Displaying 16 results from an estimated 16 matches for "vc_handle_trap_db".
Did you mean:
vc_handle_trap_ac
2020 Jul 15
2
[PATCH v4 63/75] x86/sev-es: Handle #DB Events
...gt;
> lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
> +
> + /*
> + * #DB is special and needs to be handled outside of the intrumentation_begin()/end().
> + * Otherwise the #VC handler could be raised recursivly.
> + */
> + if (error_code == SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + X86_TRAP_DB) {
> + vc_handle_trap_db(regs);
> + return;
> + }
> +
> instrumentation_begin();
Wait what?! That makes no sense what so ever.
2020 Jul 15
2
[PATCH v4 63/75] x86/sev-es: Handle #DB Events
...gt;
> lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
> +
> + /*
> + * #DB is special and needs to be handled outside of the intrumentation_begin()/end().
> + * Otherwise the #VC handler could be raised recursivly.
> + */
> + if (error_code == SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + X86_TRAP_DB) {
> + vc_handle_trap_db(regs);
> + return;
> + }
> +
> instrumentation_begin();
Wait what?! That makes no sense what so ever.
2020 Jul 14
0
[PATCH v4 63/75] x86/sev-es: Handle #DB Events
...--git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
index 8f275e5d1ce7..b0f08d9669f1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
@@ -928,6 +928,14 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_trap_ac(struct ghcb *ghcb,
return ES_EXCEPTION;
}
+static __always_inline void vc_handle_trap_db(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ if (user_mode(regs))
+ noist_exc_debug(regs);
+ else
+ exc_debug(regs);
+}
+
static enum es_result vc_handle_exitcode(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
struct ghcb *ghcb,
unsigned long exit_code)
@@ -1028,6 +1036,16 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_VC_SAFE_STACK(exc_vmm_communi...
2020 Aug 24
0
[PATCH v6 64/76] x86/sev-es: Handle #DB Events
...--git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
index ee0950f01590..e1f3ebbcc122 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
@@ -922,6 +922,14 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_trap_ac(struct ghcb *ghcb,
return ES_EXCEPTION;
}
+static __always_inline void vc_handle_trap_db(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ if (user_mode(regs))
+ noist_exc_debug(regs);
+ else
+ exc_debug(regs);
+}
+
static enum es_result vc_handle_exitcode(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
struct ghcb *ghcb,
unsigned long exit_code)
@@ -1033,6 +1041,15 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_VC_SAFE_STACK(exc_vmm_communi...
2020 Jul 15
0
[PATCH v4 63/75] x86/sev-es: Handle #DB Events
...sabled();
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * #DB is special and needs to be handled outside of the intrumentation_begin()/end().
> > + * Otherwise the #VC handler could be raised recursivly.
> > + */
> > + if (error_code == SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + X86_TRAP_DB) {
> > + vc_handle_trap_db(regs);
> > + return;
> > + }
> > +
> > instrumentation_begin();
>
> Wait what?! That makes no sense what so ever.
Then my understanding of intrumentation_begin/end() is wrong, I thought
that the kernel will forbid setting breakpoints before
instrumentation_begin()...
2020 Jul 15
2
[PATCH v4 63/75] x86/sev-es: Handle #DB Events
...; > + /*
> > > + * #DB is special and needs to be handled outside of the intrumentation_begin()/end().
> > > + * Otherwise the #VC handler could be raised recursivly.
> > > + */
> > > + if (error_code == SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + X86_TRAP_DB) {
> > > + vc_handle_trap_db(regs);
> > > + return;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > instrumentation_begin();
> >
> > Wait what?! That makes no sense what so ever.
>
> Then my understanding of intrumentation_begin/end() is wrong, I thought
> that the kernel will forbid setti...
2020 Jul 15
2
[PATCH v4 63/75] x86/sev-es: Handle #DB Events
...; > + /*
> > > + * #DB is special and needs to be handled outside of the intrumentation_begin()/end().
