Displaying 4 results from an estimated 4 matches for "sys_chmod".
2006 Mar 21
2
[PATCH] initramfs: CPIO unpacking fix
...amfs.c
@@ -249,6 +249,7 @@ static int __init do_name(void)
if (dry_run)
return 0;
if (S_ISREG(mode)) {
+ sys_unlink(collected);
if (maybe_link() >= 0) {
wfd = sys_open(collected, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode);
if (wfd >= 0) {
@@ -263,6 +264,7 @@ static int __init do_name(void)
sys_chmod(collected, mode);
} else if (S_ISBLK(mode) || S_ISCHR(mode) ||
S_ISFIFO(mode) || S_ISSOCK(mode)) {
+ sys_unlink(collected);
if (maybe_link() == 0) {
sys_mknod(collected, mode, rdev);
sys_chown(collected, uid, gid);
@@ -291,6 +293,7 @@ static int __init do_copy(void)
static int...
1998 Apr 13
4
New hack against BSD, Linux is _mostly_ safe from it.
...es an existing BSD kernel so that suser() always
returns 0 (which indicates "Yes, he''s a superuser" in the BSD kernel).
Linux isn''t susceptible to this specific attack because our suser()
function is inlined. Nevertheless, the attack could be modified so
that it changes sys_chmod() to allow anyone to set the setuid flag.
But luckily we''re saved by our bootloaders.
I am not subscribed to linux-security (someone keeps unsubscribing
me), so I have CC-ed myself on this message. If a discussion develops,
please leave me on the CC line so that I can listen in.
Thanks....
2006 Feb 21
1
[PATCH] initramfs: multiple CPIO unpacking fix
...amfs.c
@@ -249,6 +249,7 @@ static int __init do_name(void)
if (dry_run)
return 0;
if (S_ISREG(mode)) {
+ sys_unlink(collected);
if (maybe_link() >= 0) {
wfd = sys_open(collected, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode);
if (wfd >= 0) {
@@ -263,6 +264,7 @@ static int __init do_name(void)
sys_chmod(collected, mode);
} else if (S_ISBLK(mode) || S_ISCHR(mode) ||
S_ISFIFO(mode) || S_ISSOCK(mode)) {
+ sys_unlink(collected);
if (maybe_link() == 0) {
sys_mknod(collected, mode, rdev);
sys_chown(collected, uid, gid);
@@ -291,6 +293,7 @@ static int __init do_copy(void)
static int...
1998 Apr 11
0
Linux libc5.4.33 dumbness w/ mk[s]temp()
...es an existing BSD kernel so that suser() always
returns 0 (which indicates "Yes, he''s a superuser" in the BSD kernel).
Linux isn''t susceptible to this specific attack because our suser()
function is inlined. Nevertheless, the attack could be modified so
that it changes sys_chmod() to allow anyone to set the setuid flag.
But luckily we''re saved by our bootloaders.
I am not subscribed to linux-security (someone keeps unsubscribing
me), so I have CC-ed myself on this message. If a discussion develops,
please leave me on the CC line so that I can listen in.
Thanks....