search for: xored

...m to treat high-order attribute bits as a background color; instead, it apparently always uses black. This means that a background color requested via <SI> in a DISPLAY file is not honored in VGA mode. However, the BIOS supports an "XOR" mode, in which the pixels to be written are XORed with pixels already on the screen (background pixels are left untouched). So, we can get the desired effect by first writing a solid block in the desired background color, followed by XORing in the character to be displayed, using a color which is the XOR of the foreground and background colors....

1) FLAC supports only MSVS 2005 and newer, so (_MSC_VER >= 1400) is always true and can be removed. 2) The argument for FLAC__clz_uint32() is of FLAC__uint32 type, so FLAC__clz_soft_uint32() should have the same argument type. 3) The patch removes unnecessary parentheses around 'word' variable. 4) It also replaces "sizeof(FLAC__uint32) * CHAR_BIT - 1 -

recently, netect / bindview posted a review of the syskey system and how the RC4 cypher stream was reset each time. standard RC4 attack analysis shows that XORing two obfuscated passwords together results in the XOR cypher stream dropping out, and you have the two XORed password. further attack analysis can decrypt the passwords. i am looking to implement an equivalent mechanism to SYSKEY, however i do not have the relevant security skills to say whether a proposal is secure or not. i will outline the requirements, first, and then a possible proposal. 1) the...

If you export two subvolumes of a btrfs filesystem, they will both be given the same uuid so lookups will be confused. blkid cannot differentiate the two, so we must use the fsid from statfs64 to identify the filesystem. We cannot tell if blkid or statfs is best without knowing internal details of the filesystem in question, so we need to encode specific knowledge of btrfs in mountd. This is

...t; > It's not clear to me that making this optional test suite easier to > install on restrictive platforms like Windows with this security > software you mention is worth neutering the ClamAV tests run... Might we also have problems with virus-scanning firewalls? Would it work if we XORed the ClamAV test's inputs with something, and then modified the test to XOR the results of its reads (to undo the transformation). If that is sufficient to get around this issue, then it might be worthwhile. -Hal > _______________________________________________ > LLVM Developers mailin...

Ok. That you for clarifying the point for me. I was primed for a regression because this behavior changed over llvm versions and was causing my tests to fail ;). I'm now doing bitcasting to int, xoring with the signbit and bitcasting back. On Thu, Aug 7, 2014 at 2:59 AM, Owen Anderson <resistor at mac.com> wrote: > Subtraction is also not a correct implementation of negation, for

...; > >> > > Try: > > match u16 0x1a00 0xfff0 > > Mask is first applied to the value in the packet, then it''s tested > against your (0x1a00) value Can you please explain this further? You are saying that its ORed with the value? Or is it ANDed? Or maybe XORed? What operation are they applying to the value? Working from what I have done with other bit masking operations, I am assuming that the mask is ANDed with the value in the packet. Then I would assume you OR the check with the resulting value. But I am not sure. I would expect the mask to be app...

TTA-Based Co-design Environment (TCE) is a toolset for designing application-specific processors (ASP) based on the Transport Triggered Architecture (TTA). The toolset provides a complete retargetable co-design flow from C programs down to synthesizable VHDL and parallel program binaries. Processor customization points include the register files, function units, supported operations, and the

...ear to me that making this optional test suite easier to > > install on restrictive platforms like Windows with this security > > software you mention is worth neutering the ClamAV tests run... > > Might we also have problems with virus-scanning firewalls? Would it work > if we XORed the ClamAV test's inputs with something, and then modified the > test to XOR the results of its reads (to undo the transformation). If that > is sufficient to get around this issue, then it might be worthwhile. > > -Hal > > > _______________________________________________...

...| bit positions." | +------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Resolution | To mitigate this attack, the two values are now XORed | | | together. This will increase the entropy to approximately | | | 2^21, which is far more difficult to predict, especially | | | given that the random number generator is used for other | | | purposes in Asterisk, not just manager HT...

...| bit positions." | +------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Resolution | To mitigate this attack, the two values are now XORed | | | together. This will increase the entropy to approximately | | | 2^21, which is far more difficult to predict, especially | | | given that the random number generator is used for other | | | purposes in Asterisk, not just manager HT...

On Fri, Jun 15, 2012 at 1:53 PM, Mikael Lyngvig <mikael at lyngvig.org> wrote: > 1. I can't tell Microsoft Security Essentials to ignore anything. Even if > I click Allow, it breaks the pull. > 2. The issue is not me. I don't download virus infested stuff and I don't > visit dangerous sites so I rarely have a need for antivirus solutions. > > The issue is the

...to the OpenSSH client (a small amount of code that can be easily audited), and a small modification to the server it will make it possible to use SRP to authenticate on hosts that using an SRP password file. The most difficult aspect of the implimentation is that the SRP negoiated secret should be xored into the key used for SSH channel encryption (this would be rekeying because the ssh encrypted channel is already established at authentication time). This would make passworded SSH almost entirely immune to active MTM in the common case, while not reducing security at all (with the excpetion of p...

Ok, I had forgotten about sNaNs. Doesn't the same caveat apply to 0-sNaN then though or does that not signal? Does that mean we need a separate way to handle negate in the IR? Funnily enough, historically I believe we were using the multiplication by -1.0 because it was a more reliable negation that 0-x (from 3.0 until 3.3 at least). Is there a good reason why multiplication by NaN should kill

1. I can't tell Microsoft Security Essentials to ignore anything. Even if I click Allow, it breaks the pull. 2. The issue is not me. I don't download virus infested stuff and I don't visit dangerous sites so I rarely have a need for antivirus solutions. The issue is the newcomer Windows user whom I have to instruct to disable and/or remove his antivirus program if he or she wants to

...presence or * absence of an underscore before the identifiers 'setmode', --- src/share/replaygain_synthesis/replaygain_synthesis.c-dist 2005-05-25 16:07:23.000000000 +0200 +++ src/share/replaygain_synthesis/replaygain_synthesis.c 2005-05-25 16:07:27.000000000 +0200 @@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ * XORed values of both generators. */ -static unsigned int random_int_() +static unsigned int random_int_(void) { static const unsigned char parity_[256] = { 0,1,1,0,1,0,0,1,1,0,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,0,1,0,1,1,0,0,1,1,0,1,0,0,1, --- src/libFLAC/metadata_iterators.c-dist 2005-05-25 16:07:23.000000000 +0...

"Does raidzN actually protect against bitrot?" That''s a kind of radical, possibly offensive, question formula that I have lately. Reading up on theory of RAID5, I grasped the idea of the write hole (where one of the sectors of the stripe, such as the parity data, doesn''t get written - leading to invalid data upon read). In general, I think the same applies to bitrot of

I am not entirely sure this is safe. Transforming this to an fsub could change the value stored on platforms that implement negates using arithmetic instead of with bitmath (such as ours) and either canonicalize NaNs or don’t support denormals. This is actually important because this kind of bitmath on floats is very commonly used as part of algorithms for complex math functions that need to get