search for: user_mask

Hi all, It seems that setting userMask in the doveadm http api's "user" command to anything involving wildcards ?s or *s causes the API to fail. When using the API with a userMask set to the fully qualified email address, I get the expected fields back. From a python shell, with an asterisk causes the following behaviour (note that doveadm is a python module that wrappers the

...-) diff --git a/src/doveadm/doveadm-auth-server.c b/src/doveadm/doveadm-auth-server.c index 44278e467e..d9e4e01c74 100644 --- a/src/doveadm/doveadm-auth-server.c +++ b/src/doveadm/doveadm-auth-server.c @@ -170,6 +170,10 @@ cmd_user_list(struct auth_master_connection *conn, const char *username, *user_mask = "*"; unsigned int i; + doveadm_print_init(DOVEADM_PRINT_TYPE_FORMATTED); + doveadm_print_formatted_set_format("%{username}\n"); + doveadm_print_header_simple("username"); + if (users[0] != NULL && users[1] == NULL) user_mask = users[0]; @@ -180,7 +...

...hadow PTE walk + */ +struct kvm_write_access_data { + int i; + struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot; +}; + /* * the pages used as guest page table on soft mmu are tracked by * kvm_memory_slot.arch.gfn_track which is 16 bits, so the role bits used @@ -1130,7 +1139,7 @@ void kvm_mmu_set_mask_ptes(u64 user_mask, u64 accessed_mask, u64 acc_track_mask, u64 me_mask); void kvm_mmu_reset_context(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); -void kvm_mmu_slot_remove_write_access(struct kvm *kvm, +void kvm_mmu_slot_apply_write_access(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot); void kvm_mmu_zap_collapsible_sp...

...hadow PTE walk + */ +struct kvm_write_access_data { + int i; + struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot; +}; + /* * the pages used as guest page table on soft mmu are tracked by * kvm_memory_slot.arch.gfn_track which is 16 bits, so the role bits used @@ -1130,7 +1139,7 @@ void kvm_mmu_set_mask_ptes(u64 user_mask, u64 accessed_mask, u64 acc_track_mask, u64 me_mask); void kvm_mmu_reset_context(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); -void kvm_mmu_slot_remove_write_access(struct kvm *kvm, +void kvm_mmu_slot_apply_write_access(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot); void kvm_mmu_zap_collapsible_sp...

Here is change log from V3 To V4: - Fixing spelling/grammar mistakes suggested by Randy Dunlap - Changing the hypercall interface to be able to process multiple pages per one hypercall also suggested by Randy Dunlap. It turns out that this will save lots of vmexist/memory slot flushes when protecting many pages. [PATCH RFC V4 1/3] KVM: X86: Memory ROE documentation [PATCH RFC V4 2/3] KVM:

Hi, This is my first set of patches that works as I would expect, and the third revision I sent to mailing lists. Following up with my previous discussions about kernel rootkit mitigation via placing R/O protection on critical data structure, static data, privileged registers with static content. These patches present the first part where it is only possible to place these protections on memory

Hi, This is my first set of patches that works as I would expect, and the third revision I sent to mailing lists. Following up with my previous discussions about kernel rootkit mitigation via placing R/O protection on critical data structure, static data, privileged registers with static content. These patches present the first part where it is only possible to place these protections on memory

This patch series is based on the VM introspection patches (https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20200721210922.7646-1-alazar at bitdefender.com/), extending the introspection API with EPT Views and Virtualization Exceptions (#VE) support. The purpose of this series is to get an initial feedback and to see if we are on the right track, especially because the changes made to add the EPT views are not small