Gilbert wrote: > > > > Another issue was that a lot of vulnerabilities that were found in that > > > > time frame were actually flaws in new kernel code, so testing/unstable > > > > were vulnerable, but the stable kernel itself was unaffected, so it was > > > > a bit safer to be running the stable kernel since the code was older > > > > (i.e. there was more time to find and fix issues). For example, the > > > > vulnerability for one of the local privilege escalations that was > > > > exploited in the wild was introduced in 2.6.30, so lenny wasn''t > > > > affected, but testing/unstable were. > > > > > > LWN''s analysis of age of introduction of kernel security holes in 2010 > > > doesn''t seem to agree? http://lwn.net/Articles/410606/ > > > > > > | So, in a sense, the above-mentioned kernel hacker was correct - an > > > | awful lot of the vulnerabilities fixed over the last year predate the > > > | git era, and are thus over five years old. > > > > LWN''s analysis is far from comprehensive, and the conclusions are not > > based in sufficiently rigorous analysis, but instead on the usual > > numbers game. Their reporting is however very useful as a basis for > > further research. > > > > The first fact that they completely miss is that not all CVEs are > > created equal. A memory info disclosure gets a CVE just like a > > privilege escalation that has known exploits, but both are on the same > > playing field in the numbers game. Annecdotally, CVE-2010-3301 and > > CVE-2010-1146 had an exploit in the wild, and 2.6.26 was never > > affected. The only issue that had an in-the-wild exploit affecting > > lenny in that list (that I''m aware of) was CVE-2010-3081 (and lenny > > would have sidestepped that too if it had had been even more > > conservative and gone with the older/stabler 2.6.25). > > > > Even playing the numbers game with a bit more thoughtful analysis with > > the LWN data, lenny looks a lot better. It can be seen that lenny > > (2.6.26) was vulnerable to 69% (36 out of 52) of the vulnerabilities > > listed there, and squeeze (2.6.32) was vulnerable to 98% (51 out of > > 52). In my opinion that''s a rather substantial difference, and thus a > > problem worth pondering. > > So, now that I''ve had some time to contemplate the replies on this > issue, I have a much better appreciation of the need to keep unstable > closely in line with upstream development, and thus don''t want to push > the original solution anymore. Also 2.6.37 is in unstable now, so that > idea is impossible, which is OK. > > However, as I justify above, there is still a problem, and I think it > can still be solved relatively easily and without too much impact. > This time I suggest blocking 2.6.37 so 2.6.32 remains in testing for a > while. This will allow it to get updates in sync with stable kernel > security updates (without any additional effort by Dann, Moritz, and > other kernel team members other than the package upload to testing as > well).You base your reasoning on the assumption that CUT users prefer a more stable kernel to a more recent kernel. I''m tempted to think the opposite. - lucas
Raphael Hertzog
2011-Feb-19 13:09 UTC
[Secure-testing-team] [cut-team] For discussion: security support strategy for the wheezy kernel
On Fri, 18 Feb 2011, Michael Gilbert wrote:> This will also help to provide a bit more stability for CUT [0]. Over > a 1.5-year period (the non-freeze timeframe) roughly 6 new upstream > kernels will be released, and each new kernel comes along with a high > probability of introducing breakage. I''m trying to provide CUT > releases once a month, so every 3 months I will be looking at a likely > broken CUT release (or 25% of the time). However, if there is just one > kernel transition in testing development cycle, then there is only 1 > likely broken period (or 4% of the time).The kernel is not the sole component that can introduce breakage. So it seems ridiculous to do such statistics based on the kernel only. And like Lucas said, CUT users want recent software and that includes the kernel (which is also important for new hardware support). Cheers, -- Rapha?l Hertzog ? Debian Developer Follow my Debian News ? http://RaphaelHertzog.com (English) ? http://RaphaelHertzog.fr (Fran?ais)
Michael Gilbert
2011-Feb-19 18:12 UTC
[Secure-testing-team] [cut-team] For discussion: security support strategy for the wheezy kernel
