Stefan Fritsch
2006-Mar-13 12:28 UTC
[Secure-testing-team] Debian Security Analyzer (debsecan)
Hi Florian,> I''ve hacked something to check installed packages against the > vulnerability database.this is nice. A suggestion: it should not print packages that are in state "deinstall ok config-files" (at least not by default). Cheers, Stefan
Florian Weimer wrote:> I''ve hacked something to check installed packages against the > vulnerability database. It''s similar to the tsck script, but should > handle all package annotations correctly. Most of the logic is > server-side; debsecan downloads a compressed, release-specific > vulnerability list. > > Currently, there''s only a darcs repository. Get it and test it: > > $ darcs get http://darcs.enyo.de/fw/debian/debsecan/debian debsecan > $ python debsecan/src/debsecan --suite sid > > (Or sarge or etch, as needed.) > > Comments and suggestions are welcome. This tool is still in a very > early stage, but I guess it''s already pretty useful.Very nice. You plan to upload the deb soon? It might be good to either move at least the files debsecan uses to a debian.org machine, or add a debian.net address for it, so that the url it downloads from is more under debian''s control. Could it also list unfixed vulnerabilities? -- see shy jo -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 189 bytes Desc: Digital signature Url : http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/secure-testing-team/attachments/20051214/58e1e6f5/attachment.pgp
Florian Weimer
2006-Mar-13 12:28 UTC
[Secure-testing-team] Debian Security Analyzer (debsecan)
* Joey Hess:> Very nice. You plan to upload the deb soon?First I want to make sure that the data format is adequate. I''ll know a couple of days.> It might be good to either move at least the files debsecan uses to a > debian.org machine, or add a debian.net address for it, so that the url > it downloads from is more under debian''s control.I''m fine with a delegation from debian.org or debian.net (or a CNAME, if delegation is impossible), but a hard-coded A RR is not acceptable. IIRC, the debian.org hostmaster is pretty unresponsive -- and pulling the A record might be necessary if the service becomes too popular. We could distribute the files over the secure-testing mirrors, though. (Unfortunately, generating them requires 500+ MB for the package file mirror, and quite a few CPU cycles. It''s not a straight translation of the data/*/list files, I''m afraid.)> Could it also list unfixed vulnerabilities?Ah, this was a typo on the server side. Should be back to normal again. I''ve implemented the opposite, so that you can say something like this: # apt-get install $(debsecan --suite sid --format packages --only-fixed) And you''ll download only new versions of those packages which have security fixes. This should also work for the other suites, but all this version tracking is a bit scary. (BTW, --only-fixed is the main reason why the package file mirror is needed.)
Florian Weimer
2006-Mar-13 12:28 UTC
[Secure-testing-team] Debian Security Analyzer (debsecan)
I''ve hacked something to check installed packages against the vulnerability database. It''s similar to the tsck script, but should handle all package annotations correctly. Most of the logic is server-side; debsecan downloads a compressed, release-specific vulnerability list. Currently, there''s only a darcs repository. Get it and test it: $ darcs get http://darcs.enyo.de/fw/debian/debsecan/debian debsecan $ python debsecan/src/debsecan --suite sid (Or sarge or etch, as needed.) Comments and suggestions are welcome. This tool is still in a very early stage, but I guess it''s already pretty useful.
Florian Weimer
2006-Mar-13 12:28 UTC
[Secure-testing-team] Debian Security Analyzer (debsecan)
* Stefan Fritsch:> Hi Florian, > >> I''ve hacked something to check installed packages against the >> vulnerability database. > > this is nice.Thanks.> A suggestion: it should not print packages that are in state > "deinstall ok config-files"Fixed, by skipping packages which are not in the "installed" state. (I hope this is okay; theoretically, a vulnerable binary of a half-installed package might be left behind.)
* Moritz Muehlenhoff:> Florian Weimer wrote: >> Test reports welcome. If everything goes well, I''m going to announce >> 0.2 to a wider audience. > > It''s very nice. But the default display should combine reports for > individual binary packages or work on source packages.Source packages are a non-starter because they confuse end users. 8-( I''m going to implement some kind of aggregation in --format report mode, though.
I have uploaded debsecan 0.2. Major changes are: * debsecan 0.1 did not report vulnerability status correctly when a binary package did not match the name of a source package (a rather embarrassing bug, which prompted me to create a proper test suite). * Thanks to Andreas Barth''s kind support, the vulnerability data is now stored on the secure-testing.debian.net infrastructure. * A script to create a randomized cron entry is included ("debsecan-create-cron"). I have discovered how to deal with pinning etc., but this requires quite a bit of additional code on the server side. Implementation will need to wait after christmas, I guess. Another problem has come up: If a binary package is removed (say, libfoo7 is replaced by libfoo8), and the foo source package is fixed, it''s not clear how to deduce that the "fix" is to remove libfoo7 (and not to upgrade it, which is not possible because the archive contains a newer source package, but no binary package). Test reports welcome. If everything goes well, I''m going to announce 0.2 to a wider audience.
Florian Weimer wrote:> Test reports welcome. If everything goes well, I''m going to announce > 0.2 to a wider audience.It''s very nice. But the default display should combine reports for individual binary packages or work on source packages. Right now there dozens of x.org reports for the same three issues. Cheers, Moritz