> > > + * Otherwise the #VC handler could be raised recursivly.
> > > + */
> > > + if (error_code == SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + X86_TRAP_DB) {
> > > + vc_handle_trap_db(regs);
> > > + return;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > instrumentation_begin();
> >
> > Wait what?! That makes no sense what so ever.
>
> Then my understanding of intrumentation_begin/end() is wrong, I thought
> that the kernel will forbid setti...
2020 Apr 28
0
[PATCH v3 64/75] x86/sev-es: Cache CPUID results for improved performance
...dx = ctxt->regs->dx;
+
+ /* Ignore insertion errors */
+ ret = xa_insert(&sev_es_cpuid_cache, cache_index,
+ cache_entry, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ }
+}
+
static enum es_result vc_handle_dr7_write(struct ghcb *ghcb,
struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
{
@@ -895,6 +994,24 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_trap_db(struct ghcb *ghcb,
return ES_EXCEPTION;
}
+static enum es_result vc_handle_cpuid_cached(struct ghcb *ghcb,
+ struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+ unsigned long cache_index;
+ enum es_result result;
+
+ cache_index = sev_es_get_cpuid_cache_index(ctxt);
+
+ if (sev_es_check_cpuid_cache(ctxt, c...
2020 Jul 14
92
[PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Hi,
here is the fourth version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches. I
addressed the review comments sent to me for the previous version and
rebased the code v5.8-rc5.
The biggest change in this version is the IST handling code for the
#VC handler. I adapted the entry code for the #VC handler to the big
pile of entry code changes merged into
2020 Jul 14
92
[PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Hi,
here is the fourth version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches. I
addressed the review comments sent to me for the previous version and
rebased the code v5.8-rc5.
The biggest change in this version is the IST handling code for the
#VC handler. I adapted the entry code for the #VC handler to the big
pile of entry code changes merged into
2020 Apr 28
116
[PATCH v3 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
Hi,
here is the next version of changes to enable Linux to run as an SEV-ES
guest. The code was rebased to v5.7-rc3 and got a fair number of changes
since the last version.
What is SEV-ES
==============
SEV-ES is an acronym for 'Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted
State' and means a hardware feature of AMD processors which hides the
register state of VCPUs to the hypervisor by
2020 Apr 28
116
[PATCH v3 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
Hi,
here is the next version of changes to enable Linux to run as an SEV-ES
guest. The code was rebased to v5.7-rc3 and got a fair number of changes
since the last version.
What is SEV-ES
==============
SEV-ES is an acronym for 'Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted
State' and means a hardware feature of AMD processors which hides the
register state of VCPUs to the hypervisor by
2020 Jul 24
86
[PATCH v5 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Hi,
here is a rebased version of the latest SEV-ES patches. They are now
based on latest tip/master instead of upstream Linux and include the
necessary changes.
Changes to v4 are in particular:
- Moved early IDT setup code to idt.c, because the idt_descr
and the idt_table are now static
- This required to make stack protector work early (or
2020 Aug 24
96
[PATCH v6 00/76] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Hi,
here is the new version of the SEV-ES client enabling patch-set. It is
based on the latest tip/master branch and contains the necessary
changes. In particular those ar:
- Enabling CR4.FSGSBASE early on supported processors so that
early #VC exceptions on APs can be handled.
- Add another patch (patch 1) to fix a KVM frame-size build
2020 Sep 07
84
[PATCH v7 00/72] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Hi,
here is a new version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches for x86. The
previous versions can be found as a linked list starting here:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200824085511.7553-1-joro at 8bytes.org/
I updated the patch-set based on ther review comments I got and the
discussions around it.
Another important change is that the early IDT
2020 Sep 07
84
[PATCH v7 00/72] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Hi,
here is a new version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches for x86. The
previous versions can be found as a linked list starting here:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200824085511.7553-1-joro at 8bytes.org/
I updated the patch-set based on ther review comments I got and the
discussions around it.
Another important change is that the early IDT