On Sat, 19 Feb 2011 14:09:50 +0100 Raphael Hertzog wrote:> On Fri, 18 Feb 2011, Michael Gilbert wrote: > > This will also help to provide a bit more stability for CUT [0]. Over > > a 1.5-year period (the non-freeze timeframe) roughly 6 new upstream > > kernels will be released, and each new kernel comes along with a high > > probability of introducing breakage. I''m trying to provide CUT > > releases once a month, so every 3 months I will be looking at a likely > > broken CUT release (or 25% of the time). However, if there is just one > > kernel transition in testing development cycle, then there is only 1 > > likely broken period (or 4% of the time). > > The kernel is not the sole component that can introduce breakage. So it > seems ridiculous to do such statistics based on the kernel only.Hi Raphael, I completely concur that there are indeed other important components like grub and xorg where breakage would be a showstopper. However, I don''t think the consequences would be quite so substantial. There is just so much intimately dependent on the kernel that breakage there has a very wide area of effect; whereas grub or xorg breakage is somewhat contained. This is why I''m only significantly concerned about the kernel. Anyway, I agree that there will be breakage, but I don''t want CUT to be mostly about constantly resolving the same repetitive kernel breakage. Also, this solution isn''t just about CUT stability. As I''ve been describing, it is about killing about 2 birds with one stone: 1. Make testing always installable by retaining a stable/well-tested kernel and associated d-i infrastructure 2. Improve testing security by reducing the amount of vulnerabilities existent in older kernels (roughly 67% fewer in 2.6.32 vs 2.6.37 as described previously) In fact these are two of the three known problems in testing mentioned in your LWN article [0]. And the only consequence is that testing users don''t get the latest kernel bling. However, that is offset by the availability of 2.6.37 and associated infrastructure in unstable. So there really are no downsides that can''t be worked around with a little education/effort on the part of the user.> And like Lucas said, CUT users want recent software and that includes the > kernelI don''t think it is appropriate to project a singular perspective onto all users. Ultimately our goal is to perform a balancing act between freshness and stability. In the past the primary focus has been on freshness in testing, but I think there is room to swing the pendulum a bit more toward stability. It''s really a requirement if we''re ever going to be able to achieve something a testing that''s "constantly usable". Also, users needing bleeding-edge freshness can always take the plunge into unstable.> (which is also important for new hardware support).This seems to be a meme that continues to persist without much in the way of evidence. It certainly may have been true in the past, but I think things have changed for the better with the advent of stable upstream support (i.e. support for new hardware is backported to the stable kernels). Also, I''ve read about 10 reviews of squeeze, and none of them have indicated any problems with hardware support (except for missing support for non-free firmware) even though that uses a kernel initially released almost a year and a half ago. In fact, I''ve only ever had one piece of hardware (a wireless card) that was unsupported by Debian, and that was when sarge was still in testing, and all that was needed was to enter the device id into the discover list. It wasn''t even a kernel issue. Ultimately I don''t see why the newest blingy kernel is a necessity in testing. Best wishes, Mike [0] http://lwn.net/Articles/406301/
Ben Hutchings
2011-Feb-19 18:48 UTC
[Secure-testing-team] [cut-team] For discussion: security support strategy for the wheezy kernel
On Sat, 2011-02-19 at 13:12 -0500, Michael Gilbert wrote: [...]> Also, this solution isn''t just about CUT stability. As I''ve been > describing, it is about killing about 2 birds with one stone: > > 1. Make testing always installable by retaining a stable/well-tested > kernel and associated d-i infrastructureWe do backport new hardware support to stable but we do not have the resources (time and equipment) to cover everything. So this would mean that neither stable nor testing would be installable on some newer hardware.> 2. Improve testing security by reducing the amount of vulnerabilities > existent in older kernels (roughly 67% fewer in 2.6.32 vs 2.6.37 as > described previously)Huh? I don''t see any source for this figure. [...]> > (which is also important for new hardware support). > > This seems to be a meme that continues to persist without much in the > way of evidence. It certainly may have been true in the past, but I > think things have changed for the better with the advent of stable > upstream support (i.e. support for new hardware is backported to the > stable kernels). > > Also, I''ve read about 10 reviews of squeeze, and none of them have > indicated any problems with hardware support (except for missing > support for non-free firmware) even though that uses a kernel initially > released almost a year and a half ago.[...] I can assure you there is already a substantial backlog of new hardware that is currently unsupported in squeeze. For example, any current ATI graphics chip. And this is at the start of squeeze''s lifetime, not the end. Ben. -- Ben Hutchings Once a job is fouled up, anything done to improve it makes it worse. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 828 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part URL: <http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/secure-testing-team/attachments/20110219/78fbfa69/attachment.pgp>
