Author: nion Date: 2009-08-11 18:43:00 +0000 (Tue, 11 Aug 2009) New Revision: 12566 Modified: data/CVE/list Log: track new wordpress issue Modified: data/CVE/list ==================================================================--- data/CVE/list 2009-08-11 18:22:31 UTC (rev 12565) +++ data/CVE/list 2009-08-11 18:43:00 UTC (rev 12566) @@ -1,3 +1,8 @@ +CVE-2009-XXXX [wordpress password reset] + - wordpress <unfixed> (unimportant; bug #541102) + [lenny] - wordpress <no-dsa> (Minor issue) + [etch] - wordpress <no-dsa> (Minor issue) + NOTE: not really a security issue in my opinion, just an annoying bug CVE-2009-XXXX [libxerces2-java: xml-based firewall bypass / port scanning] - libxerces2-java <unfixed> (low; bug #540862) [etch] - libxerces2-java <no-dsa> (minor issue)
Michael S. Gilbert
2009-Aug-11 19:13 UTC
[Secure-testing-team] [Secure-testing-commits] r12566 - data/CVE
On Tue, 11 Aug 2009 18:43:00 +0000, Nico Golde wrote:> Author: nion > Date: 2009-08-11 18:43:00 +0000 (Tue, 11 Aug 2009) > New Revision: 12566 > > Modified: > data/CVE/list > Log: > track new wordpress issue > > Modified: data/CVE/list > ==================================================================> --- data/CVE/list 2009-08-11 18:22:31 UTC (rev 12565) > +++ data/CVE/list 2009-08-11 18:43:00 UTC (rev 12566) > @@ -1,3 +1,8 @@ > +CVE-2009-XXXX [wordpress password reset] > + - wordpress <unfixed> (unimportant; bug #541102) > + [lenny] - wordpress <no-dsa> (Minor issue) > + [etch] - wordpress <no-dsa> (Minor issue) > + NOTE: not really a security issue in my opinion, just an annoying bugi think there is some concern here. if i were running wordpress, i would not want an attacker to be able change my account''s password without authentication. although, the question is, what can the attacker do once they have access to a wordpress account? not a whole lot; just use wordpress''s functionality. i would say we should want to fix it and probably push out updates in ospu/spu''s. mike
Giuseppe Iuculano
2009-Aug-12 04:20 UTC
[Secure-testing-team] [Secure-testing-commits] r12566 - data/CVE
Michael S. Gilbert ha scritto:> although, the question is, what can the attacker do once they have > access to a wordpress account?Note that attacker do not have access to a wordpress account, he can only send the reset password in admin email. Cheers, Giuseppe -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 197 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature URL: <http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/secure-testing-team/attachments/20090812/bcf872ea/attachment.pgp>
Michael S. Gilbert
2009-Aug-12 05:03 UTC
[Secure-testing-team] [Secure-testing-commits] r12566 - data/CVE
On Wed, 12 Aug 2009 06:20:25 +0200 Giuseppe Iuculano wrote:> Michael S. Gilbert ha scritto: > > > although, the question is, what can the attacker do once they have > > access to a wordpress account? > > Note that attacker do not have access to a wordpress account, he can only send > the reset password in admin email.if the attacker can send a password reset request, they can then change the password, right? or does that just send an email back to the valid user? if that''s the case, then yes, the worst is that someone could do is cause some annoyance by generating those mails. note that fedora pushed updates for this today, so they must consider it to be of worthwhile concern. not that we should view their opinion as definitive, but it is more evidence that this is a real issue. mike
Nico Golde
2009-Aug-12 12:19 UTC
[Secure-testing-team] [Secure-testing-commits] r12566 - data/CVE
Hi, * Michael S. Gilbert <michael.s.gilbert at gmail.com> [2009-08-11 21:37]:> On Tue, 11 Aug 2009 18:43:00 +0000, Nico Golde wrote: > > Author: nion > > Date: 2009-08-11 18:43:00 +0000 (Tue, 11 Aug 2009) > > New Revision: 12566 > > > > Modified: > > data/CVE/list > > Log: > > track new wordpress issue > > > > Modified: data/CVE/list > > ==================================================================> > --- data/CVE/list 2009-08-11 18:22:31 UTC (rev 12565) > > +++ data/CVE/list 2009-08-11 18:43:00 UTC (rev 12566) > > @@ -1,3 +1,8 @@ > > +CVE-2009-XXXX [wordpress password reset] > > + - wordpress <unfixed> (unimportant; bug #541102) > > + [lenny] - wordpress <no-dsa> (Minor issue) > > + [etch] - wordpress <no-dsa> (Minor issue) > > + NOTE: not really a security issue in my opinion, just an annoying bug > > i think there is some concern here. if i were running wordpress, i > would not want an attacker to be able change my account''s password > without authentication.Guessing an email address is also not authentication. There is no security issue here, it''s a bug, yes an annoying one but nothing more.