search for: vc_handle_trap_db

Displaying 16 results from an estimated 16 matches for "vc_handle_trap_db".

Did you mean: vc_handle_trap_ac
2020 Jul 15
2
[PATCH v4 63/75] x86/sev-es: Handle #DB Events
...gt; > lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled(); > + > + /* > + * #DB is special and needs to be handled outside of the intrumentation_begin()/end(). > + * Otherwise the #VC handler could be raised recursivly. > + */ > + if (error_code == SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + X86_TRAP_DB) { > + vc_handle_trap_db(regs); > + return; > + } > + > instrumentation_begin(); Wait what?! That makes no sense what so ever.
2020 Jul 15
2
[PATCH v4 63/75] x86/sev-es: Handle #DB Events
...gt; > lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled(); > + > + /* > + * #DB is special and needs to be handled outside of the intrumentation_begin()/end(). > + * Otherwise the #VC handler could be raised recursivly. > + */ > + if (error_code == SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + X86_TRAP_DB) { > + vc_handle_trap_db(regs); > + return; > + } > + > instrumentation_begin(); Wait what?! That makes no sense what so ever.
2020 Jul 14
0
[PATCH v4 63/75] x86/sev-es: Handle #DB Events
...--git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c index 8f275e5d1ce7..b0f08d9669f1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c @@ -928,6 +928,14 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_trap_ac(struct ghcb *ghcb, return ES_EXCEPTION; } +static __always_inline void vc_handle_trap_db(struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + if (user_mode(regs)) + noist_exc_debug(regs); + else + exc_debug(regs); +} + static enum es_result vc_handle_exitcode(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt, struct ghcb *ghcb, unsigned long exit_code) @@ -1028,6 +1036,16 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_VC_SAFE_STACK(exc_vmm_communi...
2020 Aug 24
0
[PATCH v6 64/76] x86/sev-es: Handle #DB Events
...--git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c index ee0950f01590..e1f3ebbcc122 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c @@ -922,6 +922,14 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_trap_ac(struct ghcb *ghcb, return ES_EXCEPTION; } +static __always_inline void vc_handle_trap_db(struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + if (user_mode(regs)) + noist_exc_debug(regs); + else + exc_debug(regs); +} + static enum es_result vc_handle_exitcode(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt, struct ghcb *ghcb, unsigned long exit_code) @@ -1033,6 +1041,15 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_VC_SAFE_STACK(exc_vmm_communi...
2020 Jul 15
0
[PATCH v4 63/75] x86/sev-es: Handle #DB Events
...sabled(); > > + > > + /* > > + * #DB is special and needs to be handled outside of the intrumentation_begin()/end(). > > + * Otherwise the #VC handler could be raised recursivly. > > + */ > > + if (error_code == SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + X86_TRAP_DB) { > > + vc_handle_trap_db(regs); > > + return; > > + } > > + > > instrumentation_begin(); > > Wait what?! That makes no sense what so ever. Then my understanding of intrumentation_begin/end() is wrong, I thought that the kernel will forbid setting breakpoints before instrumentation_begin()...
2020 Jul 15
2
[PATCH v4 63/75] x86/sev-es: Handle #DB Events
...; > + /* > > > + * #DB is special and needs to be handled outside of the intrumentation_begin()/end(). > > > + * Otherwise the #VC handler could be raised recursivly. > > > + */ > > > + if (error_code == SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + X86_TRAP_DB) { > > > + vc_handle_trap_db(regs); > > > + return; > > > + } > > > + > > > instrumentation_begin(); > > > > Wait what?! That makes no sense what so ever. > > Then my understanding of intrumentation_begin/end() is wrong, I thought > that the kernel will forbid setti...
2020 Jul 15
2
[PATCH v4 63/75] x86/sev-es: Handle #DB Events
...; > + /* > > > + * #DB is special and needs to be handled outside of the intrumentation_begin()/end(). > > > + * Otherwise the #VC handler could be raised recursivly. > > > + */ > > > + if (error_code == SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + X86_TRAP_DB) { > > > + vc_handle_trap_db(regs); > > > + return; > > > + } > > > + > > > instrumentation_begin(); > > > > Wait what?! That makes no sense what so ever. > > Then my understanding of intrumentation_begin/end() is wrong, I thought > that the kernel will forbid setti...
2020 Apr 28
0
[PATCH v3 64/75] x86/sev-es: Cache CPUID results for improved performance
...dx = ctxt->regs->dx; + + /* Ignore insertion errors */ + ret = xa_insert(&sev_es_cpuid_cache, cache_index, + cache_entry, GFP_ATOMIC); + } +} + static enum es_result vc_handle_dr7_write(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt) { @@ -895,6 +994,24 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_trap_db(struct ghcb *ghcb, return ES_EXCEPTION; } +static enum es_result vc_handle_cpuid_cached(struct ghcb *ghcb, + struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt) +{ + unsigned long cache_index; + enum es_result result; + + cache_index = sev_es_get_cpuid_cache_index(ctxt); + + if (sev_es_check_cpuid_cache(ctxt, c...
2020 Jul 14
92
[PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Hi, here is the fourth version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches. I addressed the review comments sent to me for the previous version and rebased the code v5.8-rc5. The biggest change in this version is the IST handling code for the #VC handler. I adapted the entry code for the #VC handler to the big pile of entry code changes merged into
2020 Jul 14
92
[PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Hi, here is the fourth version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches. I addressed the review comments sent to me for the previous version and rebased the code v5.8-rc5. The biggest change in this version is the IST handling code for the #VC handler. I adapted the entry code for the #VC handler to the big pile of entry code changes merged into
2020 Apr 28
116
[PATCH v3 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
Hi, here is the next version of changes to enable Linux to run as an SEV-ES guest. The code was rebased to v5.7-rc3 and got a fair number of changes since the last version. What is SEV-ES ============== SEV-ES is an acronym for 'Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State' and means a hardware feature of AMD processors which hides the register state of VCPUs to the hypervisor by
2020 Apr 28
116
[PATCH v3 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
Hi, here is the next version of changes to enable Linux to run as an SEV-ES guest. The code was rebased to v5.7-rc3 and got a fair number of changes since the last version. What is SEV-ES ============== SEV-ES is an acronym for 'Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State' and means a hardware feature of AMD processors which hides the register state of VCPUs to the hypervisor by
2020 Jul 24
86
[PATCH v5 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Hi, here is a rebased version of the latest SEV-ES patches. They are now based on latest tip/master instead of upstream Linux and include the necessary changes. Changes to v4 are in particular: - Moved early IDT setup code to idt.c, because the idt_descr and the idt_table are now static - This required to make stack protector work early (or
2020 Aug 24
96
[PATCH v6 00/76] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Hi, here is the new version of the SEV-ES client enabling patch-set. It is based on the latest tip/master branch and contains the necessary changes. In particular those ar: - Enabling CR4.FSGSBASE early on supported processors so that early #VC exceptions on APs can be handled. - Add another patch (patch 1) to fix a KVM frame-size build
2020 Sep 07
84
[PATCH v7 00/72] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Hi, here is a new version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches for x86. The previous versions can be found as a linked list starting here: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200824085511.7553-1-joro at 8bytes.org/ I updated the patch-set based on ther review comments I got and the discussions around it. Another important change is that the early IDT
2020 Sep 07
84
[PATCH v7 00/72] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Hi, here is a new version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches for x86. The previous versions can be found as a linked list starting here: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200824085511.7553-1-joro at 8bytes.org/ I updated the patch-set based on ther review comments I got and the discussions around it. Another important change is that the early IDT