Michael Gilbert
2011-Feb-19 19:04 UTC
[Secure-testing-team] [cut-team] For discussion: security support strategy for the wheezy kernel
On Sat, 19 Feb 2011 18:48:40 +0000 Ben Hutchings wrote:> On Sat, 2011-02-19 at 13:12 -0500, Michael Gilbert wrote: > [...] > > Also, this solution isn''t just about CUT stability. As I''ve been > > describing, it is about killing about 2 birds with one stone: > > > > 1. Make testing always installable by retaining a stable/well-tested > > kernel and associated d-i infrastructure > > We do backport new hardware support to stable but we do not have the > resources (time and equipment) to cover everything. So this would mean > that neither stable nor testing would be installable on some newer > hardware.Right, and in those rare cases, the user will have to sufficiently educate themselves to be able to use unstable.> > 2. Improve testing security by reducing the amount of vulnerabilities > > existent in older kernels (roughly 67% fewer in 2.6.32 vs 2.6.37 as > > described previously) > > Huh? I don''t see any source for this figure.http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/cut-team/2011-February/000193.html http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/cut-team/2011-February/000194.html> [...] > > > (which is also important for new hardware support). > > > > This seems to be a meme that continues to persist without much in the > > way of evidence. It certainly may have been true in the past, but I > > think things have changed for the better with the advent of stable > > upstream support (i.e. support for new hardware is backported to the > > stable kernels). > > > > Also, I''ve read about 10 reviews of squeeze, and none of them have > > indicated any problems with hardware support (except for missing > > support for non-free firmware) even though that uses a kernel initially > > released almost a year and a half ago. > [...] > > I can assure you there is already a substantial backlog of new hardware > that is currently unsupported in squeeze. For example, any current ATI > graphics chip. And this is at the start of squeeze''s lifetime, not the > end.I''ve been using ati cards exclusively for some time now; although I''ve also been willing to install the fglrx driver for full support ;) Also, the xorg vesa driver does work. Again, if the user is interested in such new developments, they will need to be willing to learn how to run an unstable system. Best wishes, Mike
Ben Hutchings
2011-Feb-19 19:32 UTC
[Secure-testing-team] [cut-team] For discussion: security support strategy for the wheezy kernel
On Sat, 2011-02-19 at 14:04 -0500, Michael Gilbert wrote:> On Sat, 19 Feb 2011 18:48:40 +0000 Ben Hutchings wrote: > > > On Sat, 2011-02-19 at 13:12 -0500, Michael Gilbert wrote:[...]> > > 2. Improve testing security by reducing the amount of vulnerabilities > > > existent in older kernels (roughly 67% fewer in 2.6.32 vs 2.6.37 as > > > described previously) > > > > Huh? I don''t see any source for this figure. > > http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/cut-team/2011-February/000193.html > http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/cut-team/2011-February/000194.htmlI read those and I can''t see any source for comparison between 2.6.32 and 2.6.37. In fact you say that ''squeeze (2.6.32) was vulnerable to 98% (51 out of 52)'' which implies only 2% fewer vulnerabilities.> > [...] > > > > (which is also important for new hardware support). > > > > > > This seems to be a meme that continues to persist without much in the > > > way of evidence. It certainly may have been true in the past, but I > > > think things have changed for the better with the advent of stable > > > upstream support (i.e. support for new hardware is backported to the > > > stable kernels). > > > > > > Also, I''ve read about 10 reviews of squeeze, and none of them have > > > indicated any problems with hardware support (except for missing > > > support for non-free firmware) even though that uses a kernel initially > > > released almost a year and a half ago. > > [...] > > > > I can assure you there is already a substantial backlog of new hardware > > that is currently unsupported in squeeze. For example, any current ATI > > graphics chip. And this is at the start of squeeze''s lifetime, not the > > end. > > I''ve been using ati cards exclusively for some time now; although I''ve > also been willing to install the fglrx driver for full support ;)Then I really can''t take your concern for security seriously. The changelog for fglrx-source has no mention of security fixes, and I don''t for one moment believe there are no vulnerabilities in it.> Also, the xorg vesa driver does work.Seems like a waste of money to buy an ATI card and then use it as a dumb framebuffer.> Again, if the user is interested in such new developments, they will > need to be willing to learn how to run an unstable system.I thought that users interested in new stuff were supposed to run CUT. Ben. -- Ben Hutchings Once a job is fouled up, anything done to improve it makes it worse. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 828 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part URL: <http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/secure-testing-team/attachments/20110219/dbf12abe/attachment.pgp>
