Displaying 20 results from an estimated 25 matches for "vc_slow_virt_to_phi".
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vc_slow_virt_to_phys
2020 May 20
2
[PATCH v3 59/75] x86/sev-es: Handle MONITOR/MONITORX Events
On Tue, Apr 28, 2020 at 05:17:09PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky at amd.com>
>
> Implement a handler for #VC exceptions caused by MONITOR and MONITORX
> instructions.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky at amd.com>
> [ jroedel at suse.de: Adapt to #VC handling infrastructure ]
> Co-developed-by: Joerg Roedel
2020 May 20
2
[PATCH v3 59/75] x86/sev-es: Handle MONITOR/MONITORX Events
On Tue, Apr 28, 2020 at 05:17:09PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky at amd.com>
>
> Implement a handler for #VC exceptions caused by MONITOR and MONITORX
> instructions.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky at amd.com>
> [ jroedel at suse.de: Adapt to #VC handling infrastructure ]
> Co-developed-by: Joerg Roedel
2020 May 20
1
[PATCH v3 51/75] x86/sev-es: Handle MMIO events
On Tue, Apr 28, 2020 at 05:17:01PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky at amd.com>
>
> Add handler for VC exceptions caused by MMIO intercepts. These
> intercepts come along as nested page faults on pages with reserved
> bits set.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky at amd.com>
> [ jroedel at suse.de: Adapt to VC
2020 Jun 11
2
[PATCH v3 59/75] x86/sev-es: Handle MONITOR/MONITORX Events
On Thu, Jun 11, 2020 at 03:10:45PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 11:38:45PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > On Tue, Apr 28, 2020 at 05:17:09PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> > > +static enum es_result vc_handle_monitor(struct ghcb *ghcb,
> > > + struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
> > > +{
> > > + phys_addr_t monitor_pa;
> >
2020 Jun 11
2
[PATCH v3 59/75] x86/sev-es: Handle MONITOR/MONITORX Events
On Thu, Jun 11, 2020 at 03:10:45PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 11:38:45PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > On Tue, Apr 28, 2020 at 05:17:09PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> > > +static enum es_result vc_handle_monitor(struct ghcb *ghcb,
> > > + struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
> > > +{
> > > + phys_addr_t monitor_pa;
> >
2020 Apr 28
0
[PATCH v3 51/75] x86/sev-es: Handle MMIO events
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky at amd.com>
Add handler for VC exceptions caused by MMIO intercepts. These
intercepts come along as nested page faults on pages with reserved
bits set.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky at amd.com>
[ jroedel at suse.de: Adapt to VC handling framework ]
Co-developed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel
2020 Aug 24
0
[PATCH v6 52/76] x86/sev-es: Handle MMIO events
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky at amd.com>
Add handler for VC exceptions caused by MMIO intercepts. These
intercepts come along as nested page faults on pages with reserved
bits set.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky at amd.com>
[ jroedel at suse.de: Adapt to VC handling framework ]
Co-developed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel
2020 Apr 28
0
[PATCH v3 59/75] x86/sev-es: Handle MONITOR/MONITORX Events
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky at amd.com>
Implement a handler for #VC exceptions caused by MONITOR and MONITORX
instructions.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky at amd.com>
[ jroedel at suse.de: Adapt to #VC handling infrastructure ]
Co-developed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
---
2020 Apr 28
0
[PATCH v3 53/75] x86/sev-es: Handle MSR events
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky at amd.com>
Implement a handler for #VC exceptions caused by RDMSR/WRMSR
instructions.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky at amd.com>
[ jroedel at suse.de: Adapt to #VC handling infrastructure ]
Co-developed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
---
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c |
2020 Jun 11
0
[PATCH v3 59/75] x86/sev-es: Handle MONITOR/MONITORX Events
On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 11:38:45PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 28, 2020 at 05:17:09PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> > +static enum es_result vc_handle_monitor(struct ghcb *ghcb,
> > + struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
> > +{
> > + phys_addr_t monitor_pa;
> > + pgd_t *pgd;
> > +
> > + pgd = __va(read_cr3_pa());
> > + monitor_pa =
2020 Jun 11
0
[PATCH v3 59/75] x86/sev-es: Handle MONITOR/MONITORX Events
On 6/11/20 12:13 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 11, 2020 at 03:10:45PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
>> On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 11:38:45PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>>> On Tue, Apr 28, 2020 at 05:17:09PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
>>>> +static enum es_result vc_handle_monitor(struct ghcb *ghcb,
>>>> + struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
2020 Jul 22
0
[PATCH v4 51/75] x86/sev-es: Handle MMIO events
Hi Mike,
On Tue, Jul 21, 2020 at 09:01:44PM +0000, Mike Stunes wrote:
> I?m running into an MMIO-related bug when I try testing this on our hypervisor.
