search for: trampoline_start

...; + u16 __iomem *jump_table; + + jump_table_addr = sev_es_get_jump_table_addr(); + + /* Check if AP Jump Table is non-zero and page-aligned */ + if (!jump_table_addr || jump_table_addr & ~PAGE_MASK) + return 0; + + jump_table_pa = jump_table_addr & PAGE_MASK; + + startup_cs = (u16)(rmh->trampoline_start >> 4); + startup_ip = (u16)(rmh->sev_es_trampoline_start - + rmh->trampoline_start); + + jump_table = ioremap_encrypted(jump_table_pa, PAGE_SIZE); + if (!jump_table) + return -EIO; + + writew(startup_ip, &jump_table[0]); + writew(startup_cs, &jump_table[1]); + + iounmap(ju...

...; + u16 __iomem *jump_table; + + jump_table_addr = sev_es_get_jump_table_addr(); + + /* Check if AP Jump Table is non-zero and page-aligned */ + if (!jump_table_addr || jump_table_addr & ~PAGE_MASK) + return 0; + + jump_table_pa = jump_table_addr & PAGE_MASK; + + startup_cs = (u16)(rmh->trampoline_start >> 4); + startup_ip = (u16)(rmh->sev_es_trampoline_start - + rmh->trampoline_start); + + jump_table = ioremap_encrypted(jump_table_pa, PAGE_SIZE); + if (!jump_table) + return -EIO; + + writew(startup_ip, &jump_table[0]); + writew(startup_cs, &jump_table[1]); + + iounmap(ju...

Hello, This series has been split into two patches, one for arm and one for x86. I figured that this was easier than doing it as a single combined patch, especially as the changes are functionally independent. x86 has been boot tested, but arm has not even been compile tested as I lack a suitable cross compiler. However, the changes are just text replacement, so I dont expect any issues. The

...9261686d840c xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S --- a/xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S Tue Jun 26 12:40:37 2007 +0100 +++ b/xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S Tue Jun 26 20:28:13 2007 -0400 @@ -175,9 +175,11 @@ 1: stosl /* low mappings cover up #include "cmdline.S" + .align 16,0x90 .globl trampoline_start, trampoline_end trampoline_start: #include "trampoline.S" +#include "wakeup.S" trampoline_end: .text diff -r 9261686d840c xen/arch/x86/boot/wakeup.S --- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/xen/arch/x86/boot/wakeup.S Tue Jun 26 21:40:42 2007 -0400 @@ -0,0...

Hi, here is the first public post of the patch-set to enable Linux to run under SEV-ES enabled hypervisors. The code is mostly feature-complete, but there are still a couple of bugs to fix. Nevertheless, given the size of the patch-set, I think it is about time to ask for initial feedback of the changes that come with it. To better understand the code here is a quick explanation of SEV-ES first.

Hi, here is the first public post of the patch-set to enable Linux to run under SEV-ES enabled hypervisors. The code is mostly feature-complete, but there are still a couple of bugs to fix. Nevertheless, given the size of the patch-set, I think it is about time to ask for initial feedback of the changes that come with it. To better understand the code here is a quick explanation of SEV-ES first.

All, We met several system failures on different hardware platforms, which are all caused by VT-d fault. err 1: disk is corrupted by VT-d fault on SATA. err 2: Dom0 kernel panics at booting, which is caused VT-d fault on UHCI. err 3, Dom0 complains disk errors while creating HVM guests. The culprit would be changeset 19054 "x86_64: Remove statically-partitioned Xen heap.". Detailed

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Hi, here is a rebased version of the latest SEV-ES patches. They are now based on latest tip/master instead of upstream Linux and include the necessary changes. Changes to v4 are in particular: - Moved early IDT setup code to idt.c, because the idt_descr and the idt_table are now static - This required to make stack protector work early (or

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Hi, here is the fourth version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches. I addressed the review comments sent to me for the previous version and rebased the code v5.8-rc5. The biggest change in this version is the IST handling code for the #VC handler. I adapted the entry code for the #VC handler to the big pile of entry code changes merged into

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Hi, here is the fourth version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches. I addressed the review comments sent to me for the previous version and rebased the code v5.8-rc5. The biggest change in this version is the IST handling code for the #VC handler. I adapted the entry code for the #VC handler to the big pile of entry code changes merged into

A character device for accessing (in user-space) pages that have been granted by other domains. Signed-off-by: Derek Murray <Derek.Murray@cl.cam.ac.uk> _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Hi, here is the new version of the SEV-ES client enabling patch-set. It is based on the latest tip/master branch and contains the necessary changes. In particular those ar: - Enabling CR4.FSGSBASE early on supported processors so that early #VC exceptions on APs can be handled. - Add another patch (patch 1) to fix a KVM frame-size build

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Hi, here is a new version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches for x86. The previous versions can be found as a linked list starting here: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200824085511.7553-1-joro at 8bytes.org/ I updated the patch-set based on ther review comments I got and the discussions around it. Another important change is that the early IDT

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Hi, here is a new version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches for x86. The previous versions can be found as a linked list starting here: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200824085511.7553-1-joro at 8bytes.org/ I updated the patch-set based on ther review comments I got and the discussions around it. Another important change is that the early IDT

Hi, here is the next version of changes to enable Linux to run as an SEV-ES guest. The code was rebased to v5.7-rc3 and got a fair number of changes since the last version. What is SEV-ES ============== SEV-ES is an acronym for 'Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State' and means a hardware feature of AMD processors which hides the register state of VCPUs to the hypervisor by

Hi, here is the next version of changes to enable Linux to run as an SEV-ES guest. The code was rebased to v5.7-rc3 and got a fair number of changes since the last version. What is SEV-ES ============== SEV-ES is an acronym for 'Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State' and means a hardware feature of AMD processors which hides the register state of VCPUs to the hypervisor by