Michael Gilbert
2011-Feb-19 19:59 UTC
[Secure-testing-team] [cut-team] For discussion: security support strategy for the wheezy kernel
On Sat, 19 Feb 2011 19:32:08 +0000 Ben Hutchings wrote:> On Sat, 2011-02-19 at 14:04 -0500, Michael Gilbert wrote: > > On Sat, 19 Feb 2011 18:48:40 +0000 Ben Hutchings wrote: > > > > > On Sat, 2011-02-19 at 13:12 -0500, Michael Gilbert wrote: > [...] > > > > 2. Improve testing security by reducing the amount of vulnerabilities > > > > existent in older kernels (roughly 67% fewer in 2.6.32 vs 2.6.37 as > > > > described previously) > > > > > > Huh? I don''t see any source for this figure. > > > > http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/cut-team/2011-February/000193.html > > http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/cut-team/2011-February/000194.html > > I read those and I can''t see any source for comparison between 2.6.32 > and 2.6.37. In fact you say that ''squeeze (2.6.32) was vulnerable to > 98% (51 out of 52)'' which implies only 2% fewer vulnerabilities.I suppose the way I said that is confusing. That research was from past results, and my latest statement is a projection based on the past. In other words, if lenny was vulnerable to 67% of the issues that squeeze was, I''m projecting that it will be similar for squeeze: it will be vulnerable to about 67% of the issues that wheezy will; although that could be +-10%, +-20%, who knows since events have yet to happen.> > I''ve been using ati cards exclusively for some time now; although I''ve > > also been willing to install the fglrx driver for full support ;) > > Then I really can''t take your concern for security seriously. The > changelog for fglrx-source has no mention of security fixes, and I don''t > for one moment believe there are no vulnerabilities in it.Well, that''s a risk I''m willing to accept for myself. Others may have a differing perspective, and that''s fine. My risk mitigation strategy should have nothing to do with the rest of the project''s.> > Also, the xorg vesa driver does work. > > Seems like a waste of money to buy an ATI card and then use it as a dumb > framebuffer.Not all ati cards are top of the line, and not all users need 3D anyway.> > Again, if the user is interested in such new developments, they will > > need to be willing to learn how to run an unstable system. > > I thought that users interested in new stuff were supposed to run CUT.Most packages will in fact be new, just the kernel and reverse dependencies will be held back. Hence CUT users will get 99% new stuff (with respect to stable), and a tiny bit held back simply for stability. Like I''ve said a couple times now, its a balancing act. All I''m asking for is a few month long experiment. And if the experiment shows signs of flaws/weaknesses, then the blocker can certainly be lifted. Best wishes, Mike
Michael Gilbert
2011-Feb-19 20:25 UTC
[Secure-testing-team] [cut-team] For discussion: security support strategy for the wheezy kernel
On Sat, 19 Feb 2011 14:59:27 -0500 Michael Gilbert wrote:> On Sat, 19 Feb 2011 19:32:08 +0000 Ben Hutchings wrote: > > > On Sat, 2011-02-19 at 14:04 -0500, Michael Gilbert wrote: > > > On Sat, 19 Feb 2011 18:48:40 +0000 Ben Hutchings wrote: > > > > > > > On Sat, 2011-02-19 at 13:12 -0500, Michael Gilbert wrote: > > [...] > > > > > 2. Improve testing security by reducing the amount of vulnerabilities > > > > > existent in older kernels (roughly 67% fewer in 2.6.32 vs 2.6.37 as > > > > > described previously) > > > > > > > > Huh? I don''t see any source for this figure. > > > > > > http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/cut-team/2011-February/000193.html > > > http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/cut-team/2011-February/000194.html > > > > I read those and I can''t see any source for comparison between 2.6.32 > > and 2.6.37. In fact you say that ''squeeze (2.6.32) was vulnerable to > > 98% (51 out of 52)'' which implies only 2% fewer vulnerabilities. > > I suppose the way I said that is confusing. That research was from > past results, and my latest statement is a projection based on the > past. In other words, if lenny was vulnerable to 67% of the issues that > squeeze was, I''m projecting that it will be similar for squeeze: it > will be vulnerable to about 67% of the issues that wheezy will; > although that could be +-10%, +-20%, who knows since events have yet > to happen.I still think I''ve written this confusingly. Let me try one more time. Over squeeze''s testing period, the stable kernel (2.6.26) was vulnerable to roughly 67% of the issues that the testing kernels (2.6.28-32) were vulnerable to. Hence projecting for the future, over wheezy''s testing period, the stable kernel (2.6.32) will be vulnerable to roughly 67% (+- some uncertainty value) of the issues that the testing kernels (2.6.37-4x) will be vulnerable to. Best wishes, Mike