>
> During boot, probe_roms (arch/x86/kernel/probe_roms.c) uses
> romchecksum over the video ROM and extension ROM regions. In my test
> VM, the video ROM romchecksum starts at virtual address
> 0xffff8880000c0000 and has length
2020 Jul 22
0
[PATCH v4 51/75] x86/sev-es: Handle MMIO events
Hmm, I have a theory ...
On Tue, Jul 21, 2020 at 09:01:44PM +0000, Mike Stunes wrote:
> If I remove the call to probe_roms from setup_arch, or remove the calls to romchecksum from probe_roms, this kernel boots normally.
>
> Please let me know of other tests I should run or data that I can collect. Thanks!
... can you please try the attached diff?
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
2020 Apr 28
0
[PATCH v3 74/75] x86/sev-es: Handle NMI State
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
When running under SEV-ES the kernel has to tell the hypervisor when to
open the NMI window again after an NMI was injected. This is done with
an NMI-complete message to the hypervisor.
Add code to the kernels NMI handler to send this message right at the
beginning of do_nmi(). This always allows nesting NMIs.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel
2020 Aug 31
1
[PATCH v6 69/76] x86/realmode: Setup AP jump table
On Mon, Aug 24, 2020 at 10:55:04AM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
> index 8f36ae021a7f..a19ce9681ec2 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
> @@ -84,6 +84,9 @@
> /* SEV-ES software-defined VMGEXIT events */
> #define SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_READ 0x80000001
2020 Apr 28
0
[PATCH v3 69/75] x86/realmode: Setup AP jump table
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky at amd.com>
Setup the AP jump table to point to the SEV-ES trampoline code so that
the APs can boot.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky at amd.com>
[ jroedel at suse.de: - Adapted to different code base
- Moved AP table setup from SIPI sending path to
real-mode setup code
- Fix sparse warnings ]
2020 Aug 24
0
[PATCH v6 69/76] x86/realmode: Setup AP jump table
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky at amd.com>
As part of the GHCB specification, the booting of APs under SEV-ES
requires an AP jump table when transitioning from one layer of code to
another (e.g. when going from UEFI to the OS). As a result, each layer
that parks an AP must provide the physical address of an AP jump table
to the next layer via the hypervisor.
Upon booting of the
2020 Jul 14
92
[PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Hi,
here is the fourth version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches. I
addressed the review comments sent to me for the previous version and
rebased the code v5.8-rc5.
The biggest change in this version is the IST handling code for the
#VC handler. I adapted the entry code for the #VC handler to the big
pile of entry code changes merged into
2020 Jul 14
92
[PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Hi,
here is the fourth version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches. I
addressed the review comments sent to me for the previous version and
rebased the code v5.8-rc5.
The biggest change in this version is the IST handling code for the
#VC handler. I adapted the entry code for the #VC handler to the big
pile of entry code changes merged into
2020 Apr 28
116
[PATCH v3 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
Hi,
here is the next version of changes to enable Linux to run as an SEV-ES
guest. The code was rebased to v5.7-rc3 and got a fair number of changes
since the last version.
What is SEV-ES
==============
SEV-ES is an acronym for 'Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted
State' and means a hardware feature of AMD processors which hides the
register state of VCPUs to the hypervisor by