> although, the question is, what can the attacker do once they have > access to a wordpress account? not a whole lot; just use wordpress''s > functionality. i would say we should want to fix it and probably push > out updates in ospu/spu''s.I don''t get your point, there is no account compromising here. If there would be editing other peoples entries can be damage as well, e.g. in business environments. Cheers Nico -- Nico Golde - http://www.ngolde.de - nion at jabber.ccc.de - GPG: 0xA0A0AAAA For security reasons, all text in this mail is double-rot13 encrypted. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 197 bytes Desc: not available URL: <http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/secure-testing-team/attachments/20090812/23ec027b/attachment.pgp>
Nico Golde
2009-Aug-12 12:21 UTC
[Secure-testing-team] [Secure-testing-commits] r12566 - data/CVE
Hi, * Michael S. Gilbert <michael.s.gilbert at gmail.com> [2009-08-12 11:58]:> On Wed, 12 Aug 2009 06:20:25 +0200 Giuseppe Iuculano wrote: > > Michael S. Gilbert ha scritto: > > > > > although, the question is, what can the attacker do once they have > > > access to a wordpress account? > > > > Note that attacker do not have access to a wordpress account, he can only send > > the reset password in admin email. > > if the attacker can send a password reset request, they can then change > the password, right? or does that just send an email back to the valid > user? if that''s the case, then yes, the worst is that someone could do > is cause some annoyance by generating those mails.Are you analysing the vulnerability you are tracking in the tracker or what? Sorry these discussions become pretty annoying and time consuming. Read the advisory and the code and you will see that this is not a reset in the meaning of an admin having a blank password after it. Fix some code and work on patches instead, way more useful.> note that fedora pushed updates for this today, so they must consider > it to be of worthwhile concern.Who cares... [...] Cheers Nico (annoyed) -- Nico Golde - http://www.ngolde.de - nion at jabber.ccc.de - GPG: 0xA0A0AAAA For security reasons, all text in this mail is double-rot13 encrypted. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 197 bytes Desc: not available URL: <http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/secure-testing-team/attachments/20090812/6492c631/attachment.pgp>
Michael S. Gilbert
2009-Aug-12 16:00 UTC
[Secure-testing-team] [Secure-testing-commits] r12566 - data/CVE
On Wed, 12 Aug 2009 14:21:33 +0200, Nico Golde wrote:> Hi, > * Michael S. Gilbert <michael.s.gilbert at gmail.com> [2009-08-12 11:58]: > > On Wed, 12 Aug 2009 06:20:25 +0200 Giuseppe Iuculano wrote: > > > Michael S. Gilbert ha scritto: > > > > > > > although, the question is, what can the attacker do once they have > > > > access to a wordpress account? > > > > > > Note that attacker do not have access to a wordpress account, he can only send > > > the reset password in admin email. > > > > if the attacker can send a password reset request, they can then change > > the password, right? or does that just send an email back to the valid > > user? if that''s the case, then yes, the worst is that someone could do > > is cause some annoyance by generating those mails. > > Are you analysing the vulnerability you are tracking in the > tracker or what? Sorry these discussions become pretty > annoying and time consuming. Read the advisory and the code > and you will see that this is not a reset in the meaning of > an admin having a blank password after it.ok, so there was some conflicting information in some of the discussion, which lead me to believe account compromise was possible. it''s clear now that this is not the case.> Fix some code and work on patches instead, way more useful.i generated patches for poppler, and no one cared to respond... mike