Ben Hutchings
2011-Feb-19 20:30 UTC
[Secure-testing-team] [cut-team] For discussion: security support strategy for the wheezy kernel
On Sat, 2011-02-19 at 14:59 -0500, Michael Gilbert wrote:> On Sat, 19 Feb 2011 19:32:08 +0000 Ben Hutchings wrote:[...]> > > Again, if the user is interested in such new developments, they will > > > need to be willing to learn how to run an unstable system. > > > > I thought that users interested in new stuff were supposed to run CUT. > > Most packages will in fact be new, just the kernel and reverse > dependencies will be held back. Hence CUT users will get 99% new > stuff (with respect to stable), and a tiny bit held back simply for > stability. Like I''ve said a couple times now, its a balancing act. > > All I''m asking for is a few month long experiment. And if the > experiment shows signs of flaws/weaknesses, then the blocker can > certainly be lifted.If an experiment is to have any validity, the hypothesis and the criteria for assessing the outcome must be decided in advance. If you can do that, perhaps you will persuade some people that this is worth doing. Ben. -- Ben Hutchings Once a job is fouled up, anything done to improve it makes it worse. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 828 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part URL: <http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/secure-testing-team/attachments/20110219/718c6302/attachment.pgp>
Michael Gilbert
2011-Feb-19 20:55 UTC
[Secure-testing-team] [cut-team] For discussion: security support strategy for the wheezy kernel
On Sat, 19 Feb 2011 20:30:47 +0000 Ben Hutchings wrote:> On Sat, 2011-02-19 at 14:59 -0500, Michael Gilbert wrote: > > On Sat, 19 Feb 2011 19:32:08 +0000 Ben Hutchings wrote: > [...] > > > > Again, if the user is interested in such new developments, they will > > > > need to be willing to learn how to run an unstable system. > > > > > > I thought that users interested in new stuff were supposed to run CUT. > > > > Most packages will in fact be new, just the kernel and reverse > > dependencies will be held back. Hence CUT users will get 99% new > > stuff (with respect to stable), and a tiny bit held back simply for > > stability. Like I''ve said a couple times now, its a balancing act. > > > > All I''m asking for is a few month long experiment. And if the > > experiment shows signs of flaws/weaknesses, then the blocker can > > certainly be lifted. > > If an experiment is to have any validity, the hypothesis and the > criteria for assessing the outcome must be decided in advance. If you > can do that, perhaps you will persuade some people that this is worth > doing.Hypothesis 1: using an older kernel in testing results in fewer vulnerabilities Criteria: fewer vulnerabilities in lenny than squeeze during squeeze testing cycle Evidence: lenny''s kernel was vulnerable to 67% of the vulnerabilities that squeeze Conclusion: hypothesis verified Criteria: fewer vulnerabilities in squeeze than wheezy during wheezy testing cycle Evidence: to be collected # vulnerabilities in squeeze and wheezy Conclusion: to be determined Hypothesis 2: using an older kernel version makes less work to provide CUT Criteria: how often CUT target release date is met Evidence: to be collected monthly release date by retaining 2.6.32 and monthly for standard unstable->testing transitions (note: requires a 2.6.32-only period for reference) Conclusion: to be determined I can''t imagine anyone else being put through such a arduous process to try an experiment for a couple months. Why does it have to be so difficult? Best wishes, Mike
Bastian Blank
2011-Feb-19 21:28 UTC
[Secure-testing-team] [cut-team] For discussion: security support strategy for the wheezy kernel
