search for: v6l

...Type::ARMSubArch_v7m || triple.getSubArch() == llvm::Triple::SubArchType::ARMSubArch_v7s || triple.getSubArch() == llvm::Triple::SubArchType::ARMSubArch_v7k) { triple.setArchName("armv7"); } } return triple; } However, because the DefaultTargetTriple is armv6l-unknown-linux-gnueabihf, and llvm didn’t know about v6l, it would fail to match and canonicalize to armv6. I added the notion of v6l to llvm to address this. Thoughts/comments? - Will -------------- next part -------------- An embedded and charset-unspecified text was scrubbed... Name: llvm-diff...

Thanks for the clarifications, Bob! I’ve spent some time with the head of the llvm.org repo, and I now understand a lot better what Renato and Tim were talking about re. the architecture aliases. The patch to add v6l, therefore, seems simple enough. I haven’t been able to test it in my usual flow, because that involves the whole swift stack. I’m considering creating a program that links to llvm to test the behavior. Index: lib/Support/TargetParser.cpp =======================================================...

>> However, because the DefaultTargetTriple is armv6l-unknown-linux-gnueabihf, >> and llvm didn’t know about v6l, it would fail to match and canonicalize to armv6. >> I added the notion of v6l to llvm to address this. > > ARMv6l was definitely there once. I'm not sure what happened. > > I'm copying the ARM folks that d...

...wift-llvm/blob/stable/include/llvm/Support/ARMTargetParser.def#L106 <https://github.com/apple/swift-llvm/blob/stable/include/llvm/Support/ARMTargetParser.def#L106> Should I get the head of the non-swift repository and generate a new diff? Also, I suspect that it’s not a good idea to have armv6l map to armv6k, because that seems like quite an assumption to make. Clearly, armv6 sub architectures that aren’t v6k will still be v6l in linux. (provided they’re little-endian). I’ve already made that change, and it would be included in any revised diff that I send out. Thanks, - Will > On J...

...lel reports 2 rather than 1 on Raspberry Pi B+ running Raspbian. (This report is just 'for the record'. The model is superseded and I think no longer produced.) The problem seems to be caused by grep processor /proc/cpuinfo processor : 0 model name : ARMv6-compatible processor rev 7 (v6l) (On Raspberry Pi 2 and 3 there is no error because the model name lines are model name : ARMv7 Processor rev 5 (v7l) model name : ARMv7 Processor rev 4 (v7l) )

> You assume triples make sense. That's the first mistake everyone does > when thinking about triples. :) I know they don't make sense in many corner cases, but I think discarding logic where it *does* exist is a mistake. > AFAIK, "ARMv7B" is only used by HighBank, which is no more. But that, > too, was "ARMv7A big endian". I believe it's what any

Hi, IMO we should support this, even though if given the option I'd have asked the linux guys not to invent a new triple. It's in linux now, and `uname -a` is a very standard way of obtaining the host's triple. James On Tue, 5 Jan 2016 at 08:34 Tim Northover via llvm-dev < llvm-dev at lists.llvm.org> wrote: > On 4 January 2016 at 14:42, Artyom Skrobov via llvm-dev >

Taking the suggestions of the group under consideration, I’ve generated a new diff. The thing to note is that armv6l is now treated identically to armv6hl. I’ve also added a unit test. This seems to me to be the least invasive method, and holds to existing conventions as closely as possible. Thoughts? -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: llvm-armv6l.diff Type: app...

In the past 24 hours multiple persons have contacted me regarding the use of elliptic curve cryptography in tinc 1.1 in light of the suspicion that the NSA might have weakened algorithms and/or elliptic curves published by NIST. The new protocol in tinc 1.1 (SPTPS) uses ECDH and ECDSA to do session key exchange and authentication, in such a way that it has the perfect forward secrecy (PFS)

In the past 24 hours multiple persons have contacted me regarding the use of elliptic curve cryptography in tinc 1.1 in light of the suspicion that the NSA might have weakened algorithms and/or elliptic curves published by NIST. The new protocol in tinc 1.1 (SPTPS) uses ECDH and ECDSA to do session key exchange and authentication, in such a way that it has the perfect forward secrecy (PFS)