On Sat, Feb 19, 2011 at 03:55:03PM -0500, Michael Gilbert wrote:> Hypothesis 1: using an older kernel in testing results in fewer vulnerabilities > > Criteria: fewer vulnerabilities in lenny than squeeze during squeeze testing cycle > Evidence: lenny''s kernel was vulnerable to 67% of the vulnerabilities that squeeze > Conclusion: hypothesis verifiedActually you did not yet proof this. Please do it.> Criteria: fewer vulnerabilities in squeeze than wheezy during wheezy testing cycle > Evidence: to be collected # vulnerabilities in squeeze and wheezy > Conclusion: to be determined > > Hypothesis 2: using an older kernel version makes less work to provide CUT > > Criteria: how often CUT target release date is met > Evidence: to be collected monthly release date by retaining 2.6.32 and monthly > for standard unstable->testing transitions > (note: requires a 2.6.32-only period for reference) > Conclusion: to be determinedHypothesis 3: Testing users wants old software Criteria: to be determined Evidence: easy Conclusion: sorry, no chance> I can''t imagine anyone else being put through such a arduous process > to try an experiment for a couple months. Why does it have to be so > difficult?You can run you little experiment. For blocking packages please persuade the release team as responsible entity within Debian. Bastian -- The joys of love made her human and the agonies of love destroyed her. -- Spock, "Requiem for Methuselah", stardate 5842.8
Ben Hutchings
2011-Feb-19 21:39 UTC
[Secure-testing-team] [cut-team] For discussion: security support strategy for the wheezy kernel
On Sat, 2011-02-19 at 15:55 -0500, Michael Gilbert wrote:> On Sat, 19 Feb 2011 20:30:47 +0000 Ben Hutchings wrote: > > > On Sat, 2011-02-19 at 14:59 -0500, Michael Gilbert wrote: > > > On Sat, 19 Feb 2011 19:32:08 +0000 Ben Hutchings wrote: > > [...] > > > > > Again, if the user is interested in such new developments, they will > > > > > need to be willing to learn how to run an unstable system. > > > > > > > > I thought that users interested in new stuff were supposed to run CUT. > > > > > > Most packages will in fact be new, just the kernel and reverse > > > dependencies will be held back. Hence CUT users will get 99% new > > > stuff (with respect to stable), and a tiny bit held back simply for > > > stability. Like I''ve said a couple times now, its a balancing act. > > > > > > All I''m asking for is a few month long experiment. And if the > > > experiment shows signs of flaws/weaknesses, then the blocker can > > > certainly be lifted. > > > > If an experiment is to have any validity, the hypothesis and the > > criteria for assessing the outcome must be decided in advance. If you > > can do that, perhaps you will persuade some people that this is worth > > doing. > > Hypothesis 1: using an older kernel in testing results in fewer vulnerabilities > > Criteria: fewer vulnerabilities in lenny than squeeze during squeeze testing cycle > Evidence: lenny''s kernel was vulnerable to 67% of the vulnerabilities that squeeze > Conclusion: hypothesis verified > > Criteria: fewer vulnerabilities in squeeze than wheezy during wheezy testing cycle > Evidence: to be collected # vulnerabilities in squeeze and wheezy > Conclusion: to be determinedThis experiment does not require that the propagation of kernel packages into testing is changed.> Hypothesis 2: using an older kernel version makes less work to provide CUT > > Criteria: how often CUT target release date is met > Evidence: to be collected monthly release date by retaining 2.6.32 and monthly > for standard unstable->testing transitions > (note: requires a 2.6.32-only period for reference) > Conclusion: to be determinedOK, that''s a real experiment. However I suspect there will be many confounding factors that make it difficult to single out any one cause for delays.> I can''t imagine anyone else being put through such a arduous process > to try an experiment for a couple months. Why does it have to be so > difficult?Because this experiment would involve many thousands of users, and you have to convince other developers that the benefit to these users may be worth the cost. Ben. -- Ben Hutchings Once a job is fouled up, anything done to improve it makes it worse. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 828 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part URL: <http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/secure-testing-team/attachments/20110219/422f63ce/attachment.pgp>
Michael Gilbert
2011-Feb-19 21:58 UTC
[Secure-testing-team] [cut-team] For discussion: security support strategy for the wheezy kernel
On Sat, 19 Feb 2011 22:28:17 +0100 Bastian Blank wrote:> On Sat, Feb 19, 2011 at 03:55:03PM -0500, Michael Gilbert wrote: > > Hypothesis 1: using an older kernel in testing results in fewer vulnerabilities > > > > Criteria: fewer vulnerabilities in lenny than squeeze during squeeze testing cycle > > Evidence: lenny''s kernel was vulnerable to 67% of the vulnerabilities that squeeze > > Conclusion: hypothesis verified > > Actually you did not yet proof this. Please do it.I did verify it for the timeframe of the LWN study. Actually, there is no such thing as a proof ; I suppose I could do a more thorough study using the detailed kernel-sec data over the entire squeeze development cycle...but that may take a while since I don''t have much free time any more.> > Criteria: fewer vulnerabilities in squeeze than wheezy during wheezy testing cycle > > Evidence: to be collected # vulnerabilities in squeeze and wheezy > > Conclusion: to be determined > > > > Hypothesis 2: using an older kernel version makes less work to provide CUT > > > > Criteria: how often CUT target release date is met > > Evidence: to be collected monthly release date by retaining 2.6.32 and monthly > > for standard unstable->testing transitions > > (note: requires a 2.6.32-only period for reference) > > Conclusion: to be determined > > Hypothesis 3: Testing users wants old software > > Criteria: to be determined > Evidence: easy > Conclusion: sorry, no chanceUsers have a variety of desires. It''s the developers job to make the best overall decision regardless of users'' immediate demands. The release team fights with this all the time during the freeze (users want new software, but the risk of breakage outweighs their immediate wants).> > I can''t imagine anyone else being put through such a arduous process > > to try an experiment for a couple months. Why does it have to be so > > difficult? > > You can run you little experiment. For blocking packages please persuade > the release team as responsible entity within Debian.Isn''t it the kernel team that I need to convince? That''s what this discussion is all about. Thanks, Mike
Michael Gilbert
2011-Feb-19 22:40 UTC
[Secure-testing-team] [cut-team] For discussion: security support strategy for the wheezy kernel
On Sat, 19 Feb 2011 21:39:03 +0000 Ben Hutchings wrote:> > Hypothesis 1: using an older kernel in testing results in fewer vulnerabilities > > > > Criteria: fewer vulnerabilities in lenny than squeeze during squeeze testing cycle > > Evidence: lenny''s kernel was vulnerable to 67% of the vulnerabilities that squeeze > > Conclusion: hypothesis verified > > > > Criteria: fewer vulnerabilities in squeeze than wheezy during wheezy testing cycle > > Evidence: to be collected # vulnerabilities in squeeze and wheezy > > Conclusion: to be determined > > This experiment does not require that the propagation of kernel packages > into testing is changed.OK, revised hypothesis 1: using 2.6.32 in wheezy for the first year of its development will result in fewer vulnerabilities Criteria: fewer vulnerabilities in wheezy/2.6.32 vs unstable kernel over 1 year period Evidence: to be collected # vulnerabilities affecting 2.6.32 and kernel in unstable at the same time Conclusion: to be determined> > I can''t imagine anyone else being put through such a arduous process > > to try an experiment for a couple months. Why does it have to be so > > difficult? > > Because this experiment would involve many thousands of users, and you > have to convince other developers that the benefit to these users may be > worth the cost.OK, are you sufficiently convinced to give me a chance at this experiment, at least for a couple months??? Best wishes, Mike
Bastian Blank
2011-Feb-19 23:25 UTC
[Secure-testing-team] [cut-team] For discussion: security support strategy for the wheezy kernel
On Sat, Feb 19, 2011 at 04:58:50PM -0500, Michael Gilbert wrote:> On Sat, 19 Feb 2011 22:28:17 +0100 Bastian Blank wrote: > > On Sat, Feb 19, 2011 at 03:55:03PM -0500, Michael Gilbert wrote: > > > Hypothesis 1: using an older kernel in testing results in fewer vulnerabilities > > > Evidence: lenny''s kernel was vulnerable to 67% of the vulnerabilities that squeeze > > Actually you did not yet proof this. Please do it. > I did verify it for the timeframe of the LWN study.The LWN study is for a wrong time frame. We speak about .26-.32 here, not .33-.36. Also it does not take stable kernel releases into account.> > Hypothesis 3: Testing users wants old software > > Criteria: to be determined > > Evidence: easy > > Conclusion: sorry, no chance > Users have a variety of desires.Yes. Stable users uses stable. So you have to show that a majority of users uses testing not to get new hardware support/new software.> > > I can''t imagine anyone else being put through such a arduous process > > > to try an experiment for a couple months. Why does it have to be so > > > difficult? > > You can run you little experiment. For blocking packages please persuade > > the release team as responsible entity within Debian. > Isn''t it the kernel team that I need to convince? That''s what this > discussion is all about.You were not able to convince one person of the kernel team. And I still don''t see what this experiment would provide for the _users_ (I explicitely exclude your effort, because our priority are the users and not your experiment). Bastian -- Time is fluid ... like a river with currents, eddies, backwash. -- Spock, "The City on the Edge of Forever", stardate 3134.0
Lucas Nussbaum
2011-Feb-20 07:24 UTC
[Secure-testing-team] [cut-team] For discussion: security support strategy for the wheezy kernel
On 19/02/11 at 17:40 -0500, Michael Gilbert wrote:> On Sat, 19 Feb 2011 21:39:03 +0000 Ben Hutchings wrote: > > > Hypothesis 1: using an older kernel in testing results in fewer vulnerabilities > > > > > > Criteria: fewer vulnerabilities in lenny than squeeze during squeeze testing cycle > > > Evidence: lenny''s kernel was vulnerable to 67% of the vulnerabilities that squeeze > > > Conclusion: hypothesis verified > > > > > > Criteria: fewer vulnerabilities in squeeze than wheezy during wheezy testing cycle > > > Evidence: to be collected # vulnerabilities in squeeze and wheezy > > > Conclusion: to be determined > > > > This experiment does not require that the propagation of kernel packages > > into testing is changed. > > OK, revised hypothesis 1: using 2.6.32 in wheezy for the first year of its development > will result in fewer vulnerabilities > > Criteria: fewer vulnerabilities in wheezy/2.6.32 vs unstable kernel over 1 year period > Evidence: to be collected # vulnerabilities affecting 2.6.32 and kernel in > unstable at the same time > Conclusion: to be determined > > > > I can''t imagine anyone else being put through such a arduous process > > > to try an experiment for a couple months. Why does it have to be so > > > difficult? > > > > Because this experiment would involve many thousands of users, and you > > have to convince other developers that the benefit to these users may be > > worth the cost. > > OK, are you sufficiently convinced to give me a chance at this > experiment, at least for a couple months???I don''t understand why you think that testing or CUT users want an "old" kernel, but want to run recent software for everything else on their system. Also, you need to see the downsides of this proposed experiment. By not upgrading the kernel in testing, you will limit the amount of testing that the new kernel will receive. That could, in turn, cause more bugs to be found late in the wheezy release process, making it harder to reach a newer stable kernel. Or are you suggesting that we stay with 2.6.32 forever? ;) - Lucas
Michael Gilbert
2011-Feb-20 21:29 UTC
[Secure-testing-team] [cut-team] For discussion: security support strategy for the wheezy kernel
On Sun, 20 Feb 2011 08:24:32 +0100 Lucas Nussbaum wrote:> On 19/02/11 at 17:40 -0500, Michael Gilbert wrote: > > On Sat, 19 Feb 2011 21:39:03 +0000 Ben Hutchings wrote: > > > > Hypothesis 1: using an older kernel in testing results in fewer vulnerabilities > > > > > > > > Criteria: fewer vulnerabilities in lenny than squeeze during squeeze testing cycle > > > > Evidence: lenny''s kernel was vulnerable to 67% of the vulnerabilities that squeeze > > > > Conclusion: hypothesis verified > > > > > > > > Criteria: fewer vulnerabilities in squeeze than wheezy during wheezy testing cycle > > > > Evidence: to be collected # vulnerabilities in squeeze and wheezy > > > > Conclusion: to be determined > > > > > > This experiment does not require that the propagation of kernel packages > > > into testing is changed. > > > > OK, revised hypothesis 1: using 2.6.32 in wheezy for the first year of its development > > will result in fewer vulnerabilities > > > > Criteria: fewer vulnerabilities in wheezy/2.6.32 vs unstable kernel over 1 year period > > Evidence: to be collected # vulnerabilities affecting 2.6.32 and kernel in > > unstable at the same time > > Conclusion: to be determined > > > > > > I can''t imagine anyone else being put through such a arduous process > > > > to try an experiment for a couple months. Why does it have to be so > > > > difficult? > > > > > > Because this experiment would involve many thousands of users, and you > > > have to convince other developers that the benefit to these users may be > > > worth the cost. > > > > OK, are you sufficiently convinced to give me a chance at this > > experiment, at least for a couple months??? > > I don''t understand why you think that testing or CUT users want an "old" > kernel, but want to run recent software for everything else on their > system.I''ve already answered that in another mail. But basically the answer is a transition to unstable for users that *don''t want* the older/stabler kernel. Of course that does require users to change their ways, but that''s not so bad. In fact it may be good to have more users running unstable, finding bugs, and submitting reports.> Also, you need to see the downsides of this proposed experiment. By not > upgrading the kernel in testing, you will limit the amount of testing > that the new kernel will receive. That could, in turn, cause more bugs > to be found late in the wheezy release process, making it harder to > reach a newer stable kernel. > Or are you suggesting that we stay with 2.6.32 forever? ;)Of course not ;) I actually think there are a lot of people using unstable, and those are really the best users to find bugs in the kernel anyway (since presumably they actually know what they are doing). I suppose that would be an alternative hypothesis: keeping 2.6.32 in testing for too long will lead to a lower quality final wheezy kernel. That''s more of a subjective/qualitative issue, and I don''t really know how to define criteria to quantify it. But like I said, in my opinion unstable users are sufficient to work out the bugs. Best wishes, Mike